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Abstract  
 
The objective of this report is provide a survey on the techniques (i.e., technologies and 
procedures) that can be used in the fight against the distribution of counterfeit goods in 
various domains. Different techniques can be used to identify and control the distribution 
of counterfeit goods at different levels. The list of surveyed techniques and approaches 
in this report includes: a) technologies for goods authentication, which can be used to 
distinguish between genuine and counterfeit goods, b) track and trace technologies, 
which can be used to control the supply and distribution chains to make it easier to 
detect counterfeit goods in the supply chain entering through a legitimate distribution 
channel, c) technologies and procedures for container tracking and sealing c) 
technologies for the analysis of ecommerce web sites, which can be used to identify 
sellers of counterfeit products and d) set-up of organizational structures and processes. 
Each technique may not be the only valid solution for the problem of production and 
distribution of counterfeit products. The problem of counterfeiting is related to many 
different domains and goods (e.g., agricultural products, electronic circuits, medicines) 
and each technique can be applied with different degrees of success to different 
domains. In addition, each technique has a different level of market maturity: some 
techniques are still in the research stages while others have been already deployed in 
the market for years.  The survey evaluates and compares the techniques against the 
different domains using different metrics, which include the design and deployment 
costs, the complexity of the technology, the usability and so on. The comparison of the 
techniques is based on collected evidence both from literature and from direct feedback 
from law enforcers and stakeholders. 
The report also links the design and deployment of the identified techniques with 
organization and processes aspects. The feasibility and operational success of some 
techniques is only possible if an organization framework (e.g., supply chain 
management) is in place. On the other side, specific technologies (e.g., authentication 
technologies) can greatly improve organizational-based approach to limit the risk of 
distribution of counterfeit products. 
The report does also present the concept of “empowerment of the consumer” where 
technologies for fight against counterfeiting can also be used in the field by the 
consumer. Here the term consumer can include citizens, law enforcers or even small 
companies with different capabilities and goals. The concept of “empowerment of the 
consumer” is based on the increasing capabilities of mobile devices and systems in term 
of processing power, wireless connectivity and sensor accuracy, which allows the 
implementation of technologies, which were confined to forensics laboratories until 
recently. The overview of the techniques for empowering the consumer will be the main 
focus of a subsequent report.  
Privacy aspects are also taken in consideration. Because many techniques are based on 
the authentication and tracing of the “good”, this information could also be used to track 
the individual and impact his/her privacy. The report provides some insights on the 
approaches, which could be used to mitigate these risks. 
Finally, the report recommends actions and suggests areas where policies and practices  
to  combat  counterfeiting  could be strengthened.  
The following recommendations are suggested: 
1. The application of Due Diligence and Responsible Supply Chain Management to e-
commerce distribution should be further analysed and the definition of a suitable 
regulatory framework should be supported. 
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2. The application of techniques for forensic analysis to empower law enforcers or 
even the generic citizen in the field in the fight against counterfeiting should be 
supported in collaboration with industry and standardization bodies. 
3. Standardization activities for the usage of consumer equipment like 
smartphones for fight against counterfeiting (including awareness) should be 
supported. 
4. A knowledge management database should be put in place at European level. 
The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) and Observatory 
could be quite suitable to this goal. 
5. Regulatory frameworks or guidelines should be put in place to support brand 
owners in their choice of selecting the best techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting. 
6. A cost/benefit analysis should be implemented for the deployment of 
authentication technology in the product design, manufacturing and distribution 
processes in different market sectors. 
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1. Introduction  
The scope of this technical report is to provide an overview of the possible techniques to 
fight against counterfeiting. With the term “technique”, we intend a technology and/or a 
process or both, which can be used in the fight against the production and distribution of 
counterfeit products. 
Note that in this report, we will use the term counterfeit to include the infringing of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). 
Counterfeiting is a very wide phenomenon, which is increasing in scope and magnitude 
and which affects many different market sectors.  Many different types of goods are 
impacted by the counterfeiting problem and one specific technique may not be 
appropriate to all the different types of goods. Each technique has also different degree 
of maturity. Some techniques are still very much in the research phase and used only in 
forensic labs while other techniques have been used for thousands of years but they are 
still applied with increased level of sophistication.  
Note that the report only focuses on physical goods and not digital goods. In other 
words, piracy of digital media is not addressed in this report. 
The objective of this report is to provide a comprehensive but not necessarily detailed 
survey of all the different techniques, which can be applied at different levels of the fight 
against counterfeiting: from awareness and detection by consumers, identification by 
law enforcers, analysis in forensic labs or organization processes and best practices.  
The reason why this technical report is not focused on a specific area or phase in the 
overall anti-counterfeiting process is because the technological evolution has allowed the 
adoption of techniques previously confined to forensic labs to phases, which are nearer 
to the consumers. In a similar way, techniques previously used only by manufacturers 
and distributors are available to a larger variety of stakeholders from consumers to law 
enforcers. 
The reason why the report may not provide a very detailed view of the specific 
techniques is because there is already an extensive literature for each specific technique. 
This report itself has been drafted on the basis on a very long list of references from 
public, private, research and media sources, which the reader can use to investigate 
more in detail a specific technique. 
One important goal of this report is to provide a qualitative analysis to evaluate the 
different techniques regarding various metrics and different domains. This is presented 
in an Excel matrix in section 10. 
The importance of consumer technology like a smartphone or other portable equipment 
to fight against counterfeiting in the field is another element of this report, which is 
briefly address in a section focused on the concept of “Empowering the consumer”. This 
topic will be the main objective of a subsequent report. 
There is no specific target audience of this report. The report aims to help the reader on 
the potential techniques, which can be used against counterfeiting at the time of writing 
(October 2015). 
 
The structure of this report is following: 
• Section 2 describes the main classifications of anti-counterfeiting techniques. 
• Section 3 describes the main domains (market sectors) addressed in this report. 
• Section 4 provides a description of the main authentication technologies, where a 
taxonomy has been created on the physical features of the good. 
• Section 5 describes the techniques based on the concept of “track and trace” 
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• Section 6 describes the techniques based on container, packaging and sealing. 
• Section 7 describes new trends in the counterfeiting phenomena and the related 
techniques to address them. 
• Section 8 describes techniques based on the definition of organizational processes 
and structures. 
• Section 9 briefly describes the main government and private initiatives for fight 
against counterfeiting. 
• Section 10 provides the comparison matrix where all the techniques described 
before are qualitatively evaluated against a list of described metrics. 
• Section 11 briefly describes future emergency threats in the counterfeiting 
context. 
• Section 12  describes the concept of “empowering the consumer”. 
• Section 13 provides a list of recommendations and areas where actions should be 
taken. 
• Finally section 14 provides the conclusions to the report. 
Annex A.1 provides the evaluation tables of the techniques presented in this report. 
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2. Classification of techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting and IPR infringement 
 
Counterfeiting is a longstanding problem which is growing in scope and  magnitude.  As 
described in (OECD 2008), counterfeiting is of  concern  to  governments  because  of (i) 
the  negative impact  that  they  can  have  on  innovation,  (ii) the  threat  they  pose  
to  the  welfare  and health of the consumers and (iii) the substantial resources that they 
channel to criminal networks,  organised  crime  and  other  groups  that  disrupt  and  
corrupt  society.  They  are  of concern  to  business  because  of  the  impact  that  they  
have  on (i)sales  and  licensing, (ii)brand  value  and  firm reputation,  and (iii)the  
ability  of  firms  to  benefit  from  the breakthroughs  they  make  in  developing  new  
products.  They  are  of  concern  to consumers   because   of   the   significant   health   
and   safety   risks   that   substandard counterfeit and pirated products could pose to 
those who consume the items. 
The term “counterfeit” has been associated to different categories of goods, which has 
been copies, modified or re-branded in different ways. There are various categories of 
counterfeit goods in different domains and a precise taxonomy for each domain is out of 
the scope of this report, but we will provide two examples from two market sectors, 
which are heavily impacted by the counterfeit problem. 
Electronic products 
A potential taxonomy of the different counterfeit electronic circuit products has been 
presented in (Guin (2013)) and it reused here.  
 
 
Figure 1 Taxonomy of counterfeit electronic products 
Where (from (Guin (2013))), the different categories are described below: 
1. Cloned. Cloning can be done by a) reverse engineering, and, b) by obtaining 
intellectual property (IP) illegally (also called IP theft). 
2. Overproduced: Due to globalization, design houses outsource their designs for 
fabrication and packaging to companies all around the world, mainly to reduce 
the manufacturing cost. Overproduction occurs when foundries and packaging 
companies sell components outside of contract with the design house 
(component’s intellectual property (IP) owner).  
Note that this category does not include overproduced goods, which have 
identical components and design of the valid goods. In this case, this is 
considered a contract policing issue. This category is related to overproduced 
goods, which have different components or materials (often of lower quality). 
3. Out-of-Spec/Defective: A part is considered defective if it produces an 
incorrect response to post-manufacturing tests. These parts should be destroyed, 
downgraded, or otherwise properly disposed of. However, if they instead are sold 
on the open markets, either knowingly by an untrusted entity or by a third party 
who has stolen them, there will be an unknown increase in risk of failure. 
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4. Recycled. It refers to an electronic component that is reclaimed/recovered from 
a system and then modified to be misrepresented as a new component of the 
proper manufacturer.  Recycled components can be declared counterfeit if they 
are not declared as such and they are instead sold as genuine/new components. 
5. Remarked: Most legitimate components contain markings on their packages that 
indicate manufacturer, trademark, part number, grade, lot code, etc. If a 
company is remarked to indicate another model or category, it can be considered 
counterfeit. 
6. Tampered. Tampered: Components that are tampered can have dangerous 
consequences for the systems that incorporate them for security and safety. In 
this case, a good can be considered counterfeit when it has been tampered to 
replace internal components. 
 
Medicines 
In the medicine sector, (Davison 2011) has provide the following categories of 
counterfeit products: 
1. Counterfeit Product in Counterfeit Packaging, where both the packaging and 
its contents are entirely false and designed to deceive. 
2. Re-packaging of genuine product in Counterfeit Packaging, where authentic 
medicines taken illegally (e.g., theft) can be re-distributed in a new and 
counterfeit package. 
3. Re-using genuine packaging with counterfeit ingredients, where discarded 
valid packages are re-used to store counterfeit medicines or ingredients. 
4. Re-labeling of expired or withdrawn stock, where old stock (even expired) is 
re-sold as new. 
5. Re-labeling of low-dose products to indicate more expensive doses, where 
the medicine or the package are not counterfeit (but maybe modified or 
tampered) but the dosage is changed. 
6. Usage of substitute materials where one or more ingredients of the medicine 
is substituted with another ingredient. 
 
Various techniques have been developed to mitigate the risk of the products and 
distribution of counterfeit items in the categories shown above. The identification and 
description of the various techniques is provided in the rest of the report, but we can 
identify a number of properties which are desirable for the techniques: 
1. They should be easy to apply. This means that the complexity of the deployment 
of the anti-counterfeit solutions should be minimal, in particular to the production 
of the packaging line. 
2. They should difficult to imitate. This means that the anti-counterfeit information 
(e.g., identity or features of the good) should be resistant against replication and 
cloning.  
3. The costs of implementation and deployment of the anti-counterfeit solution 
should be feasible in relation to the specific domain/market. The cost can be 
different among the various domains. For example, high value goods in the retail 
or electronics sector may justify anti-counterfeit solutions which include 
expensive validation or tracking equipment.  
4. They should easily support the identification of the counterfeit good from the 
valid good. Note that the identification of a counterfeit good can be implemented 
by visual detection of an un-trained examiner (e.g., a generic citizen), a trained 
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examiner (e.g., a law enforcer) or a forensic laboratory. More details on the 
different phases and categories of examiners and how they can be linked are 
provided in another section of this report. 
5. They should be accurate in the identification of the counterfeit good. 
6. They should compliant with existing international (open) standards that enable 
interoperability of the technology for all participants in the supply chain as well as 
the products’ end users (i.e. consumers, law enforcement agencies, experts). 
7. Evidence from such technologies should be permissible in a court of law.  
In line with internal market rules fostering competition and innovation, legislation should 
allow trademark owners (and more generally, supply chain economic operators) to select 
the most appropriate anti-illicit trade technologies.  
More desirable features of anti-counterfeit techniques can be identified. In fact, the 
features identified above and other features are used in section 10. Comparison Matrix 
to evaluate the various anti-counterfeiting techniques presented in this report. 
There are many different classifications schemes for anti-counterfeiting techniques.  
One potential classification scheme/taxonomy is: 
1. Anti-counterfeiting based on an electronic device added to object, which must be 
protected against counterfeiting. For example: RFID tag. This electronic device 
can be used to track and trace the object. 
2. Anti-counterfeiting based on the intrinsic features of the object. For example: 
texture or color. This can be used to authenticate the object. 
3. An additional physical element (distinct from 1), which can enhance the 
uniqueness of the object. For example: a label. This can be used to authenticate 
the object. 
4. A modification which changes in a special way the intrinsic features of the object. 
For example a special ink or substance, which cannot be separated from the 
object.  
5. Techniques, which are focused on the distribution channels (e.g., e-commerce) or 
to the correlation of data from difference elements/sources to identify anomalies 
in the workflow. 
 
In this report, we will structure the survey of anti-counterfeit techniques in: a) 
authentication technique, b) track and trace techniques and c) other techniques 
including organizational approaches. Each category includes sub-categories, which will 
be described in detail. 
As described in the rest of the report, a single technology may not be enough to address 
the problem of counterfeit products and it is possible that the combinations of different 
techniques must be used. In addition, we should consider that technologies on their own 
may not be able to solve the problem of counterfeiting products (Wilcok 2014). 
Technologies should be used in the framework of established organizations and 
processes within the companies and among all the stakeholders (both public and private) 
in a domain. 
The drafting of this report is based on existing references and documents, which includes 
scientific papers, news report, official reports from public and private organizations and 
standards.  
In particular, this report has adopted in most cases the concepts and definitions from 
standard  ISO 12931:2012, Performance criteria for authentication solutions used to 
combat counterfeiting of material goods. 
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Note: In this report, the term counterfeit includes infringing of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR). 
Disclaimer: In this report, case studies and anti-counterfeit products are mentioned to 
show the maturity of specific anti-counterfeiting technologies. It is not the intention of 
this report to endorse these anti-counterfeit products or the company producing them.  
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3. Domains 
 
Any product can become the target for counterfeiters, particularly products or brands 
which are in a market leading (or second or third) position in a given country. However, 
to facilitate this report we here present a section which has the objective to identify the 
main domains where the technologies described in the other sections can be applied. 
3.1. Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) 
Fast-moving consumer goods or consumer packaged goods are products that are sold 
quickly. Examples include non-durable goods such as processed foods, soft drinks, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, toiletries or cosmetics, non-prescription 
medicines, and many other consumables. In contrast, durable goods or major appliances 
such as electronics, mechanical, engineering, and automotive parts (and textiles to a 
certain extent) are generally replaced over a period of several years. 
FMCG have a short shelf life, either as a result of high consumer demand or because the 
product deteriorates rapidly. Some FMCG, such as meat, fruits and vegetables, dairy 
products, and baked goods, are highly perishable. Other goods, such as pre-packaged 
foods, soft drinks, alcohol, tobacco, toiletries or cosmetics, medicines and cleaning 
products, have high turnover rates. 
Although they are sold at relatively low cost compared to more durable goods, FMCG’s 
are also substantially suffering from counterfeiting. The large quantities of FMCG sold, 
low public awareness re. counterfeit issues affecting FMCG’s, and usually non-deterrent 
penalties are incentives for counterfeiters aiming at maximizing cumulative profits while 
minimizing risks.  
The usually low margin and high volume business, the short shelf life of the items, the 
high speed manufacturing, the wide supply chain networks involving a high number of 
manufacturers, logistics service providers and distributors, and the nature of the 
products are important constraints to take into account when considering anti-illicit trade 
technologies for FMCG. 
3.2. Textiles 
Counterfeit goods in the textile industry have grown in recent years and the range of 
goods subject to infringement has increased significantly. The four most IP-infringement 
areas in the textile industry are: 
1. High quality woven worsted with selvedge (selvedge  are self-finished edges of 
fabric) 
2. ‘Noble fibres,’ including cashmere 
3. Interior textiles 
4. Branded apparel and accessories  
A detailed report on the counterfeit problem in this sector is provided in (OHIM 2013b). 
3.3. Sporting Goods/Sports Equipment 
This domain represents all the goods for sports activities which are not included in the 
textiles category. In other words, this domain includes goods like a golf club or a tennis 
racquet but not the tennis shoe, which is in the textiles domain. The distinction is done 
because of the different types of materials used in the production of the good. 
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A detailed report on the problem of counterfeiting in this domain is provided in (OHIM 
2013). 
3.4. Mechanical, Engineering, Automotive 
 
The pressure for lower costs is one of the main drivers for IP infringers to enter the 
market of automotive parts. Suppliers can get a competitive advantage by offering lower 
quality automotive parts and components, which opens the door to IP- infringing 
products. 
The threat of counterfeit auto parts in the automotive sector is raising growing concerns 
(NYTIMES (2013)). A recent recall by a major auto-manufacturer Reuters, (2014) is only 
one example of numerous case studies related to the presence of counterfeit auto parts 
in vehicles. In such circumstances,  while the negative impact of an IP-infringing product 
can be devastating for the customer, it can also have a negative impact on the 
reputation of the vehicle manufacturers and lead to potential lawsuits. They also have to 
bear the costs of the recall of vehicles to replace the parts, which have been identified as 
counterfeit. By systematically applying due diligence across their supply chain 
automotive companies could better ensure that fewer IP-infringing product enter their 
market. It also includes aerospace components because of the criticality of these 
components and the history of fake aircraft parts causing fatal accidents. 
 
3.5. Electronics/Integrated Circuits/Semiconductors 
 
The infiltration of IP-infringing electronic products in the globalized supply chain is not a 
new phenomenon. Their level of presence in these markets has drastically increased in 
the last decade. This tendency has been amplified with the recycling of used components 
which are refurbished, but sold as new products in the market. The other main strategy 
of IP infringers is to re-label components to appear having a different function from their 
original, of course of greater value. This falsification regards both new and refurbished 
electronic components. This tendency may not be IP-infringing unless the refurbished 
components are sold under a different brand (re-branded). 
In the defence market, many cases have been reported of IP-infringing or counterfeit 
products. The detection of such infringing parts usually occurs when there is a product or 
system failure, and the subsequent investigation on the root cause failure reveals that a 
part, or the entire product, is not authentic. However, product failures are not always 
easily traceable to the level of the counterfeit item. In many cases, without proper root 
cause analysis, the failure is attributed incorrectly to other causes. Examples of IP-
infringing electronics in the defense market can be found in GIDEP, (2006) and GIDEP, 
(2006b). 
In the battle to defend their genuine products electronics industry specialists have 
adopted a number of measures which are continuously adapted to new IP-infringing 
threats. Also innovative approaches are tested and employed to enhance the legitimate 
electronic products trade.    
The consequences of IP-infringing components go beyond lost revenues of the 
electronics industries. Such components affect electronic products by degrading their 
performance, damaging further the reputation of the industry and reducing the market 
range. 
Some sectors in the electronics industry can be more vulnerable to IP-infringing products 
than others. For example, defence hardware systems or airplanes systems are often in 
service for long periods, which makes them particularly susceptible to IP-infringements, 
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due to problems with the availability and obsolescence of parts used in such systems as 
described in (Stradley et al. (2006)).  
A recent survey on techniques used to detect counterfeit goods is (Tehranipoor (2015)). 
Other references dealing with the detection of counterfeit electronic circuits are provided 
in the rest of the report. 
 
3.6. Phones/Smartphones/Tablets 
 
This category is specific to Phones/Smartphones and Table, which are a relevant market 
sector in counterfeit products. 
3.7. Food 
 
The problem of counterfeit food has been known for decades and it is one of the first 
examples of the counterfeit problem. Apart from the economic impact, safety 
considerations are extremely important. The range of counterfeit food products is 
extremely wide: from alcohol based products (e.g., wine) to meat, cheese and so on. 
Because of this wide range of products and because of the packaging, direct 
authentication of the products can be quite challenging apart from very specific types of 
products. Because of the complexity of the counterfeiting problem in food products, in 
this report, we will only consider specific categories of food with high value where 
counterfeit techniques have been developed. For example, wine bottles. 
 
3.8.  Healthcare 
 
3.8.1.  Medicines 
The problem of counterfeit medicines is growing considerably in recent years. Ten per 
cent of the world’s medicines are counterfeits according to the World Health Organization 
(WHO (2008)). The quality of the counterfeit products is usually can be so low due to the 
manufacturing and process conditions, that they can become a direct threat to patients’ 
health (OECD (2008) and (Seiter (2009)). As in other domains, counterfeiting is 
financially rewarding and largely risk-free and terrorist groups finance their activities 
through the counterfeit trade and major crime syndicates are involved as well. But in 
this case, the safety of the people is at stake as well. 
The distribution of counterfeit medicines has also increased due to the presence of 
numerous fraudulent websites where anyone can easily and anonymously buy 
prescription-only medicines as described in (Weiss (2006)). Then, a potential approach 
for the detection of counterfeit  medicines can include both an analysis of fraudulent web 
sites and authentication techniques as described in the rest of this report. 
 
3.8.2.  Medical devices 
Another recent development in counterfeiting is related to counterfeit medical devices. It 
has been reported in (Biesman (2014)) that counterfeit aesthetic medical devices have 
been used. As opposed to legitimate, legal devices, the counterfeit versions infringe on 
patent rights, falsely claim to have clearance by the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and infringe on branding of well recognized, FDA cleared products. In the same 
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source (Biesman (2014)), it has been reported that numerous patient injuries are 
documented to have been produced by counterfeit products. Counterfeit issues can be 
present for the entire medical devices or for the single electronic components used in the 
manufacturing process, which can make the detection of counterfeit medical devices 
more difficult. 
We should also not ignore the new development on wearable medical devices (Gomez, 
(2014), where risks associated to security aspects have already been highlighted. These 
risks could worsen if counterfeit medical devices are used. 
 
3.9.  Agriculture 
 
3.9.1.  Agricultural products 
This is a wide category, which includes different types of agricultural products including 
wine, oil, tobacco and other products. 
3.9.2.  Agrichemicals 
This category includes materials used for agriculture including pesticides and fertilizers. 
3.9.3.  Agriculture crops and plants 
This category includes materials used for agriculture crops and plants, which are 
protected by Intellectual Property Rights. In this case, authentication technologies are 
used to identify samples, which are IPR infringing. 
3.10.  Luxury Goods 
This category includes all the luxury goods not included in the previous categories.  For 
example, watches, jewels and others. This category is distinct from others because of 
lack of safety aspects, and high cost of goods, which may justify the application of more 
expensive techniques. An example of the problem of the distribution of counterfeit 
watches and the impact on the economy is provided in (WATCHES 2015), where it is 
reported that “Tens of millions of fake Swiss watches are offered for sale every year, 
while the Swiss watch industry produces around 30 million original watches. Fake 
watches account for 9% of customs seizures, placing watches second only to textiles as 
the most counterfeited products”. 
3.11.  Paper products 
This category includes paper products like banknotes, financial contracts and similar 
goods. This category does not include identity documents. Because these types of items 
are not strictly goods, they are not addressed in the analysis of this report. 
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4. Authentication technologies 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
The concept of the application of authentication technologies to the fight against 
counterfeiting is quite simple. It is a classic problem of identification and authentication 
of an entity from another on the basis of specific features. Counterfeit goods may have 
some intrinsic or applied features, which makes them distinct from the valid goods. We 
use the word intrinsic to describe a fundamental feature of the object like the DNA of a 
plant or a human being. As described in the rest of the report, many objects have 
intrinsic features, which can be used for authentication. These intrinsic features can be 
the results of the production environment (e.g., manufacturing plan), the distribution 
environment (e.g., specific type of bacteria living on a plant after it has been planted), 
the composing elements (e.g., a medicine composed by specific substances or an 
electronic component with filters, amplifiers) or other factors (e.g. specific 
implementation of different algorithms in electronic devices). 
To be used for authentication, the intrinsic features must have a high level of granularity 
as most of the authentication algorithms are based on a statistical analysis where the 
level of accuracy in the authentication process is related to the number of collected 
samples. 
In the cases, where it is not possible to use the intrinsic features of the object, because 
the level of granularity is limited or because the intrinsic features cannot be extracted 
without damaging the good, additional features can be inserted to prevent clonability of 
the good. This can be achieved with different techniques, which are described in the 
report. Usually, the insertion of the additional features must be done in the production 
phase or the distribution phase, where the feature is applied to the object. For example, 
QR codes, or holograms applied to packages containing the good. 
There are various classification methods of authentication technologies, which are 
described here. 
For example, authentication technologies can be classified in two types as described in 
ISO 12931:2012 (ISO (2012) and (Li (2013)). 
• Overt techniques, and 
• Covert techniques 
The main difference between the two is that overt technologies can be verified by users 
who are familiar with the overt technology and – for preference – have a reference 
genuine sample of the feature with which to compare the suspect feature on the suspect 
good, while covert technologies require experts with specific (e.g., laboratory) 
equipment to be verified, as the details of the technology are not disclosed and available 
to those who have administrative responsibility over the deployment of the technology. 
In a way covert technologies adopt an approach similar to the concept of “security by 
obscurity”. Another difference is that (Davison 2011), overt techniques are mostly based 
on the sensorial capability of the human being: sight, sound, smell, touch and taste, 
while covert techniques are based on the digital information present in the token, which 
must be processed by a digital device (e.g., a computing device). 
Examples of overt technologies include holograms, colour-shifting inks, security threads, 
watermarks and sequential product numbering. Depending on the product they can be 
integrated using chemical or physical markers as it happens for banknotes and 
documents. Special inks technologies include invisible ultra-violet (UV) inks which are 
visible only with ultra-violet lamps and colour-shifting inks which change colour 
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depending on the view angle. Watermarks and security threads (a thin ribbon of metal 
or plastic) are also techniques widely used for banknotes. Another overt authentication 
technology is fluorescent fiber which is inserted in the paper-making process. 
Covert technologies include also similar elements such as security inks, digital 
watermarks, biological taggants, chemical or microscopic taggants. An example of covert 
technology used again in document security is micro-printing where complex artwork is 
generated made of multiple fine lines. They are difficult to replicate and counterfeited 
prints are easily identified by document security experts. 
Another classification of authentication techniques is based on the identified part of the 
spectrum, where the authentication can take place: from visible light, to infrared, radio 
frequency emissions or analysis with high energy rays. While the complexity of 
authentication techniques in the visible light is usually low (e.g., simple visual inspection 
belongs to this category), authentication based on high energy rays (e.g., X-Ray) require 
expensive equipment, which requires specific training. Another set of authentication 
techniques is based on the electrical or chemical properties of the good. 
The classification of the techniques can also be based on the phases of the evaluation of 
the goods. We can identify three main phases for the authentication of a good (these 
phases are derived from (ISO (2012)): 
1. Detection based on overt features, where an examiner inspect a good on basis of 
the human senses and it does not require any additional equipment to allow a 
feature to be verified as genuine. For example, the visual inspection of a good to 
examine if the brand identifier (e.g., logo) is valid. A malformed logo could 
indicate a counterfeit good. 
 
2. Detection based on a required authentication tools and/or specialized knowledge 
to verify their presence and validity of authentication elements in a good. For 
example, a QR code reader could support the identification of a good by checking 
the QR code identifier against a remote database. 
 
3. Forensic analysis, which requires the use of knowledge and dedicated scientific 
methods to validate the authentication elements or intrinsic attributes of a 
material good. For example, a spectrometer could be used to identify the 
chemical elements of a medicine. A counterfeit medicine can have different 
elements of different percentages from a valid medicine. 
 
Different types of stakeholders participate to different phases: while a generic consumer 
or a custom officer can use authentication techniques in phases 1 or 2, phase 3 is mostly 
adopted by forensic labs owned by a company (e.g., the brand company itself), a 
company specialized in forensics analysis or a government agency. 
In this report, we decided to adopt the taxonomy of the authentication techniques shown 
in Figure 2, which is mostly based on the physical characteristics of the good. On the left 
are listed all the authentication technologies, which are based on the electromagnetic 
spectrum emissions from the good itself. They include the basic visual inspection but 
also very sophisticated radio frequency analysis techniques. On the right, are other 
authentication technologies based on chemical, acoustics and other means including the 
DNA of organic goods. A specific category is defined for the authentication technologies 
based on the artefacts produced by the good itself. This is a recent category, which is 
the result of the technological evolution of consumer electronic and their capabilities. For 
example, a smartphone can be identified by the images, which are collected by the 
smartphone itself as described in section 4.10. Authentication based on artefacts 
generated internally by the good. 
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Please, note that this taxonomy is defined independently of the different categories of 
goods and domains defined in section 3. Domains. Even if examples of the goods 
authentication are provided, an analysis of the feasibility of each authentication 
technique is provided only at the end of the section.  
The description of the technique is also independent from the phase where the good is 
inspected. It is the objective of section 10. Comparison Matrix to evaluate the different 
techniques against a range of metrics. In particular, we are interested to the evolution of 
the technologies, which allowed some authentication technologies to move from phase 3 
(Forensic analysis) to phase 2 (Detection based on a required authentication tools). This 
technological evolution is a key to support the concept of empowering the consumer 
presented in section 12. Empowering the Consumer and in a technical report subsequent 
to this one. In other words the advancement of technology has allowed the application of 
technologies and tools designed for forensic analysis to the detection phase, which can 
be performed by customs officers or even the generic citizen with low cost equipment or 
even consumer equipment like a smartphone. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Taxonomy of authentication methods 
 
4.2.  Authentication based on electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions  
The following sections describe the techniques, which can be used to authenticate a good 
on the basis of the electromagnetic spectrum emissions, which includes visible light 
(e.g., simple visual inspection of the good), radio frequency emissions (e.g., the phone 
when it is transmitting), infrared or others.  
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4.3.  Visual inspection with no augmentation 
 
4.3.1.  Description of the technique 
In this section, we describe the basic visual inspection technique with no added visual 
identifiers (e.g., holograms), which are instead described in section 4.7. Visual 
Identifiers inserted in the good. 
Visual Inspection is the oldest and fastest technique to detect counterfeit goods. The 
inspectors try to identify traces of refurbishing or relabeling work done on the 
components. A general characteristic of the anti-counterfeit inspection methods in 
electronics field is that because of the size of the components, microscopes or other 
visual technologies (X-rays) are required (see also the following sections on the 
augmentation of the visual techniques). 
The identification of the traces is based on acquired information about the tools and the 
substances used, as well as on the overall experience gained through the years in the 
fight against counterfeiting. Chemicals may be used when substances need to be the 
identified. Automated vision systems have been tried for industrialised inspection 
solutions, but the usual approach is to use samples, inspected visually by experts.  
Counterfeit items are usually distinguished due to bad reproduction of logos, 
imperfections in the casing or the package or different internal features (e.g., different 
placement of the batteries or the circuits). On the web, there are various examples and 
tutorials to distinguish and identify counterfeit products from valid products. Medicines 
can be distinguished by the slightly different colour or by a different casings. Apparel is 
usually distinguished due to a low quality logo on the dress. 
In the case of electronic components or mechanical items, the most common evidence 
searched with the visual inspection are the following features: 
• sanding marks 
• polymer masking (blacktopping) to cover marks  
• bent leads, 
• replated leads 
• evidence of rework  
• quality and correctness of markings and logos  
 
A fast and easy method to identify if an electronic part has been remarked or resurfaced 
is to apply on the surface a chemical substance. There is a number of mineral spirits 
together with isopropyl alcohol which are used. If the marking is able to be removed 
using this solution, the component is suspect for counterfeit if the marking are easily 
removed. 
To detect possible resurfacing or polymer blacktopping acetone is also used. 
Blacktopping can also be detected using a standard blade to scrape off the polymer film. 
4.3.2.  Analysis of visual inspection with no augmentation 
Visual inspection is currently one of the most common techniques to identify counterfeit 
goods and it is usually reported in various Guidelines and Best Practices for fight against 
counterfeiting (see for example (WHO (1999)).  
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The Visual inspection can be augmented by different means. The most simple is to use a 
loupe (magnifying glass). The application of a microscope to enhance forensic visual 
inspection in fight against counterfeiting of goods is pretty obvious but there have been 
recent developments in this area, which are described in 4.4. Augmented Visual 
inspection. 
The simplest visual augmentation tools are: loupe, laser pointer, polarising filter and 
scrambled indicia viewing filter. 
The advantage is that it can be applied to a large variety of goods and materials and the 
related packaging. 
Another advantage is that it does not require expert knowledge in using a specific 
instrument (e.g., spectrometer) and a generic person could try to distinguish a 
counterfeit good from a proper one if he/she is made aware of the differences (e.g., 
counterfeit awareness web sites or other tools could provide this information to the 
generic consumer). This is one of the aspects of “empowering the consumer”, which is 
described in section 12. Empowering the Consumer. 
The disadvantages are: 
a) that it requires specific knowledge of the counterfeit good to inspect the specific 
differences with the valid good. This knowledge is continuously changing due to 
improvements in the quality of the counterfeit models. As a consequence, an 
inspector (e.g., a law enforcer) can have problems in being updated on all the 
possible counterfeit models or new types of counterfeits. 
b)  The quality of counterfeit goods is improving and cosmetic or external differences 
may not so visible as in the past. As a consequence, it may be difficult to detect 
them with a naked eye as in the case of small electronic circuits or medicines. In this 
case other techniques, which are related to the intrinsic properties of the good must 
be used. 
 
4.4. Augmented Visual inspection 
 
4.4.1. Description of the technique 
The Visual inspection can be augmented by different means. The most simple is to use a 
microscope.  
The application of USB microscopes, which provide the image directly to a computer has 
been mentioned in (Villasenor (2013)) specifically for the fight against counterfeit 
circuits. The USB microscope is fairly inexpensive.  For the detection of counterfeit parts, 
a microscope with at least 30X magnification is recommended. It is also important that 
the user have a camera built into your microscope (see (AERI (2015))). 
More powerful tools have been researched and developed by DARPA as described in 
(DARPA (2014)). One of the contractors of DARPA has developed and deployed an 
Advanced Scanning Optical Microscope that can scan integrated circuits by using an 
extremely narrow infrared laser beam, to probe microelectronic circuits at nanometer 
levels, revealing information about chip construction as well as the function of circuits at 
the transistor level. 
Beyond the microscope, other technologies like X-ray or the electron microscope can be 
used to effectively augment the visual inspection of a good. Because these techniques 
are based on the induced emissions generated by a stimulation (e.g., electronic beam), 
they are described more in detail in section 4.9. Induced emissions (spectroscopy, 
magnetic resonance and similar techniques).   
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4.4.2.  Analysis with Augmented Visual inspection 
Augmented Visual inspection is a very common method for detecting counterfeit goods. 
In comparison to the simple visual inspection, it requires test equipment like a 
microscope, which introduce an additional cost. On the other side of the coin, low cost 
microscopes are now available in the market, which can be connected to the computer 
like the USB microscope identified in (Villasenor (2013). In these cases, the inspector 
can also have the additional advantage that the computer connected to the USB 
microscope can implement algorithms for image recognition or image enhancement.  
Advantages and disadvantages are quite similar to the visual inspection and we refer to 
4.3.  Visual inspection with no augmentation and 4.4. Augmented Visual inspection for 
the rest of the analysis. 
 
4.5. Chemical reaction for visual inspection 
 
4.5.1.  Description of the technique 
This technique uses a chemical reagent to distinguish between a fake or valid product. 
The method can be used in electronic circuit’s identification as it is not destructive. For 
example, acetone is a common chemical to determine if the part of an electronic circuit 
has been remarked. A less harsh solvent can be a combination of 3 parts mineral spirits 
and one part alcohol. This is the mixture that MIL-STD-883 (method 2015.13) requires 
part markings to withstand (see (AERI (2015))). 
4.5.2.  Analysis of chemical reaction for visual inspection 
The main disadvantage of this technique is that it requires test lab tools and materials 
(e.g., chemical reagents) and it requires the adequate training to use them. Even with 
this disadvantage, chemical reaction is used with good accuracy for the identification of 
counterfeit medicines (Hu (2006)) or electronics.  
Another disadvantage is that the test can be destructive on the good to be identified. 
The advantage is that the test bed is relatively cost-effective and the needed training is 
relatively simple.  
 
4.6. Statistical analysis of images of the good (object 
recognition) 
 
4.6.1. Description of the technique 
The statistical analysis of images taken from an item or good can be a powerful 
enhancer of visual inspection. The concept of object recognition is to collect images of 
the good under examination or parts of the good and compare them to a reference of 
the valid good to understand if the good under examination is a fake or not. In other 
words, object recognition is the task of recognising the presence of a specific instance of 
an object (e.g., a specific bottle, a specific car), given one template image showing the 
object of interest. Object recognition is mostly a matching problem (i.e., images are 
compared – matched – with a template). 
Unique optical intrinsic properties of the good can be used to combat counterfeiting. For 
example, the analysis of the image of the fabric of the textile component of a luxury bag 
can be used to distinguish a fake bag from a valid bag.  
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One can distinguish between two main categories of object representation, namely 
window-based and part-based models. Models of the first kind describe the object 
appearance as a whole, within a certain region of interest (the window); instead, models 
of the second kind consider objects as composed by several parts, whose appearance is 
described separately, and are typically accompanied by a set of geometric constraints of 
the location of the parts with respect to each other. While window-based models 
generally work well for rigid objects (e.g. a bottle), a part-based model is more suited to 
describe objects that have kinematics (e.g., the human body). In both cases, different 
features can be used for statistical analysis and object recognition as described in 
(Carbonetto (2004)):  
1. Colour. The colour of the image of an object is one of the features, which can be 
used to identify an object even if colour alone may not be enough to identify an 
object. In fact, while colour can be important for recognising some categories, in 
practice the actual colour perceived by the machine is strongly influenced by 
illumination conditions, and achieving invariance to illumination is still a 
challenging and largely unsolved problem in computer vision. In addition, colour 
information alone cannot encode the object shape, which is an important and 
discriminant cue. 
2. Shape. The shape of an object or part of it (e.g., the antenna of an automotive 
telematics component) is another feature, which can be used to identify an 
object. A shape-texture cue is described by an orientation histogram, which is 
computed based on image derivatives in x and y directions (Wang (2008)). 
3. Texture. Image texture is defined as a function of the spatial variation of pixel 
intensities. A textural signature is capable of capturing inherent features, and it is 
usually capable of coping with various changes in the environment (e.g., change 
of lighting). 
The basic approach to object recognition, which can be adopted in fight against 
counterfeiting is based on the following phases: 
1. Library creation. Creation of a library of test images of valid goods. 
2. Features extraction: features are extracted from the image taken of a good 
under evaluation. 
3. Matching: local features from the template image(s) are compared against the 
ones from the library. 
4. Verification: during the previous step, a number of wrong matches are expected 
to be found; an additional verification phase takes care of filtering out the 
mismatches, typically by checking the geometric configuration to ensure it is 
consistent with the layout of the template object. The output of this final step is 
the identification of good under evaluation as fake or valid good with a specific 
probability. 
 
While object recognition is well known techniques used in many domains, there are 
considerable challenges, which limit its applicability in the fight against counterfeiting: 
1. Lighting conditions. A change in the illumination conditions (intensity and 
colour) can heavily affect objects’ appearance. Descriptors used to represent the 
object should be robust/invariant to such changes.  
 
2. Appearance changes due to rotations, viewpoint and perspective. Depending 
on the position and pose of the object in the scene, its appearance may strongly 
vary. This problem becomes even harder in case of non-rigid objects. 
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3. Occlusions. The object of interest may be partly occluded by other objects in the 
scene. As a result, the appearance “perceived” by the machine changes (as it 
incorporates spurious elements from the objects responsible of the occlusion); 
this can ultimately lead to a missing detection. 
 
4. Availability of training data. Learning a model of the object requires an 
appropriate amount of training data, i.e. images of instances of the object 
category to detect. Such data should in principle show the full range of 
appearances of the object category. It is often difficult, and a time-consuming 
activity, to collect and label such images. In fact, to increase the probability of 
finding the same object in a corpus of images and videos, one should give to the 
system enough examples (e.g., images showing the object of interest in front 
pose, in rear pose, on top, etc.) to represent the whole appearance variability. 
However, in typical application scenarios only one or a few examples are 
available, which can severely limit the practical usefulness of object recognition. 
 
As a consequence, object recognition has many limitations for fight against 
counterfeiting even if it can be applied in very specific fields where the creation of the 
library is relatively easy and the challenges are somewhat mitigated (e.g., lighting 
conditions can be set). 
Object recognition can be enhanced by specific features inserted in the object as 
described in the following section.  
4.6.2. Analysis of Statistical analysis of images of the good (object 
recognition) 
The application of images recognition for fight against counterfeiting has been widely 
addressed in research literature but the market deployment is limited because of the 
challenges described in the previous section.  
In (NEC (2014)), NEC described a solution, which overcome some of the challenges 
described above because specific patterns are embedded in pre-identified parts of the 
good.  As with similar techniques, the creation of a library is still required to implement 
the system. The NEC solution could be a precursor of similar techniques in the coming 
years. 
The advantage of the technique is the simplicity and the cost effectiveness: only a 
camera and a connection with adequate bandwidth is needed. In fact, this technique is 
one of the candidates to implement the empowerment of the users because a generic 
smartphone is what is needed from the consumer side. 
 Note that object recognition could be enhanced by inserting visual identifiers in the 
good and then updating the reference library with the information on the visual 
identifier. The techniques based on virtual identifiers are described in the next section. 
 
4.7. Visual Identifiers inserted in the good (Overt and 
Covert) 
 
4.7.1. Introduction 
The identification of good can be enhanced by using visual identifiers inserted in the 
good to enhance the visual inspection or the other identification techniques described 
previously in this report (e.g, 4.4. Augmented Visual inspection). The application of 
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visual identifiers applied to the good or the package is a very popular category of anti-
counterfeit techniques because of its limited costs and easy of deployment. The 
disadvantage is the risk of cloning the identifier. 
Well know methods, which already applied for the fight against counterfeiting, include 
(see Li (2013)  and (WHO (2015))) various overt and covert technologies, which are 
described below. 
Note that overt technologies can also be used as covert technologies and vice-versa 
depending on the complexity of the design. Most of the recent developments in overt 
and covert technologies have embedded hidden features in over technologies to make 
them more difficult to be cloned.  
4.7.2. Overt technologies 
This category includes all the techniques where the authentication artifacts applied or 
built into labels, documents and packages are quite visible to the user and show dynamic 
visual effects. 
Each technique is described in detail in the following sub-sections. Note that some of 
these techniques can also be covert features depending on the design of the technique 
for fight against counterfeiting. 
4.7.2.1. Holograms 
Holograms, which incorporates an image with 3D or another visible construction.  
Holograms are three-dimensional drawings that can be used as foils, stickers, labels and 
films. Hologram serves as a detection feature. When sophisticated criminals have the 
resources to reproduce packaging that is barely distinguishable from the genuine, the 
same cannot be said of the fake holograms. In this category, we include only simple 
holograms, which are a type of the more general category of OVD described in the next 
bullet. 
In this technique, we also include colour shifting elements or inks, where color changes 
are used to uniquely identify an item or type of item. Color-shifting ink changes color 
depending on the angle at which the package is viewed 
In this technique, we also include colour shifting elements or inks, where color changes 
are used to uniquely identify an item or type of item. Color-shifting ink changes color 
depending on the angle at which the package is viewed. 
There are many examples of holograms in the market available today (October 2014). 
Here we provide some examples, just to show that this technology is well understood 
and applied in the market in various domains and applications. Examples of products 
already available in the market are: 
• (SICPA 2015), which produce security inks, which are devised to protect 
banknotes and security documents from the threats of counterfeiting and fraud. 
They range from inks developed for specific printing processes to theft-deterrence 
system. 
• (KBA  2015), which produces special inks for the production of bank-notes (e.g., 
South African bank-notes). KBA-NotaSys range of equipment covers several 
printing processes. They includes: a) Intaglio printing, which provides the note’s 
relief, tactility and fine lines, b) Offset printing, which is used to display multi-
colour designs, c) Silk Screen printing, allowing the application of thick ink films, 
especially for optically variable and iridescent inks, d) Application of Optical 
Variable Devices, either as continuous stripes or individual patches e) Laser 
Marking, involving the application of laser based features and others.  
• (Zeiser 2015), which uses inks together with other technologies to mitigate the 
risk of counterfeiting of ID cards. One of their line of products is PERSOLINE ID, 
which is a modular tool solution created by Atlantic Zeiser to provide full-color 
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personalization of ID cards. To maximize durability and security, the machine 
incorporates several technologies in one single solution: from laser 
personalization and inkjet printing, to digital UV varnishing and security 
lamination. 
As noted in the introduction of this technical report, these examples should not be meant 
as recommendations by this report. These examples are just provided to show the 
maturity of these techniques in the market. 
  
4.7.2.2.  Optical Variable Devices (OVD) 
 
Optically Variable Devices (OVD), where complex images or texture change image or 
colour depending on the angle of interaction between the viewer, the object and 
(sometimes) an illuminating light source. The goals is to make the OVD so simple (and 
cost-effective) in its visual change that it is easily remembered and recognized, but so 
complex in production that it cannot be easily cloned or reproduced. 
There are many companies, which produce anti-counterfeiting products based on OVD. 
Apart from KBA-Notasys described previously, Optaglio is another company, which 
applies OVD in the production of banknotes and national identity documents. Optaglio 
has developed Nanogravure™, Banknote foils and OVDot™. Nanogravure™ indicates 
nano-engraved holograms developed and patented by Optaglio. OVDot™ indicates a 
technology developed by Optaglio using metallic holographic elements for covert 
marking against counterfeiting and fraud. 
4.7.2.3. Watermark 
This was one of the early technique to mark the surface of a good or even a digital 
artifact (e.g., image or movie where watermark is also called digital watermark) through 
a pattern, which was not obviously identifiable. Watermarks are used in banknotes often 
in combination with the other techniques described here. For example watermark can be 
implemented with special inks or holograms.  
The main strength of the watermark is that the technique become an intrinsic feature of 
the good rather than being just applied (and then easy to remove). The disadvantage is 
that it can be cloned and the challenge is how to make the cloning process so difficult 
that it is not worth for a counterfeiter. 
4.7.2.4.  Security thread 
Security thread is a metal thread or polyester plastic thread embedded in a specific part 
of the paper during paper preparation. On the thread, some specific characters or 
patterns may be printed to mitigate the risk of clonability. Usually, threads are 
embedded within the paper fiber and are invisible. 
As with other techniques, the thread can be used in combination with other special paper 
making technologies such as watermark, special inks and so on.  
Security threads are developed by many companies and they are usually applied to 
banknotes, Id documents or packages. 
4.7.2.5. Fluorescence artifacts 
Fluorescence artifacts are fluorescence materials applied on the good or inserted during 
the production phase. For example, fluorescence fiber anti-counterfeit paper is produced 
by adding colorless fluorescence fibers during the paper-making process. The fiber can 
be observed when a package with fluorescence fiber is placed under ultraviolet light. 
Other shapes can also be used. 
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4.7.2.6. QR Code 
A QR code, which consists of black modules (square dots) arranged in a square grid on a 
white background, which can be read by an imaging device (such as a camera) and 
processed using Reed–Solomon error correction until the image can be appropriately 
interpreted. 
QR code is one of the most widely used techniques for the identification of goods and it 
can also used for tracking goods along the supply chain.  
Because QRs codes are very easy to collect and process by a camera, QR code is also 
one of the techniques for empowering the consumers in the fight against counterfeiting 
as described in section 12. Empowering the Consumer.  
The main strength of the QR code technique is its cost-effectiveness, the simplicity of 
creation of the QR code or its analysis by a consumer mass market device and the fact 
that a QR code can embed tracking information. The main disadvantage is that QR code 
can be easily cloned unless additional techniques are used in combination. Watermarks 
could be added to the QR code image or special inks or OVD could be used to create QR 
code. For example, the Israelian company Visualead (http://www.visualead.com/) 
proposes a technology where images or profile pictures are transformed to Visual QR 
Codes. 
4.7.2.7. Nanoparticles 
Application of nanoparticles to the good to enhance the identification. Nanoparticles can 
be used to implement some of the other techniques listed here. For example in (Zhang 
2008), nanoparticles are used to implement fluorescence identification. 
 
4.7.3. Covert technologies 
4.7.3.1.  Introduction 
A covert feature is used to enable the brand owner or a specific category of stakeholder 
to identify counterfeit products.  The generic citizen will not be aware of its presence nor 
have the means to verify it.  A covert feature should not be easy to detect or copy 
without specialist knowledge. 
Various covert technologies have been proposed:  
• Micro-printing generates complex artwork that is made of multiple fine lines. The 
backgrounds of micro-printing products contain countless hexagons that not only 
come out blotchy, but also change the background color of faked items. 
• A taggant is a chemical or physical marker added to the good to support its unqie 
identification. The more complex is the taggant (there could be taggants 
consisting of microscopic particles built up in many layers), the more difficult is to 
clone it, but it can also be more expensive or difficult to install in the good.  
• Security inks which are visible only under a certain condition. 
Variations or combination of the previous methods are described below. For example, 
(Warasart (2012)) uses a technique which is based on the generation of a verification 
code from the document in the form of a QR code, which is then cryptographically 
signed. In the generation process, the QR code is generated from the text of the 
document, which is then hashed, cryptographically signed with the private key of the 
document issuer and further compressed. The resulting QR code image is printed on the 
document itself. In the verification process, the reverse is done starting with the OCR 
processing of the printed QR code through to the validation of the digital signature. 
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Use of taggant markers embedded in the tear-tape of the product’s wrapper (for 
example, polypropylene film) increases the level of security and protection of a product 
against counterfeit.  
Taggant markers are a recognized invisible security element widely used in various 
industries. Taggants are specific invisible chemical markers, proven to be a highly 
secured technology, which can be authenticated by specific inspection devices. The 
taggant is embedded in the tear-tape of the product/item/packet’s wrapping film. The 
removal of the tear-tape is an immediate sign that the product/item/packet’s integrity 
has been tampered with: once removed, they cannot be re‐applied and thus make clear 
that the product they secure has been tampered with. 
As an example, taggant, tear tapes and cello (polypropylene film) are integral parts of 
products wrapped into a packaging unit. Taggant tear-tape is generally admissible in 
court to assist authentication.  
Another way to apply a security feature ‐ one of the latest innovations in this area ‐ is to 
spray invisible substance over products. The technology is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to mimic, and relatively cost‐efficient, as it is applied to the outer packaging 
during its manufacturing or at product packaging time. 
Another techniques, which is very simple to use for the consumers is through polarized 
filters. A polarized filter implemented on a simple strip can be used to highlight features 
embedded on a material (e.g., textile) or a label. In other words, an hidden image which 
becomes visible only through a special polarizer. There are various examples in the 
market of available products using this technique like Latentogram® by ATB GROUP. 
A more advanced type of taggant is proposed by (Corbellini et al., (2006)). It is based 
on microtaggans (microscopically traceable particles, with size from over 1 mm down to 
under 20 µm), realized as a multiple colour layer structure. The applicable domain is the 
textile industry. They are produced by a single producer who certifies and register in a 
database the taggans generated for each customer. In (Corbellini et al., (2006)), the 
authors describe their solution which is based on two-dimensional bar codes which carry 
information about the product such as producer name, product identifier, date and time 
of production that has been cryptographically signed to guarantee authenticity. The 
barcode is then marked directly on the textile. Issues which may raise from the 
particular support on which the barcode is printed are discussed. A deformation index 
has been studied to verify if a material is suitable for marking using the proposed 
technique. According to the authors, the marking system has proved to be applicable on 
most kinds of commercially available textiles. 
The security features are designed to provide authentication, i.e. to verify immediately 
whether a product is genuine. One essential characteristic of a security feature is to be 
resistant to counterfeiting or duplication. 
The method of putting the security feature on the packaging unit is also an important 
issue to take into account while applying technologies to protect the products against 
counterfeit. To ensure its effectiveness, and to be admissible in court to authenticate the 
product, the security feature must be part of the product’s packaging.  
4.7.3.2.  Analysis of Visual Identifiers inserted in the good 
The application of visual identifiers both overt and covert represents one the most 
common category of techniques for fight against counterfeiting for various reasons. 
Primarily they are very easy to apply to various types of goods in different domains. For 
example, QR codes or special inks can be used on labels of packages of food specimen or 
medicines or banknotes and so on. Secondly, another strong advantage is the price. 
Most of the overts or coverts technologies are very cost effective with a price of few 
cents for thousands of items. A third advantage is the simplicity of the control systems 
like readers, which can be just a simple camera connected to a remote server for 
checking the collected data against a reference library. A smartphone with an application 
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connected to a remote server, where the overt code is collected and analyzed has 
already been implemented by various companies. There are numerous implementation 
of these techniques. For example, the SICPATRACE system (SICPA 2015) can be applied 
to a large range of products including tobacco, alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals, as 
well as food and soft drinks. The system can be used both by generic consumers and by 
law enforcers through the SICPAMOBILE® device. In this example, the overt visible ink 
or QR code is used by the generic consumer to verify the authenticity of the product 
(e.g., a label on a bottle of wine) while invisible ink can be used by law enforcers.  
Another strategy is to link different types of information from different technologies. For 
example, a Bar Code could be correlated to the QR code so that the cloning and re-use 
of only one of the codes would identify a counterfeit product. 
One disadvantage of both overt or covert techniques is that they cannot be applied to all 
types of goods. They can be difficult to apply to specific categories of goods if they are 
too small (e.g., electronic circuit) or they are used in extreme environmental conditions 
like car engine components.  Another issue is that the good inside the package is not 
authenticated. For example, medicines inside a package could be taken away and put in 
a counterfeit package. In these cases, the control of the supply chain or the distribution 
channels could mitigate these risks by ensuring the full traceability of the good and its 
content. Due Diligence practices could also be applied as described in section 8.1. Due 
Diligence and Supply Chain Management Responsibility to ensure the trust of the 
stakeholders in the supply chain and avoid this kind of risks.  
 
4.8.  Application of Radio Frequency emissions for fight 
against counterfeiting 
 
4.8.1.  Radio Frequency Identifier 
The most common form of identification through radio frequency emissions is the RFID 
technology, which is already described in section  for track and trace technologies. The 
concept is to create a Radio Frequency (RF) device, which emits a specific signal when 
irradiated. The device is applied to the good to be identified. Then, it is not an intrinsic 
characteristics of the good, but rather the consequence of a linkage of the good with the 
RFID device. 
Variation of this technique are based on the coating of the good with metallic material or 
other material, which can radiate. For example, nano-rods can be applied to an 
electronic circuit as described in (Kuemin (2012)).  
4.8.2. Unintentional Radio Frequency emissions 
The technique is based on the concept that electronic circuits, when powered, emit radio 
frequency emissions, which are intrinsically linked to the physical structure of the circuit. 
Using a parallel from biology, the RF emissions can be linked to the DNA of the electronic 
circuit or component. 
The idea is that electronic circuits and mobile devices which are counterfeit, have specific 
RF emissions, which distinguish them from valid equipment. This is due to the fact that 
low quality material (i.e., cheap substandard components) or low quality manufacturing 
practices are used to produce electronic equipment with lower costs than the valid 
equipment. This has been reported by many sources like (Telecom Digest (2014)) and 
NOKOMIS (2014). 
There are various examples of the application of this technique from literature. For 
example, (Cobb (2012)) show how RF emissions can be used to uniquely identify 
integrated circuits. In a similar way, (Williams, (2010) has shown the specific identity 
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GSM phones can be detected on the basis of their RF emissions not only for different 
models but also for different phones within the same model (for example phones with 
different serial numbers). 
In this specific case, we evaluate the RF emissions, when the electronic circuit is not 
communicating by wireless means either because it does not have the capability (e.g., 
no specific RF interface) or because it does not transmit at a specific moment or in a 
particular configuration (e.g., a phone set in airplane mode). 
4.8.3. Radio Frequency Emission while transmitting 
In this section, we focus on a specific categories of electronic systems: mobile devices 
(e.g., phones), which are transmitting in their allocated frequency bands. For example, 
the signal of GSM phone while it is transmitting a voice conversation has unique features 
related to radio frequency components like filters, amplifiers, and front-ends. An analysis 
of the signal can extract the intrinsic features of the GSM phone and disregards features 
of the signal related to the transmitted content (e.g., voice of the person). This can be 
achieved by removing the parts of the signal, which are content related. In a typical GSM 
burst, these parts are usually the ramp up and ramp down of the signal. 
An example of ramp up for two different phones of the same model (e.g., Nexus phone) 
averaged on a large number of collected samples is shown in Figure 3. The small 
differences between the two signals can be used to identify a phone from another and a 
valid phone from a counterfeit phone. 
As for other means of authentication (e.g., images), this requires the creation of a 
reference library of GSM signals from different phones/models. The reported accuracy 
from literature can be very high: from 94 to 100% depending on the type of phone 
(Hasse (2013)). 
The same mechanism can be used for other types of phone or other wireless standards 
other than GSM. 
 
Figure 3 Ramp up of a GSM burst for two different phones of the same model 
 
4.8.4. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) 
A PUF can be defined as a function that is embodied in a physical structure of the good 
and is easy to evaluate but hard to predict. More precisely, when queried with a 
challenge (e.g., radio frequency emission) C, the PUF generates a response R that 
depends both on C and the unique physical properties of the good. For example: an 
Integrated Circuit can provide a specific radio frequency (RF) response when challenged 
by a RF emission. To be applicable for anti-counterfeit, the PUF solution must be robust, 
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physically unclonable, unpredictable and tamper-evident as indicated in (Tzenbeisser 
(2012)). Robustness is measured by similarity of the responses when the good 
implemented with PUF is queried multiple times. Unclonability is measured by the 
difficulty to create two PUFs, which are indistinguishable based on their 
challenge/response behavior. Unpredictability means that it should be infeasible to 
predict a priori a PUF response to an unknown challenge. Finally, resistance to tampering 
means that it should not be physically possible to change the PUFs in the good once the 
good is deployed in the market. In this patent proposal, we focus on strengthen the 
robustness and unclonability of PUFs. Please, note that PUF can also be applied to 
approach a) and be implemented in the devices attached to the good (e.g., RFID). 
A PUF is based on the characteristics of a physical system which have the property of 
reacting to a challenge generating a unique response. In (Chong et al. (2008)), the 
authors described scattering phosphor particles as the physical identifier. The physical 
identifier is capable of resisting to physical cloning thanks to the random distribution of 
the particles. The PUF response generated from the random pattern, which is based on 
the phosphorescence property of phosphor particles to ultra-violet light exposure, is 
used to encode the digital identifier. Phosphor particles are used to generate a tag which 
is blended with the material used for the packaging of the product. 
In addition, the authors in (Chong et al. (2008)) define the registration and verification 
processes which are based on the use of smartphones to take a snapshot of the printed 
pattern and process it to upload related information such as serial number and hash 
value of the digital identifier to the remote database. In the verification process, after 
submitting the snapshot to the remote database for verification, the user receives the 
results of verification via SMS. As a consequence, this technique can also be used for the 
empowerment of the consumer as described in section 12. Empowering the Consumer. 
4.8.5.  Analysis of the Application of Radio Frequency emissions 
for fight against counterfeiting 
This class of techniques has been extensively studied in research literature where it has 
proven to produce very good results in term of accuracy.  
The advantage of this technique is that it is based on the intrinsic features of the good 
rather than a label applied to it. To cheat brand-owner or law enforcers, counterfeiters 
would need to produce goods, with the same intrinsic or applied (e.g., PUF) features, 
which basically means that the counterfeiter should reproduce the same good, with no 
economic gain. Because low quality electronic devices usually used in counterfeit 
products have distinct features in comparison to the genuine products, counterfeit goods 
can be relatively easy to identify. In other words there is no economic incentive for a 
counterfeiter to build a counterfeit good with the same electronic components of the real 
good. 
The main disadvantage of this class of techniques is the limited applicability to the 
category of goods, which produces spontaneous radio frequency emissions: in most 
cases, these are electronic components or mobile devices (even if various reports have 
highlighted that this is an important segment of counterfeit products). The other 
important disadvantage is that the evaluation of radio frequency emissions requires 
radio frequency test components and test benches which are usually available only in 
test labs. On the other side of the coin, the drop in price of radio frequency equipment 
has drastically reduced the overall costs of a potential test bench for radio frequency 
emissions and various references has demonstrated that a test-bench of roughly 1500 
Euro (Hasse 2013) could be used to implement the technique described in this section. 
Then, this technique could be used by law enforcers to detect counterfeit electronic 
components and mobile devices as reported by (NOKOMIS, 2013). 
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4.9. Induced emissions (spectroscopy, magnetic resonance 
and similar techniques)  
 
4.9.1. Introduction 
This category includes authentication still based on the spectrum emission of a good but 
where the emission are induced. In other words, this category includes spectroscopy, 
magnetic resonance and similar techniques. 
These technologies are usually very expensive to implement and deploy (i.e., the 
detection systems and test beds are very expensive) but they are used in many domains 
by specialized personnel. Their application to the fight against Counterfeit in the mass-
market (i.e., for empowering the generic consumer of the law enforcers) is very limited 
at the current stage. Technology developments could change this perspective in the 
future. Portable systems have been reported in literature (see (Hargreaves 2008)), 
which implement similar functions of very expensive test bed equipment. These portable 
systems are described in the following sections. Apart from these portable systems, 
these technologies are usually adopted in the manufacturing process for high value 
goods or they are employed by experts in goods authentication in the private or public 
sector. 
The following list of the detection methods and the description of physical principles that 
are based on is not exhaustive but includes the most frequent modern methods 
encountered in the literature. See also Radman (2010) for a similar survey on these 
technologies. 
4.9.2. Nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy 
Nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy or (NMR spectroscopy), is a research 
technique that exploits the magnetic properties of certain atomic nuclei. It determines 
the physical and chemical properties of atoms or the molecules in which they are 
contained. It relies on the phenomenon of nuclear magnetic resonance and can provide 
detailed information about the structure, dynamics, reaction state, and chemical 
environment of molecules. The intramolecular magnetic field around an atom in a 
molecule changes the resonance frequency, thus giving access to details of the electronic 
structure of a molecule. (Holzgrabe, U., & Malet-Martino, M. (2011)) apply NMR 
spectroscopy to the fight against counterfeiting of medicines. Equipment to execute NMR 
spectroscopy is very expensive and the application of this technique to the generic 
consumer or the law enforcer is unfeasible. Although lately small dimension 
experimental devices appear in the literature giving promises for hand held NMR 
applications, As described in (Haa (2014),  NMR spectroscopy has been celebrated for its 
ability to probe molecular structures and dynamics with the atomic resolution and state-
of-the-art NMR spectrometers use large superconducting magnets, whose high and 
uniform magnetic fields lead to the fine spectral resolution necessary for interrogating 
large molecules such as proteins. On the other side, the spectral resolution of the bulky, 
expensive, and high-maintenance NMR spectrometers is not necessary for a broad array 
of studies involving small-to-medium size molecules in chemistry, chemical engineering, 
and biotechnology. In this case, portable, affordable, and low-maintenance NMR 
spectrometers built with a permanent magnet can make the benefits of NMR 
spectroscopy more broadly available and enable new applications. Bulky superconducting 
systems have to be permanently placed in dedicated laboratories, but portable systems 
can enable in-field, on-demand, or online applications such as quality control, chemical 
reaction monitoring and counterfeiting. Still, to the knowledge of the authors of this 
report, there are not case studies on the applications of portable NMR spectroscopy to 
counterfeiting. In other words, it is still not clear is portable NMR spectrometers provide 
the needed level of granularity to identify counterfeit products. 
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4.9.3. Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) 
Another method used recently is the Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) 
(Griffiths (2007)) which was developed to target organic compounds, providing an 
important analytical tool for characterizing and identifying organic substances. In the 
case of electronics it can be used to distinguish between polymers of the original cover 
and the polymer material used for blacktopping. FTIR can also detect other organic 
contaminants on a counterfeited electronic component. (Farouk et al (2011)) applied 
FTIR to the fight against counterfeiting of diabetic drugs. 
Fourier transform spectroscopy technique shines an InfraRed (IR) beam containing 
simultaneously many frequencies of light in a wide spectrum. By measuring how much of 
that beam is absorbed by the sample material, chemical bonds and the molecular 
structure of organic compounds can be identified. This process is repeated many times. 
Afterwards, a computer takes all these data and works backwards to infer what the 
absorption is at each wavelength. 
This provides the ability to non-destructively determine the source of organic 
contaminants in areas such as electrical contacts, metallization lines, magnetic disk 
drives and die surfaces (Shrivastava, (2014)). Recently two technological improvements 
in FTIR, i.e., microbeam technology and attenuated total reflectance (ATR), allow 
investigators to analyze thin films, organic and inorganic, in areas as small as 10-15 
microns. 
The application of FTIR for the detection of counterfeit Viagra has been reported in 
(Pereira (2014), where fifteen commercial samples (Viagra® and Cialis®) and thirty two 
counterfeit samples (Viagra and Cialis) were analyzed and the FTIR data was subjected 
to chemometric treatment via unsupervised pattern recognition methods and a 
supervised pattern recognition method. The reported accuracy was quite good.  
The advantage of the FTIR techniques is the high selectivity and high degree of 
accuracy. FTIR can identify a chemical compound in a goods or even specific materials. 
Portable FTIR systems also started to appear in the market like the Agilent Cary 630 
FTIR Spectrometer. 
The disadvantage is the collection of the samples as the material to be identified must be 
in direct contact with the FTIR instrument and only the surface of the material can be 
analysed. This impose strong limitations on many goods. Another disadvantage is that 
FTIR systems can be quite expensive starting from thousands of dollars to tens of 
thousands of dollars. In addition, the identifier of the material to be tested can be hidden 
by other materials as in the case of medicines. 
 
4.9.4.  Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIR) 
In the beginning of 20th century researchers were able to relate the character of groups 
of atoms within molecules as being related to specific absorptions1. These absorptions 
are the result of interactions with the fundamental vibrations of the chemical bonds 
associated with the atoms of the groups. Chemical bonds can be modelled as weak 
springs holding together two or more atoms.  When energy is added these springs will 
vibrate more actively and when energy is added to the system then they will vibrate 
more energetically. NIR is a type of spectroscopy where the near-infrared region of the 
electromagnetic spectrum (wavelength from about 800 nm to 2500 nm) is used.  
                                           
1 http://www.impublications.com/content/introduction-near-infrared-nir-spectroscopy 
 
  
 
35
This technique is sensitive to both the chemical and physical nature of the sample 
constituents and can be performed rapidly with minimal sample preparation. NIR can be 
used as a screening technique to detect counterfeit samples as described in (Olsen et al, 
2012) and in many other sources, where NIR is applied to pharmaceutical products. The 
advantage of NIR in comparison to SAM and SEM is that it can be an automatic process 
and not strictly dependent on SMEs. 
Techniques have been developed for NIR spectroscopy of microscopic sample areas for 
film thickness measurements, research into the optical characteristics of nanoparticles 
and optical coatings for the telecommunications industry. 
The advantage and disadvantage of NIR are following: 
The advantage is that the technique is not destructive. In other words, you do not need 
to damage the good to detect a counterfeit good.  
The other advantage is that the technique can be quite fast. As reported in (Olsen et al, 
2012) a sample can be analyzed and identified with good accuracy in less than one 
minute. 
The disadvantage is that it is necessary to build a library of medicines and their spectral 
features, which can take various days. The library must also be updated every time a 
new medicine or variation of the medicine is created.  The other disadvantage is that the 
test bed can be relatively costly and it requires training of the personnel executing the 
test. 
Finally, as with other spectroscopy techniques, the technique can only be applied to a 
specific type of good like medicines.  
 
 
Figure 4 A typical NIR spectrum for chloroform 
 
4.9.5. Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) 
Scanning Electron Microscopes (SEM) were invented in 1935 but arrived at the market 
only in 1965. They belong to the greater category of Electron Microscopes and they use 
a high-energy beam of electrons to scan a sample following a raster scan pattern. The 
basic principle of their functioning is to collect information about the sample's surface 
topography, composition as well as other properties like electrical conductivity, from 
signals emitted from electron interaction with the atoms of the sample material.  
  
 
36
The SEM uses the reflected electrons from the various interaction mechanisms with the 
sample material. This allows to SEM to operate in a number of function modes. Each 
mode provides different type of information about the examined sample. 
The basic mode is secondary electron imaging or SEI, where inelastic electron scattering 
caused by the interaction between the sample's electrons and the incident electrons 
results in the emission of low-energy electrons from near the sample's surface. 
In SEI mode, SEM can produce very high-resolution images of a sample surface, 
revealing details less than 1 nm in size. Due to the very narrow electron beam, SEM 
micrographs have a large depth of field yielding a characteristic three-dimensional 
appearance useful for understanding the surface structure of a sample.  
A wide range of magnifications is possible. These can range from nearly 10 times 
(equivalent to that of a powerful hand-held lens) to more than 500,000 times, which is 
about 250 times the magnification limit of the best light microscopes available on the 
market today. 
Consequently using SEM in the fight against counterfeit electronic products is self-
evident since it can provide signs and traces of alterations in microscopic level.  SEM can 
be conducted on IC or parts of electronic components after removing the encapsulates 
(decapsulation) or after delidding (see (Sood et al (2011)).  
For example, SEM microscopy can be used to verify the elemental composition of the 
metallization layers. SEM can also be used to verify the solder plating composition on the 
part termination. In certain cases, SEM can also be used for inspecting external part 
packaging for signs of sand blasting and for detecting topographical changes resulting 
from the black-topping process.  In summary these techniques are augmentation of 
visual inspection and they are dependent on the experience and quality of SEMs. The 
capability of SEM to provide magnified and detailed images from the device external or 
internal surfaces revealing signs that may not even be visible to the counterfeiters 
during the alteration process. Usually the rendered images from the inspected sample 
are compared side to side to images from original pieces.  
One of the most common SEM uses is as a technique to detect subtle differences of 
blacktopping. It is impossible for blacktopping to match the exact surface texture of the 
original component body; SEM offers examination at several 1000x magnification in 
order to reveal these textural differences. blacktopping and the actual component body. 
Additionally, in a counterfeit goods, specific parts are handled more and go through a 
variety of procedures during the counterfeiting process. Each of these procedures, 
increases the potential of contamination of the counterfeited part. SEM can detect and 
identify these elemental contaminants that would not be present on an authentic part. 
The advantage of SEM microscopy is that it can be used for a large variety of goods 
where visual magnification is used to detect counterfeit goods. Another advantage is that 
it does not require the a-priori building of a library. 
The main disadvantage is clearly the cost. A SEM microscopy costs from ten of 
thousands of Euro and upwards, with precise SEM system costing hundreds thousands of 
Euros. This is clearly not practical for market deployment of anti-counterfeiting systems.  
4.9.6. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive spectroscopy (EDS) 
SEM and EDS, can be conducted on IC or parts of electronic components after removing 
the encapsulants (decapsulation) or after delidding (see (Sood et al (2011)). For 
example, the combination of SEM and EDS can be used to verify the elemental 
composition of the metallization layers. SEM/EDS can also be used to verify the solder 
plating composition on the part termination. In certain cases, SEM/EDS can also be used 
for inspecting external part packaging for signs of sand blasting and for detecting 
topographical changes resulting from the black-topping process. As in SAM, these 
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techniques are augmentation of visual inspection and they are dependent on the 
experience and quality of the experts. 
Advantage and disadvantages are similar to SEM with an increased level of accuracy. 
The disadvantage of SEM/EDS is similar to SEM already described: the cost of the test 
equipment is very high and in this case, the  additional cost of the EDS system as well. 
4.9.7. X-Ray Inspection 
Known from medical applications and from security controls (e.g., airports) X-Ray 
inspection provides another way to obtain images of the internal structure of electronic 
components in a nondestructive way. Usually image magnification is applied in a 
simultaneously, hence it is called also X-ray microscopy. Modern X-Ray systems provide 
resolution of a decimal fraction of mm, and magnification of up to 10,000. 
The image of the inner parts of a potential counterfeit sample is compared to the image 
of a certified original electronic part, from top view (but also side view may be required).  
This process may be done in real-time, in which case the dose rate should be taken into 
account. 
Indeed one of the main applications of X-ray inspection is for the detection of counterfeit 
electronic circuits, as the very high magnification can show features like inconsistent die 
size,  inconsistent leadframe, or broken wire bonds. In all these cases, the imperfections 
or differences in counterfeit circuits from proper circuits are highlighted through the X-
ray inspection. 
A high quality image of the internal structure of an electronic component can provide a 
lot of information about its intended use but also about internal alterations, defects, and 
degradation. X-ray flashing provides images based on material density that allow 
pinpointing of soldering and wire bond flaws. In addition, X-ray microscopy can reveal 
anomalies such as “die” attach voiding, solder pooling, or die shifting.  
Some advanced X-ray systems have capabilities to perform both 2D and 3D scanning 
inspection.  In many cases X-ray imaging operates together with scanning acoustic 
microscopy (SAM) since the information they provide is complementary.  
The advantage is the high level of accuracy in detecting some categories of counterfeit 
goods. The disadvantage is the high cost of the test bed equipment and the need for 
training by the expert, who uses X-ray to identify the counterfeit good. 
4.9.8. X-ray fluorescence 
 X-ray fluorescence (XRF) spectroscopy is used if more information is needed about the 
micro structure of the component. X-rays are used to bombard a material and then 
analyse the emitted "secondary" (or fluorescent) rays that return from it. This method is 
widely used for elemental and chemical analysis, particularly in the investigation of 
metals, glass and ceramics materials, and for research in forensic science, geoscience 
etc.  
X-Ray fluorescence has been used to fingerprint medicines and distinguish valid 
medicines from counterfeiting medicines in (Ortiz (2012)) among other examples. As 
described in (Ortiz (2012), X-ray fluorescence (XRF) is a suitable technique for 
characterization of the presence of metals and this technique has advantageous features 
like multielemental capability, good detectivity, high precision, short analysis times, and 
is nondestructive, which makes it suitable to be extended to a great variety of samples. 
In case of medicines XRF presents an excellent analytical methodology for determination 
of active ingredient (in case of sildenafil citrate that presents sulfur, S, in its structure), 
excipients and covering agents as calcium phosphate, titanium oxide and iron oxide (P, 
Ca, Ti and Fe) that can be detected directly by XRF on the surface of pharmaceutical 
formulations. 
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The level of accuracy is quite good. The disadvantages are similar to the previous 
techniques: high costs of the test bed equipment and needed training of the personnel 
conducting the tests. 
4.9.9. Energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy 
Energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EXDS) is an analytical technique used for the 
elemental analysis or chemical characterization of a sample. 
Analysis of the X-ray emission spectrum produces qualitative results about elemental 
composition of the specimen. Comparison of spectrum of the specimen with spectra of 
standards of known composition produces quantitative results.  When an electron from 
the inner shell of an atom is excited by the energy of a photon, it moves to a higher 
energy level.  The difference in energy is emitted as a photon which has a wavelength 
that is characteristic for the element. The presence of metal and their concentration in a 
good can be identified and calculated using EXDS. On the basis of the different 
concentrations of metals, a valid good can be discriminated against a counterfeit good. 
The application of Energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy to detect different categories of 
counterfeit goods has been demonstrated by various research activities. In (Li (2011), 
the technique has been applied to the identification of counterfeit food. Other examples 
are provided for the detection of bank notes. 
The advantage if the high level of accuracy.  
The disadvantages are that the technique is only applicable to specific type of goods 
where the chemical composition (e.g., presence of metals) can be exploited for the 
authentication of the good. The other disadvantage is the high cost of the test bed 
equipment and the need for training of the tester. 
 
4.9.10. Analysis on Induced emissions 
The different techniques described in this section have some common advantages and 
disadvantages for the detection of counterfeit goods. The main disadvantage is the cost 
of the test equipment with can run from thousands of euros to hundreds of thousands of 
euros. The other disadvantage is that the tester must be trained to use the test bed 
equipment. The advantages are the high level of accuracy reported in literature to 
identify extensive categories of goods from medicines to food to electronic circuits and 
bank notes. Not all the techniques can be used for the identification of different types of 
goods because some technique provides visual augmentation while others are based on 
the identification of chemical components in the good.  
An advantage of these techniques is that they are not destructive: in other words, you 
do not need to damage the good to identify and distinguish the proper good from the 
counterfeit one. 
 
4.10. Authentication based on artefacts generated internally 
by the good 
 
This section describes techniques where the authentication of the good can be done on 
the basis of digital samples taken by the good itself, which (in most cases) must be an 
electronic device (e.g., a camera) or component. An obvious challenge is that the data 
must be extracted from the device itself, but from an operational point of view, this can 
be quite simple. For example a law enforcer can take a picture from a “suspect” phone 
using a test SIM and compare it to a reference library of phones of the same model to 
confirm that the “suspect” phone is counterfeit. 
  
 
39
4.10.2. Statistical analysis of images produced by the good 
Identification of counterfeit devices with image acquisition capability (digital cameras, 
smartphones, tablets, webcams, camcorder…) can be achieved by characterising the 
image artefacts caused by the CMOS sensor (Filler (2008)) and/or by any of the post-
processing steps (de-mosaicing filter (Bayram (2005)), JPEG compression (Kay (2006)), 
etc). 
The detection of a counterfeited device can be easily performed in  smartphones and 
tablets by different means: 
1. using an application, which can to be installed in the smartphone, that analyses a 
photo taken using the device, and compares the artefacts found in the image to a 
reference library.  
2. Collecting an image of series of images (e.g., around 5) and sending them to a 
remote application service when the image and the model is compared against a 
reference library. 
 
The target for collecting the image could be a neutral background. For example, it could 
be a blank sheet of paper. 
 
It is worth to point out that a database of reference artefacts should be made available 
and maintained, ideally populated with the cooperation of manufacturers of camera of 
smartphones. 
 
Figure 5 Image acquisition pipeline in a typical imaging device 
 
4.10.3. Statistical analysis of audio samples produced by the good 
This technique is similar to the identification of counterfeit devices with image acquisition 
capability described before, but it is applied to audio samples instead of images. 
Detection of counterfeit devices with audio acquisition capability (smartphones, tables, 
webcams, camcorders, cordless phones…) can be achieved by analysing the response of 
the audio circuit to a standard stimulus (e.g., a standard tone). Some work has been 
already done in this direction in the context of digital forensics (Aggarwal (2014)) and 
(Romero (2014)). Cues to analyse to the purpose at hand include: microphone 
frequency response; effects of custom oscillators; effects produced by the Analog-to-
Digital Converters. 
In principle, the response of any sensor of an electronic device can be exploited to detect 
whether it is a genuine or a counterfeited good. E.g. in the case of smartphones, the 
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response of accelerometers, gyroscopes, temperature sensors, etc. This will be described 
in the next section. 
The idea is to identify the acquisition device by assuming that the device along with its 
associated signal processing chain leaves behind ‘intrinsic traces’ in the speech signal. 
Indeed, the various devices (e.g. telephone handsets, cell-phones) do not have exactly 
the same frequency response because of the tolerance in the nominal values of the 
electronic components and the different designs employed by the various manufacturers 
as described in (Kotropoulos (2014)). Then, the recorded speech can be used to identify 
the device itself: if it is counterfeit or not. 
4.10.4. Statistical analysis of sensor based data produced by the 
good 
In a similar fashion of the previous methods, the identification of a device on the basis of 
the data collected by it, could be extended to other sensors. Sensors can be of different 
kind, but an important requirement is that the data collected by the sensors and used for 
the device identification has enough granularity to perform the identification. This means 
that some sensors may not be used for authentication purposes. For example, a 
temperature sensors or a gravity sensor may not be adapt to this purpose. Example of 
sensors, which can be used to authenticate a mobile device include accelerometers or 
gyroscopes (as reported in (Dey (2013)).  
An example of the differences in the accelerometers of different smarthphones, which 
can be used to distinguish between valid and counterfeit smartphones is provided in 
Figure 6. The graph shows the different sets of collected data against time for three 
different smartphones of the same model when they are subject to a reproducible 
movement pattern. Differences in the patterns (like in the red graph from the green 
graph) can be used to distinguish the smartphones. 
 
Figure 6 Differences between accelerometer data collected by Smartphones 
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4.10.5. Analysis of Authentication based on artefacts generated 
internally by the good 
The techniques described above mostly originated from research efforts in recent years. 
The degree of accuracy can be quite high as reported by (Filler (2008)). On the other 
side, no products have been recorded at this moment, which are based on these 
techniques. Still, it is relatively easy to collect the artefacts from a mobile device and use 
them to distinguish a valid phone from a counterfeit phone.  
The advantage of these techniques in comparison to other techniques is that there is no 
need of expensive equipment to distinguish a counterfeit phone from another but just 
the construction of a library of trained data (which can be generated by the 
manufacturer of the phone or the electronic device) and the definition of the validation 
procedure (e.g., for example take the pictures of a sample). The additional advantage is 
that the identification is based on the intrinsic and internal features of the electronic 
device, which cannot be easily faked because the economic gains in building counterfeit 
electronic devices in using components of inferior quality, which will be identified in the 
analysis.  
The main disadvantage is that these techniques are only applicable to very specific 
categories of goods like cameras, smartphones, and any other electronic or mechanical 
devices, which include a sensor. On the other side of the coin, this category of device 
represents a very substantial market impacted by counterfeit products. As a 
consequence, cost effective and accurate techniques like the one presented in this 
section can be quite helpful to law enforcers. 
  
4.11. Electrical Inspection 
 
4.11.1. Description of the technique 
Another approach used to detected counterfeit electronic components is to check the 
electric and electronic properties of the components. The level of inspection can vary 
from simple to a full function. The cost of the chosen inspection and the criticality of the 
component are two main factors to determine the level of testing.  Simple inspection 
targets basic electrical characteristics such as resistance, capacitance, voltage or pin-to-
pin values. On the other end, a full electrical/electronic inspection includes a black box 
approach where all the intended functions are checked using input-output 
measurements. Most of the times, these tests are done with the use of software, and 
can even include environmental factors like temperatures.  
As described in (Guin (2014)), there can be (at least) four different techniques for the 
application of electric inspection to fight against counterfeiting: 
1. Parametric tests,  
In the parametric tests, direct current (dc) and alternating current (ac) parameters are 
verified. Parametric tests can be performed over a range of operating temperatures to 
measure DC and AC parameters of a chip. They include curve tracing test, contact test, 
power consumption test, output short current test, output drive current test, threshold 
test, rise and fall time tests, setup, hold and release time tests, propagation delay tests, 
etc. The objective of parametric testing is to determine the quality of each product to 
avoid counterfeit distribution and production. This is accomplished by running a suite of 
tests or as many vital tests as possible to check the DC, AC, and parametric performance 
of the component in question. The intricacies of these tests can easily give test 
engineers a robust data set that they can use to uncover a counterfeit component where 
other test methodologies fail to uncover any problems or anomalies (from Guin 
(2014)).Electrical tests require training of the personnel responsible to conduct the tests 
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and it also requires a dedicated lab, which could be a disadvantage in the detection 
phase and limits the application of this technique to forensics labs. 
2. Functional Tests 
Functional tests are the most efficient way of verifying the functionality of a component 
and are perhaps one of the most expensive test methods available to identify counterfeit 
device, which have an high degree of complexity. For instance, system memory chips 
will have to pass a series of functional tests exercising address, data lines, and bursting 
under various operating conditions (e.g., temperature, voltage, clock speed). A 
functional test could verify that all parts perform at specified higher frequencies and 
through the required temperature range using a functional baseline test (from Guin 
(2014)).  
This type of tests usually require highly trained personnel and a complex test bench, 
which is also tailored to the type of electronic device to be tested. 
3. Burn-in Tests 
In burn-in tests, the component is operated at stressed conditions, such as elevated 
temperature, to determine failures or to highlight an abnormal behaviour. The problem 
of this type of tests is that they are destructive or anyway damaging the good under 
inspection. They also require specific knowledge of the electronic device or circuits as 
different devices can have different behaviour depending on their design.  
4. Structural tests 
In structural tests, test patterns are applied to an electronic device to analyse defects 
and anomalies related to internal structures or interconnection. The problem of this type 
of tests is that they requires a specific knowledge of the electronic device or circuits to 
compare the blueprint of the valid electronic device with the counterfeit one. 
Decapsulation is also used. By the term decapsulation is meant the removal of the 
external part of the electronic component to leave the internal part exposed for 
inspection. Most of the times, the decapsulation results in the destruction of the 
electronic component. To succeed in this technique, the inspectors use mechanical or 
chemical tools to remove the cover or top layers of the component. Chemical 
decapsulation is primarily performed on plastic encapsulated components and is 
accomplished by applying acids onto the surface of the component to dissolving the 
plastic. Mechanical decapsulation is done with some tool (cutters, blades, tweezers etc.). 
After the decapsulation the components are investigated for the part numbers, date 
codes, die markings etc. 
4.11.2. Analysis of Electrical Inspection 
Electrical inspection has been extensively used to detect counterfeit electronic devices 
and it can be quite accurate when the design and production of the counterfeit device 
was of low quality. In these cases, the low quality of the device is revealed by the 
functional, parametric or stress tests.  This technique is less accurate in the case of 
overproduced electronic devices (e.g., devices produced by the same manufacturing 
plant of the valid device), because the circuit design is basically the same even if the 
quality of the material could be worst. In this case, stress test could identify the 
overproduced devices.  
The main advantage of electric inspection is that the producer of the type of electronic 
device, which is counterfeit, can easily test a counterfeit devices using the same test 
equipment already used for their own devices.  
The main disadvantage is that the test bed setup can be quite expensive, it requires 
extensive training by the personnel and it can be quite specific for the type of device. In 
other words, electrical inspection may not be very effective for law enforcers in the 
detection phase, but it is mostly used in forensic labs at the time of writing this report. 
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The other disadvantage is that these techniques are only applicable to electronic or 
electro-mechanical devices, which is still a large market impacted by the counterfeit 
products. 
Finally, we note that burn-it tests or decapsulation are destructive tests, which can also 
be a disadvantage. 
 
4.12. Chemical Inspection 
 
4.12.1. Description of the technique 
The technique of chemical inspection is use a chemical agent to support the identification 
of the good. Depending on the type of the good, there are various chemical agents, 
which can be used and different processes, which can be executed. 
Chemical inspection is based on the application of a chemical reagent to the good or the 
surface of the good or parts of the good, which reacts in different ways if the good is 
counterfeit or not. 
Chemical inspection can be used in combination with other techniques like the visual 
inspection of spectrometry. 
Chemical inspection is often used in the identification of counterfeit medicines as 
presented in (Hu (2006)), which describes the development and application of a “Fast 
Drug Identification System” which includes a fast chemical identification system 
equipped in a mobile vehicle is being developed in China and gradually put into use from 
2005. Common chemical agents described in (Hu (2006)) are Sulfuric acid or 
Permanganate acid. 
Another area is the detection of counterfeit electronic circuits and components. 
The potential issue with chemical agents is that they are potentially destructive, which 
means that the sample could be degraded and destroyed as part of the test. 
4.12.2. Analysis of Chemical Inspection 
The advantage of this techniques is that it does not require complex test bed facilities as 
it is mostly based on the application of a chemical reagent, which can be prepared up-
front. The other advantage of the technique is that it can be applied to a wide range of 
physical goods (e.g., medicines and electronic components). In addition, the technique 
can be used in combination with other techniques like visual inspection.  
The disadvantages are:  
a) Chemical agents can be potentially destructive, which means that the sample 
could be degraded and destroyed as part of the test. 
b) The tester must be trained to the use of chemical reagents and in the 
identification of the reaction to distinguish between a valid good or a counterfeit 
good. Because there can be a wide range of products, this disadvantage can be 
addressed through detailed manuals. 
 
4.13. Authentication based on Weight and Structural Tests 
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4.13.1. Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) 
4.13.1.1. Description of the technique 
Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA), measures weight loss as a result of a variance in the 
temperature, which is applied to the good. This method is based on the fact that 
different materials (e.g., polymers) decompose losing weight at different temperatures 
keeping other conditions constant. Thermogravimetry is one of the oldest thermal 
analytical procedures and has been used extensively in the study of polymeric. 
Thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) relies on the measurements of three parameters, 
which must be collected with an high degree of precision: mass change, temperature, 
and temperature change. Therefore, the basic instrumental requirements for TGA are a 
precision balance with a pan loaded with the sample, and a programmable furnace. The 
furnace can be programmed either for a constant heating rate, or for heating to acquire 
a constant mass loss with time. 
The TGA apparatus can quantify changes like loss of water, loss of solvent, loss of 
plasticizer, decarboxylation, pyrolysis, oxidation, decomposition, weight % filler, amount 
of metallic catalytic residue remaining on carbon nanotubes, and weight % ash. All these 
material loss measurements are usually done during heating, but in certain cases 
measurements are recorded during cooling too. 
Apart from the stoichiometric analysis regarding certain compounds in the material of 
the sample, structural defects may also become evident.  The results from 
thermogravimetric analysis are presented (Westenberger et al (2005)) by (1) mass 
versus temperature (or time) curve, referred to as the thermogravimetric curve, or (2) 
rate of mass loss versus temperature curve, referred to as the differential 
thermogravimetric curve. A typical scanning rate is 10 °C/minute and information is 
extracted by comparing the characteristics of the curves with reference data. For 
counterfeit detection, TGA is targeting mainly at blacktopping and the altered polymers 
used for that. Comparing with original parts can reveal the differences in the material. 
In the automotive sector, the application of TGA to detect counterfeit goods has been 
described in the test standard SAE (2015), where the test method provides the 
capabilities, limitations, and suggested possible applications of TGA as it pertains to the 
detection of counterfeit electronic components. 
4.13.1.2. Analysis of Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) 
The main advantage is that thermogravimetric analysis can be quite accurate but it is 
mostly based on sophisticated test bed equipment (the TGA equipment), which can be 
quite expensive and it require extensive training for its usage. As a consequence, this 
technique is mostly used in forensics labs at the time of writing this report. An additional 
disadvantage is that it is a destructive test as the good is subject to mass or 
temperature change.  
 
4.13.2. Path Delay in electronic circuits  
 
4.13.2.1. Description of the technique 
The analysis of the path delay (Zhang (2008)) can show structural differences in 
electronic circuits and it can be used to distinguish a circuit from another. When an 
electronic circuit is used in the field, aging or environment effects (e.g., heat and 
humidity) could cause some of its parameters to shift over time. Similar differences can 
also be generated by differences in manufacturing plants and processes of different 
materials used in manufacturing. The test is based on the execution of a typical 
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workload (e.g., execution of an algorithm) a number of times. The statistical data is then 
collected and analysed to see the differences.  The method has been proven in (Zhang 
(2008)) to reach very high accuracy (98-100%). Challenges are related to the cause of 
the differences due to aging or environmental effects, which may pose the question if 
the electronic circuit is counterfeit or just aged. 
The application of path delay has also been reported in (Guin 2014), which also 
describes the main steps to be executed on an Integrated Circuit. In the first step, paths 
are simulated and selected according to their aging rate. Then, the delay of these paths 
is measured by a clock  sweeping  technique  in  new  ICs  (either  during manufacturing 
test on all ICs or during authentication on a sample of new ICs) and in any available 
devices under authentication. 
Statistical analysis is used to decide whether the device under authentication is a 
recycled IC. This require the creation of a library of valid ICs created at the end of the 
manufacturing process. (Guin 2014) reports that the used ICs can be completely 
separated from the signature of the new ICs, implying a 100% detection rate for 
recycled ICs. 
4.13.2.2. Analysis of path delay in electronic circuits 
Path delay is a powerful techniques to identify counterfeit electronic circuits with a high 
degree of accuracy and this is the strongest advantage. An additional advantage is that 
it is not a destructive type of test. 
The disadvantages are: 
1. The technique is limited to electronic circuits, which have a path for the 
transmission of electronic signals. Other types of goods do not take advantage of 
this technique. 
2. The technique requires experience and training on the usage of test equipment, 
which can be quite specific and limits the application of this technique to forensics 
lab. 
3. The technique requires access to the electronic circuits. While the technique itself 
is not destructive of the electronic circuits it may require the removal or 
destruction of the case of equipment where it is installed. 
 
4.13.3. Thermal Analysis Scanning Calorimetry 
4.13.3.1. Description of the technique 
Recently, several thermal analysis techniques are employed in the fight against 
counterfeiting. One of the techniques, called Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC), 
measures the parameters of chemical reactions as a function of temperature. To perform 
DSC analysis, the temperature is controlled in a way that the apparatus containing the 
tested sample increases linearly its temperature, as a function of time. The reference 
sample should have a well-defined heat capacity over the range of temperatures to be 
scanned. The thermal analysis techniques are based on the principle that the sample 
(when heated) is subject to physical transformation e.g. phase transitions, while 
measuring  the heat energy absorbed by it need to flow to it than the reference to 
maintain both at the same temperature.  
The differences in the heat absorption with respect to a reference sample provide the 
necessary information to distinguish between a valid good and a counterfeit one. 
Parameters can be melting point, phase transition temperature, heat capacity etc. that 
characterize polymers used in counterfeit electronics.  DSC can detect the presence of a 
different substance in an altered component compared to a genuine sample.  
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The usual operating procedure is that a sample (e.g., a medicine) and an inert reference 
are heated separately by two heaters at a predefined rate (measured in °C/min). A 
computer control, connected to sample and reference, assures that the two pans remain 
at the same temperature throughout the entire experiment. When the sample reaches 
the temperature at which it undergoes some thermal transition, its heater will have to 
put out an amount of heat that is different from the one of the reference. This difference 
in heat is measured and reported in a plot: this means that there will be a specific signal 
for each thermal transition. 
In addition to the thermal transition, other polymorphic transitions like changes its 
crystalline structure or loss of water or chemical components can be detected by the 
DSC technique. 
Beyond medicines, DSC has also been used in the detection of counterfeit electronic 
circuits as reported in (Sood 2011). DSC can provide clues to levels of cure of the 
molding compound and the numbers and types of past thermal exposures (e.g., from 
reworking, reballing). 
4.13.3.2. Analysis of Thermal Analysis Scanning Calorimetry 
The advantage of this technique is that it is quite accurate and it is based on the intrinsic 
properties of the good under testing (e.g., its chemical composition), then it is quite 
difficult to create a counterfeit item with exactly the same components of the valid good.  
The disadvantages are: 
1. A library of reference substances must be created. The challenge is that the 
analysis of all the reference substances must be conducted in the same operative 
conditions that will be used in the screening of the counterfeits. For example, the 
same kind of pan and the same temperature scan speed. 
2. The technique is only applicable to goods where the chemical composition can be 
used to differentiate between a valid and counterfeit good. 
3. DSC test beds can be quite expensive and they require extensive training. As a 
consequence, this technique is mostly used in forensics labs at the time of writing 
this report.  
 
4.14. Authentication based on DNA 
 
4.14.1. Description of the technique 
This technique is based on the DNA analysis of organic material like an agricultural crop 
or plant as the DNA is unique. An example of the application of DNA checking for plants 
or crops is provided by (Naktuinbouw (2015)), where DNA identification is used not only 
to distinguish between crops protected from IPR and counterfeit but also on the area of 
provenance of the crops on the basis of the resident bacteria. 
Another example of DNA analysis is provided in (IEEE (2012)) where DNA samples are 
applied to the package (in a similar way of an RFID) to uniquely authenticate the 
package. 
Some companies have already proposed anti-counterfeiting products based on synthetic 
DNA sequences, which can encode company and product-specific information into inks or 
resins. The goal is to mitigate the risk of cloning the token or tag applied to the good.  
One example is DNATech (2015), which applies synthetic DNA to covert tokens like 
security threats.  
  
 
47
Another example is ADNA (2015), which instead use plant (natural) DNA to generate QR 
codes, which are used both for authentication and for tracking and tracing applications. 
The generated DNA embeds a unique serial code number, which is not easy to clone 
because it is part of a very complex DNA structure. 
 
4.14.2. Analysis on Authentication based on DNA 
The application of DNA (either synthetic or natural) to the production of token or tags 
was a technique not mature from the market point of view (i.e., still in the research 
phase) until few years ago. The evolution of the technology has allowed the application 
of this technology to fight against counterfeiting as proven by the various companies 
proposing DNA based products. 
Because the DNA generation can be applied to covert tokens and tags, the main costs 
are in the generation of the token itself as the cost of covert tokens are well understood. 
From this point of view, this technique can be applied today to the detection phase 
(described in the Introduction of this report) as the information extracted from the 
covert token or tag through a reader can be validated against a central database. 
Instead, the detection of DNA from natural samples like plants or other agricultural 
products is still very much (at this moment) a forensic activity to be conducted in the 
laboratory. 
 
4.15. Authentication based on Acoustics tests - Scanning 
Acoustic Microscopy (SAM) 
 
4.15.1. Description of the technique 
Scanning acoustic microscopy (SAM) is one of the most efficient, though expensive, 
ways of studying the structure of a component. Scanning Acoustic Microscopy (SAM) is 
using ultrasound to detect possible irregularities in a suspect electronic component and 
is a non-destructive method (Guin 2013). SAM uses sound waves to determine density 
differences within a sample both external and internal. In other words, this technique 
functions by using the reflection or the transmission of ultrasound waves to generate an 
image of the component based on its acoustic impedance at various depths. For 
example, this is very useful in detecting delamination. When focused on the surface, 
SAM can show evidence of relabeling and, when compared to a known good component, 
it can show differences in surface texture indicative of blacktopping. Deeper in the 
structure of the examined good, SAM can indicate possible prior use and reworking by 
locating potential irregularities hinting at rework such as cracking, voiding and 
delamination.  
As mentioned above, SAM is highly sensitive particularly to the presence of 
delaminations, and can detect delaminations of sub-micron thickness, which are difficult 
to detect using X-ray radiography. This is why the two methods are used in a 
complementary way. In addition to that, SAM is an important tool for detecting popcorn 
cracking/delamination, die attach voiding, evaluating flip chip underfill integrity, and lid 
seal integrity in hermetically sealed packages. Also ceramic direct bond substrates may 
be inspected for delamination using SAM.  In addition, this technique can be used to 
determine the thickness of an internal layer of material. 
Both delamination/cracking and die attach voiding are assembly related defects that can 
increase the susceptibility of components to failure in storage or use, although they may 
not constitute failures by themselves. Although delamination and cracking can result in 
sheared or lifted wire bonds, passivation cracking, metallization shifting, intermittent 
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electrical failures and metallization/bond pad corrosion. Die attach voiding can lead to 
die cracking, die attach fracture, or thermal runaway due to poor heat dissipation 
through the die attach. 
Because SAM is basically an augmented visual inspection system, the experience and 
ability of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) is essential in the identification of a counterfeit 
product and this factor can impact the accuracy of the overall process. As reported in 
(Cassell (2012)) some validation facilities and the SMEs provided different evaluations of 
counterfeit Integrated Circuits (IC). Some SMEs did not identify counterfeit ICs.  
Currently Scanning Acoustic Microscope systems employ more data gates to easily mark 
delaminations and provide a wide range of transducer frequencies, from 5 to 250 MHz, 
to increase the effectiveness 
4.14.2. Analysis on the Authentication based on Acoustics tests 
The advantages and disadvantages of this technique can be summarized as follow. 
Advantages: 
1) The technique is not destructive. 
2) The technique is quite accurate 
3) The technique can be used in combination with other techniques. 
4) Because it is a form of augmented visual inspection, there is no need to create a 
specific library of valid references. 
 
Disadvantages 
1) The test bed equipment used in this technique is quite expensive (even if 
relatively low cost SAM devices started to appear in the market). As a 
consequence, this technique is mostly used in forensics labs at the time of writing 
this report. 
2) It can be used only for specific types of goods where the structural or mechanical 
differences can be used to distinguish a valid good from a counterfeit one. 
 
4.16. Summary on the application of Authentication 
technologies for the fight against counterfeiting  
 
As described in the analysis of the various techniques, one major disadvantage is related 
to the costs for the implementation of test beds to identify valid goods from counterfeit 
ones. The equipment can be rather expensive for some techniques (in the order of tens 
of thousands of euro to hundreds of thousands of dollars). Training costs must also be 
included. 
(NOKOMIS, 2013) provides some estimates (provided in Table 1) for visual inspection, 
X-ray inspection and de-capsulation for check of Integrated Circuits (ICs) in comparison 
to functional tests of electronic components on the basis of their published specifications 
and programming interfaces. 
Table 1  Estimates on the cost of different techniques 
Type of test  
Visual Inspection Visual and acetone tests: $0.05 / piece 
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X-ray or decapsulation: $125 / piece 
Minimal Functionality Tests Simple devices: 1000 $ 
Complex Devices 3000 $ 
Full Functionality Tests Simple devices: $2000 + $5 / piece 
Complex devices: $5000 + $7.5 / piece 
 
The techniques are usually quite accurate and they are often based on the intrinsic 
properties of the goods rather than based on an element added to the good (like the 
RFID). In this way, the techniques are usually able to distinguish a counterfeit good from 
a valid one.  
In many cases, the techniques require the creation of a reference library of valid models 
to distinguish the counterfeit devices from the valid devices. In many cases, this can be 
done directly by the manufacturer but it would require the definition of a new process, 
which does not exist not. An ideal implementation of this process would require the 
definition of a central entity, which stores the reference libraries for different types of 
goods. Manufacturers would be responsible for updating the reference library when a 
new model is place on the market. Then, law enforcers or consumers could use the 
library to identify counterfeit goods in the field. See also Section 13 on 
Recommendations. 
Even with these challenges, authentication technologies can be quite effective in 
identifying counterfeit goods and they can complement very well other techniques like 
Container Tracking and generic Track and  Trace technologies described in the following 
sections. 
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5. Track and trace techniques 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Track and trace techniques are based on the assignment of an identifying token to a 
product which is then used to track the movement of the product along the supply chain. 
The use of these technologies is associated to the use of a back-end database in which 
movement of the products along the supply-chain are recorded. 
Following and recording the progressing of the product, through this identifier, in the 
supply chain is an important function which is then used by the final customer and the 
manufacturer of the product to check the origin and/or provenance of the product. 
In “track and trace”, the term “track” is related to the function the movement of the 
goods as they progress through the supply and distribution chains from manufacturers 
to the users. This is done by collecting information at some or all of the transaction 
points along the supply and distributions chains and uploading them to a database 
(Davison 2011). The term “trace” is used to represent the function of querying the 
database of previous transactions to have a view of the path of the good in the supply 
and distributions chains. One of the objectives of the “trace” function is to identify 
anomalies in the supply chain (like gaps). 
Information about the origin and history of each tracked good (or the package) is either 
carried directly in the applied token (if it has enough memory to store the different 
points in the supply chain) or it is held in a database. There is a trade-off between the 
former and the latter cases. In the former case, the token must have a memory to 
record all the transactions. This increases the cost of the token but also provide the 
benefits to the final consumer (or even the law enforcer). In the latter case, the token 
can be quite cost-effective and the final consumer can always access the tracking and 
tracing information from the database if s/he is granted access. The access to the 
database is obviously important to empower the consumers in detecting counterfeit 
items and this aspect is discussed more in detail in section 12. Empowering the 
Consumer. 
The Track and Trace tags, labels, codes may not be immune to copying of falsification, 
but its security is greatly enhanced by the inclusion of unique and apparently random 
serialization, or non-predictable numbering, ideally at individual item level. If the 
serialization was sequential, then the level of security would be very low as the sequence 
is predictable, whereas “random” serialization using highly secure algorithms or methods 
of encryption overcomes this. Individual packs may still be copied, but the system will 
identify duplicates or invalid serial numbers, as well as those which have been cancelled 
or expired, or which appear in the wrong market, or with invalid product details (incl. 
aggregated packaging information).  
Where secure serialization is applied visibly to a pack, then it may be authenticated by 
customers via a telephone, internet link to the system, to ensure that the information is 
readily accessible and yet secure against compromise.  
Empowering consumers to decode and verify serialized unique identifiers with mobile 
devices, such as smartphones, increases the likelihood of detecting non-compliant 
products, both counterfeit and diverted. Consumer-level verification with the use of 
modern-day tools also increases the awareness of the issue of illicit trade and is already 
used in many industries. In addition, data generated as a result of code verification could 
be used by the authorities to determine areas where illicit products are sold, including 
the possibility of identifying non-compliant supply chain operators. 
 
  
 
51
There are many popular technologies, which can be used for track and tracing. In this 
section, we will describe the main techniques. Note that tracking and tracing information 
can be inserted in overt and covert elements described in section 4.7. Visual Identifiers 
inserted in the good. This is significant trend in recent years and it is due to the increase 
level of sophistication of overt/covert technologies. 
The following techniques are identified, which are described more in detail in the 
following sections: 
1. Numeric Identifier and Bar Code. This is just a numeric identifier, which can be 
printed on the good or the package containing the good. 
2. QR Code. In a similar, way, this is a QR code, which can be printed on the good 
or the package containing the good. 
3. RFID. This is a Radio Frequency Identifier, which must be applied to the good or 
the package container the good. 
4. Fingerprint technology 
5. Other overt technologies. This category includes other technologies, which can be 
embedded or applied on the good or the package. For example: an hologram. 
6. Other covert technologies. This category includes other technologies, which can 
only be detected using special equipment. The covert element can be embedded 
or applied on the good or the package (e.g., a security thread) 
 
The desirable features are similar to other counterfeiting technologies: the cost of the 
element itself, the organizational and technical costs to implement the infrastructure, the 
robustness against clonability and the effectiveness and simplicity of the detection. 
An important aspect is also how the information are collected, processed and transmitted 
to the remote system. The amount of data to be transmitted creates restrictions on the 
wireless communication technology used for this purpose. 
To summarize, track and trace technologies serve a number of distinct functions: 
(a) Tracking an item through the supply chain, to each point where there is the 
facility for data capture. 
(b) Providing traceability on the history of an item (electronic pedigree), subject to 
limitation on number of control points. 
(c) Enable authentication of the data at any time, and by implication, of the pack or 
unit on which it is applied.  
 
In the following sections, we will describe each of the techniques. 
Before introducing each technique an overview of mass serialization technologies is 
provided. The subsequent sections on Bar code, QR code and other technologies can also 
be used in mass serialization technologies.  
 
5.2. Mass Serialization Technologies  
 
5.2.1. Generation of a unique secured identifier  
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Unique serialized identifiers marked on every product is the solution widely implemented 
by some Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FCMG) industries. This more and more common 
solution is in compliance with GS1 standards and accessible through GS1-compliant data 
carriers.  
A unique non-predictable serialized identifier is irremovably printed at product 
manufacturing time: it is a visible element. The way the unique identifiers are generated 
ensures (i) integrity of the data they store (ii) interoperability with systems providing 
additional data, and (iii) compatibility with various data carriers, including compatibility 
with FMCG industry standards.  
To ensure integrity, unique identifiers used by some FMCG manufactures incorporate a 
security element. This allows the unique identifier to serve as an element of the security 
feature. To ensure compatibility with various data carriers, unique identifiers should 
follow internationally recognized standards. To meet this criteria the unique identifiers 
are formatted in a GS1 format, and displayed using GS1‐compliant data carriers. 
More specifically, unique identifiers generated by some FMCG manufactures follow 
serialized GTIN (sGTIM) GS1 standards, and comprise two elements:  
1. A Global Trade Item Number (GTIN) that uniquely identifies the product (all items of 
the same product carry the same GTIN); and  
2. A serial number that uniquely identifies an item within a class of product.  
5.2.2. Data carriers for serialized unique identifiers. 
To be effective, data carriers for a serialized unique identifier must be highly compatible 
with and usable by all operators across the supply chain including the logistic service 
providers. Global interoperability is a critical factor for a solution to be widely‐accepted. 
Currently, GS1 is the only global traceability standard accepted and used across all 
industries requiring logistic services.  
Two types of data carriers are often used for serialized unique identifiers:  
(i) human readable, and  
(ii) machine readable.  
 
The human readable unique identifier is applied in alpha‐numeric format, and can be 
read by naked-eyes enabling verification by anyone without having to use any reading 
equipment/device. 
The machine readable data carrier of the unique identifiers enables fast reading (and 
aims at preventing human reading errors). It can be applied in different formats, 
depending on (i) manufacturing speed, and (ii) limited printing space on the different 
packaging elements. 
At high manufacturing speeds, it is important to use data carriers that can be applied to 
unit packets without sacrificing readability. 
 
5.2.3. Serialized unique identifier - reading and aggregation.  
The manufacturer should place the serialized unique identifiers where they can be read 
and aggregated into a higher packaging unit.  
Reading all the codes applied on products contained in a higher packaging unit is 
essential for aggregation purposes, creating the so‐called parent‐child relationship. This 
ensures that each lower packaging unit (child) is linked with a unique higher packaging 
unit (parent). Aggregation at manufacturing time enables to track the items without 
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having to unpack, track individually all unit packs and repack every time these are 
distributed in higher packaging levels (e.g. group consumer packaging unit, and in cargo 
packaging units/shipping cases). 
 
5.3. One dimension-Bar Code 
This was the first technique to serialize products and use this information to track and 
trace the good in a supply or a distribution chain. The first implementation was the 
Universal Product Code (UPC) has been a dominant barcode standard in North America 
since it was established in the 1970s.  
The UPC has evolved in various versions: UPC-A, UPC-E and so on. 
At international level, the Global Trade Item Number, GTIN, is an identification number 
that may be encoded in UPC-A, UPC-E, EAN-8 & EAN-13 barcodes as well as other 
barcodes in the GS1 System.  
Numeric Identifiers based on bar codes have been extensively used for many years 
around the world, and they remain the most used track and trace/identification 
technique.  
Because there is an extensive literature on this technique, we refer the reader to related 
references. For example for GTIN, see (GS1 2015).  
A Traceability Expert Group consulted by DG SANCO on product traceability has 
recommended in their final report (SANCO 2013) that “Key Recommendation 1 Economic 
operators should label their consumer products at least with a product identification code 
and contact details of the responsible economic operator”. 
5.4. QR code and other two dimensional bar codes 
The QR (Quick Response) Code is a two-dimensional (2-D) barcode. 
In comparison to one-dimension bar codes, the QR code are able to store more 
information in the same space.  QR codes are designed to be read and  understood 
(decoded)  by  computers, using machine-vision systems consisting of  optical  laser  
scanners  or cameras  and  barcode -interpreting software. 
Unlike 1-D bar codes, the QR Code is a 2-D matrix code that conveys information not by 
the size and position of bars and spaces in a single (horizontal) dimension, but by the 
arrangement of its of its dark and light elements, called “modules. 
The QR code have a number of advantages in comparison to one-dimension bar code. 
The main advantage is the high-capacity data storage as a QR code can store hundreds 
of time more data than an one-dimension bar code. The QR code is also robust against 
curved surfaces or errors due to marks or spots. 
QR codes are extensively used for the identification, tracking and tracing of items in the 
supply and distribution chain.  
5.5. Physical Fingerprint Technology 
 
Fingerprint technology is an emerging authentication solution that is being used in 
various domains: in 2011, the Royal Canadian Mint began using digital fingerprint 
technology to securely authenticate Canadian Dollar coins2; this technology is also used 
now for FMCG. 
                                           
2 www.amisdeleuro.org/upload/1340734488.pptx  
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Physical fingerprints use the specific characteristics of the base material of the 
packaging. For instance, paper, cardboard, metal and plastic are made up of tiny fibers 
in random orientations, which is naturally unique in its structure. According to this, every 
packet has its own microscopic structure, its own fingerprint, which cannot be rebuilt 
and cannot be removed. For a secure authentication, it is key to use this technology 
directly on the base material of the smallest packaging available to consumers; 
fingerprints of labels, stickers or banderoles will verify the attached strip but not the 
packaging onto which these are applied. 
For greater security, it is possible to combine a printed unique identifier as the visible 
element and physical fingerprint of a pack as the invisible element of a security feature. 
On a mass production line, each packet can be scanned and its unique fingerprint can be 
recorded and linked to the specific unique identifier of this packet. For checking, whether 
a packet is genuine or not, the system compares the physical fingerprint of the 
packaging base material with the digital fingerprint embedded in (or retrieved from) the 
unique identifier present on the pack. 
 
5.6. Other overt technologies 
This section identifies other overt technologies already described in sections 4.7.2. Overt 
technologies which can also contain tracking information. In other words, the overt 
element has a serialization and identification information which, in addition to 
authentication, can also be used for tracking. 
There are many examples already available in the market of overt technologies used for 
the purpose. 
One example based on specific type of seal is described in (ATT 2015). The special seal 
is a highly secure and unique code, enabling authentication, identification and 
serialization of a product or of a component. The code can be applied as an overt feature 
(but it can also be used in covert mode), and acts as a digital data container, carrying 
encrypted information on a surface ranging from a few microns to a few square 
millimeters. 
The seal may be applied on secondary and/or primary packaging or on the 
pharmaceutical product itself, using standard print techniques, including offset, 
heliography, flexography, inkjet and laser. The code can be then read on assembly lines 
or in the field with smart phones, thus granting protection to brand owners and 
consumers alike thus enabling the empowering the consumers concept as well. 
 
5.7. Other covert technologies 
 
This section identifies other overt technologies already described in section 4.7. Visual 
Identifiers inserted in the good , which can also contain tracking information. 
As for the overt technologies, various products appeared recently in the market, which 
embed track&trace information (numbering) in the covert element. 
One product based on holograms is (Rako 2015), where holograms with tamper-proof 
laser engraved track & trace numbering (based on laser codings) are applied to the good 
or the package. The laser codings are saved in central database, so that they can be 
retrieved and compared using a special reader. 
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Auhentication solutions based on a chaosmetric concept have been developed and 
described in ProofTag (2015). Chaos theory studies the behavior of dynamical systems 
that are highly sensitive to initial conditions. Small differences of these initial conditions 
yield widely divergent outcomes for such dynamical systems, rendering long-term 
prediction impossible. Once stabilized, the result of certain chaotic systems can be 
observed and measured. The measurement of each element gives a unique result 
different from all other samples, which can be used to uniquely identify a good in the 
supply chain. 
In other words, the concept is similar to biometrics that refers to the identification of 
humans by their characteristics or traits. Chaosmetric relies on the recording of 
physically unclonable features to create a serialized authentication element. The 
information used to generate the Chaosmetric tag is used to uniquely identify the item, 
so that it can traced and tracked using a smartphone. 
    
5.8. Radio Frequency Identifier 
 
5.8.1. Description  
An RFID tag is basically a device composed of a small chip connected to a coil (see 
Figure 7). The chip is essentially a state machine with a memory, providing limited 
storage and computation capabilities. For the communication with such devices, a RFID 
tag reader has to be used. The reader emits a radio frequency (RF) field that by 
induction through the coil powers the chip. At the same time the reader properly 
modulates the field to code commands sent to the chip, which in turn replies to the 
reader modulating the same field, so establishing a bi-directional communication. 
 
 
Figure 7 Radio Frequency Id 
 
The typical purpose of an RFID tag is to memorize data and release them when queried 
by a reader; usually, at least a unique identifier (ID) is stored in the chip. According to 
this peculiarity, one of their main applications is represented by item labelling. 
RFID tags can be stuck on or embedded into items to track their position, reading the 
tags at different places, and to easily get information about them storing specific item-
data in each applied tag. The information gathered from a tag can also be put in relation 
with additional item data stored in a back-end system. 
Figure 8 describes the generic architecture a system for the tracking of goods. A tag is 
attached to the good, which moves in the supply chain. Personnel involved in the supply 
chain process, can use a portable leader to inspect a RFID tab. In alternative a fixed 
reader placed in strategic points in the supply chain (e.g., intermodal exchanges) 
connected to the control centres can also be used. 
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Figure 8 Generic architecture for tracking of goods through RFID 
 
Some simple anti-counterfeit solutions could be derived by the regular usage of RFID 
tags and the relative back-end systems. For instance, if tag transactions are recorded 
and a tag is cloned, at a certain moment two or more ID entries could appear in the 
back-end system, so highlighting the presence of a possible counterfeited item. 
Alternatively, a transaction counter synchronized with the back-end system could be 
adopted on each tag and discrepancies between the current tag counter and the current 
back-end system counter for the specific tag’s ID would highlight the presence of a 
clone. The ID of a compromised tag could be also blacklisted. Differently from cloning, 
whether a fake tag is applied to a good, the relative ID could not be registered in the 
back-end system, so triggering an alarm. For such solutions a unified database/back-end 
system able to track item transactions/movements across organizations (e.g., product 
manufactures and reseller) would be necessary, but it seems not-plausible at the 
moment as many organizations tend to use custom solutions and scarcely cooperate 
together. This basically impairs the adoption of the above-mentioned solutions 
nowadays. In addition, a connection with the back-end system would be always 
required. Probably, more practical off-line solutions should be preferred in lieu of on-line 
ones. 
EPCglobal® is leading the development of industry-driven standards for the Electronic 
Product Code™ (EPC) to support the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in 
today's fast-moving, information rich, trading networks. The EPC is a unique number 
that is used to identify a specific item in the supply chain. The EPC is stored on a RFID 
tag, which combines a silicon chip and an antenna. Once the EPC is retrieved from the 
tag, it can be associated with the data held in a secured database, such as where an 
item originated or the date of its production. Much like a global trade item number 
(GTIN) on the barcode or vehicle identification number (VIN), the EPC is the key that 
contains the information used within the EPCglobal Network. An EPC tag does not carry 
personally identifiable information. Several major retailers and product manufacturers 
Antenna
Portable Reader
Firmware
Asset with Tag
RFID
Tag
Supply Chain 
application
Wireless 
communications
Fixed Reader
Firmware
Supply Chain 
application
Fixed 
communications
Control
Center
  
 
57
are testing EPC technology as a way to improve supply chain management. Similar to 
the VIN on a car, an EPC is a way to uniquely identify a pallet, case, or individual 
product. A major standardization initiative by GS1 is Electronic Product Code Information 
Services (EPCIS) EPCGlobal (EPCIS (2014)), which is an EPCglobal standard for sharing 
EPC related information between trading partners. EPCIS provides important capabilities 
to improve efficiency, security, and visibility in the global supply chain, and complements 
lower level EPCglobal tag, reader, and middleware standards. EPCGlobal has highlighted 
the need for standards to combat counterfeiting in a recent white paper (EPCGlobal 
(2012)). 
 
5.9. Other track and trace technologies 
Other tracking technologies can be based on a combination of other technologies, which 
can be even more sophisticated than RFID. Here we briefly describe some of them, but 
the technology landscape can change in time: 
1. Products similar to RFID but with a simpler design. Like radio frequency tags 
based on different standards and design than RFID. 
2. Use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) receiver to track the position 
of the goods with greater precision. 
 
In the first category, we have products like the one described in SECRF (2015) (Lime 
Tag), which are based on a secure Near Field Communication (NFC) solution that 
includes authentication and encryption protocols. These type of products can be used in 
many applications like the tracking and tracking of bottles of wines. 
In the second category, we have products, which embeds a GNSS receiver to record the 
positions of the good at certain time. While this type of devices have been mostly used 
for tracking of container, recent development and the drop in prices can support their 
usage for track and trace of small packages. 
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5.10. Analysis of track and trace based techniques for the 
fight against counterfeiting  
As described in the previous sections, different techniques can be used to support track 
and trace, even if each technique has its advantage and disadvantages. A recent report 
from NIST (NIST 2014) summarizes the main difference and advantages/disadvantages 
of the two approaches. 
The advantage of bar code/QR code and other overt/covert techniques in comparison to 
the RFID is the cost of the token itself even if the cost of RFID has decreased 
considerably in recent times. As described in (NIST 2014), barcode labels cost less than 
2 cents per label while RFID tags are at least three times more expensive per tag. The 
precise cost of RFID tags varies depending on the underlying RFID technology, but 
typically, active RFID tags are priced between $20 and $70, whereas passive RFID tags 
are between 7 and 20 cents.  
The disadvantages of bar code and QR code in comparison to RFID are that (Davison 
2011) that a direct line of sight is requested between the reader and the code. In 
addition, the presence of visible light is needed with nothing obstructing the light path 
between them. Instead, RFID tags can be read at a distance and UHF and BAP RFID can 
be read at even a greater distance and can be scanned much faster (NIST 2015). RFID 
tags can also be  read  and  written  in  large numbers. This is an important advantage 
to be taken in consideration. While, bar code are considerable cheaper, the bulk 
interaction with tagged items reduce the time in the supply chain and therefore reduce 
the costs. A study on the Bloomingdale chain (O'Connor 2009) has shown that with 
barcodes, staff was able to read  209 items/hour, while with RFID, staff was able to read 
4,767 items/hour. 
Another advantage of RFID technologies is the possibility to embed intelligence and 
algorithms, which cannot be done in bar codes: intelligent chips can be programmed to 
accumulate data for local storage, periodically wake up to perform functions and protect 
their data  or  onboard  functions  with  encryption  or passwords. Note, that the RFID  
tags, which   can  perform  this  wide  range  of functions have  relatively  high  costs. 
Regarding the application of the RFID specific technology, the general concepts of the 
application of Track and trace based on RFID technology against Counterfeiting are 
presented in (Li (2013)) where the typical manufacturer, distributor, and retailer 
elements are identified. At the manufacturer, an RFID tag is attached to the finished 
product. As described before, the tag may include information like producer’s identity, 
product code, production date, container id and so on. 
After the product arrives at the distribution centre, the information saved on the 
attached RFID tag is read and transmitted to the manufacturer’s data server to support 
the cross-correlation of information and therefore the authentication. This operation can 
be repeated at different stages and nodes (e.g., warehouse) in the distribution network 
to ensure that no counterfeited products are inserted in the distribution chain. When the 
product finally reaches the retailer the authentication is carried out in a similar way to 
the other points in the distribution chain. The retailer can keep the RFID for internal 
tracking until the product reaches the customer. 
Various references provide a costs analysis of the deployment of RFID infrastructures.  
First of all, the costs of implementing a track and trace infrastructure based on RFID 
technology should divided for the different components of the infrastructure. (Banks et 
al. (2007)) provides the following structure in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 RFID implementation cost tree from (Banks et al., (2007)). 
 
An analysis of the associated costs in RFID implementation was provided in (Smart et al 
(2010)), which examined the costs associated with the adoption of RFID in the 
automotive industry. The study found that, with the exception of the costs of tags, direct 
implementation costs were not significant for early adopters (Smart et al., (2010)). 
A simulation of the costs associated to the introduction of the RFID in a supply chain is 
also provided in (Sarac et al, (2008)). A tool has been created by the authors, which is 
used to simulate the costs in different scenarios 
Track and Trace can be an effective way to mitigate counterfeiting in relation to 
counterfeited goods, because such counterfeit good will not carry a valid RFID installed 
by the manufacture and the mismatch between the stored value of the RFID in the 
central server and the check at any place of the supply chain (including the final 
customer) can expose the counterfeit products. A similar consideration can also be 
applied to overt and covert techniques described in the previous sections. 
In fact, track and trace based on RFID has been used to mitigate counterfeiting by 
various companies. Examples include GUCCI as described in (Li (2013)) or the 
SecureTrace as described in (Pharma IQ. (2011)) has been combating counterfeiting in 
the United Kingdom for some time. 
Even if it is widely deployed, track and trace against counterfeiting have the following 
issues: 
1. The cost of implementing and maintaining a complete track and trace supply 
chain can be quite high, even if the individual RFID itself has a very low cost. On 
the other side of the coin, the implementation of track and trace in a supply chain 
can provide additional benefits not strictly related to fight against counterfeiting. 
This was highlighted by a recent study by (De Souza et al. (2011)), which 
evaluated the Return on Investment (ROI) of the implementation of track and 
trace for a company in Singapore. 
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2. RFID can be easily cloned. One solution against clonability would be to implement 
cryptographic algorithms on the challenge/response of the RFID (i.e. Secure 
RFID). Even if a new generation of secure RFID has been developed in recent 
years (one example is reported in (Liao, Y. P., & Hsiao, C. M. (2014))), the cost 
of secure RFID is higher than basic RFID. The supply chain must also be 
implemented in a more complex and costly way for the authentication elements 
based on the cryptographic algorithms. 
 
3. RFID can generate a privacy threat if the RFID is not deactivated after the point 
of sale (see also section 12.3. Privacy ). If the RFID is not secure (protected by 
encryption), the content can be read at distance by any person equipped with an 
RFID reader. This privacy threat was highlighted in the Benetton case, where 
Benetton was forced to abandon the plans for the adoption of RFID (see Simson 
et al (2005)). Various deactivation techniques exist (one is described in Chen et 
al. (2011)) but they can also add costs to the implementation of track and trace. 
In fact, the privacy threats in RFID can have an “ethical” cost as underlined in 
(Bhattacharya et al., (2007)) or in the automotive industry (Smart et al., 
(2010)). 
 
4. To be really effective, track and trace based on supply chain should support a 
smoothness integration and correlation of data among all the stakeholders 
involved in the supply chain including the customer (see (Pharma IQ. (2011))). 
The integration of the various data server add complexity to the overall 
deployment of track and trace solutions because ICT systems could be different in 
the various parts of the supply chain. 
 
5. Even if traceability has a high value in helping to pinpoint counterfeit items, it 
does not fully answer to the problem of product security. As described in (Davison 
2011), it is also important to answer the question “Is this product genuine or a 
fake ?”. The token can be duplicated or modified (even if some techniques 
presented later have solutions to prevent clonability) or even the database can be 
hacked. While, some track and trace technologies are able to insert the token in 
the good itself, so that the token cannot be removed without destroying or 
damaging the item in a visible way, many categories of products (e.g., electronic 
components) can only use an applied token.  For these categories, only 
authentication techniques can provide the answer of the proper identification of 
the product. 
 
Even with issues, track and trace is one of the most popular approach against 
counterfeiting related to Counterfeiting as described in (Michael and McCathie, (2005)). 
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6. Container tracking, packaging and sealing 
 
6.1. Container tracking 
 
6.1.1. Introduction 
The tracking of the container shipping around the world is another effective way to 
mitigate counterfeiting. As described in the UNODC report (UNODOC 2014), a large 
percentage of the containers stopped by authorities have involved counterfeit goods. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) have elaborated the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme (CCP) to 
mitigate counterfeiting risks with to minimize the exploitation of maritime containers for 
the illicit trafficking of drugs, and other transnational organized crime activities 
The main concept is to track a container from the port of origin to the port of destination 
by collecting the information on the routes of the freight containers.  
An example of a system for the tracking of the containers developed in the DG JRC is 
described in the following section. This case study shows what is the potential of 
container tracking in the fight against counterfeiting. 
 
6.1.2. ConTraffic project 
ConTraffic is a project started more than 10 years ago by JRC in collaboration with OLAF 
and DG TAXUD which aims at supporting customs authorities dealing with the control of 
containerised cargo. The goal of the project is to develop novel methods and IT tools 
that assist authorities in their risk assessment activities. 
About 90% of the international traded non-bulk cargo is transported by maritime means 
in intermodal freight containers, whereas less that 2% is physically inspected by customs 
authorities. Authorities use mainly risks analysis methods to identify which containers to 
control in order to fight criminal and illicit activities, such as smuggling of arms, drugs, 
cigarettes, counterfeited goods or avoidance of customs duties and anti-dumping quotas. 
In their risk assessment, customs officers analyse various information in order to 
develop risk profiles that can help them to ultimately identify suspicious consignment. 
Normally risk analysis and controls done by customs are based either on information 
about the entities involved (shipper, consignee, customs broker, agent, etc…) or 
characteristics of the goods (tariff classification, value, weight, etc…) or other 
information provided by the entities involved (for example the origin country in the SAD 
declaration). 
The origin, destination, transhipment locations and the complete route of the cargo 
transportation is considered an important factor in the risk analysis for the profiling & 
targeting of high-risk cargo containers. 
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Figure 10 The container flow in ConTraffic 
In most of the cases, authorities have very limited or incomplete information about the 
actual global routes of the containerized cargo and they do not use in a systematic way 
the data that describe the itinerary, status and movement of shipping containers. On the 
other hand, ocean carriers, which transport the cargo containers, collect, store and own 
Container Status Messages (CSM). These records describe the global movement and 
status of the containers and provide an independent source of information which 
complements the information available to Customs and other authorities.  
The key idea of ConTraffic is that CSM data can efficiently be used to reconstruct the 
route of containers and can systematically be used to perform route-based risk analysis 
and to support on-going investigations.  
6.1.2.1. Container Status Messages 
The ocean carrier companies, which transport millions of shipping containers between 
thousands of locations in the world, need to keep track of their fleet of containers and 
the progress of their transportation. Such companies interact with thousands of logistic 
operators around the globe that handle the various stages of the transportation.  
A key component in the success of the intermodal shipping container industry is the 
early adoption of EDI technology. This technology, through the various widely accepted 
standards, allowed the involved companies to electronically exchange information 
regarding the logistic operations. A key type of message exchanged between parties is 
the so-called Container Status Message. This type of EDI message is used to report the 
status or operation performed on a shipping container. Ocean carriers depend on the 
collection and processing of those messages, as it is the only way they can keep track of 
their fleet of containers and monitor the progress of millions of shipments. The Container 
Status Messages (CSMs) are generated by various parties involved in the handling of 
containers but most of them are generated by container terminals and depots. Ocean 
carriers collect the CSMs using the EDI technology. Each carrier company is then 
transforming, processing and storing these messages in order to be able to use them for 
their day-to-day business. Finally, most of the carriers provides CSMs information on 
their publicly accessible Track and Trace web site to inform their customers about the 
status of consignments. 
The CSMs may contain a big variety of data elements, depending also on the standards 
used to implement them. However, for the purpose of using them for route-based risk 
analysis the required data elements are just the following: Container identifier, Event 
description, Location identification, Data and time of the event, vessel, Load status 
(empty/full), Name of the carrier company. 
Experience in ConTraffic shows that these data elements are enough to understand the 
movement of the containers and the routes followed during their transportation. CSM 
records can be very valuable for route-based profiling of shipping containers. The events 
described in these CSMs indicate the locations and dates when the various operations 
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took place. They indicate how long a container remained in a particular location and how 
long it took to be transported from one location to the next. They also indicate which 
vessels were involved in the transportation. With this information, an algorithm can 
answer questions like “has the container stopped in a port X for more than Y days”. 
6.1.2.2. ConTraffic IT system 
ConTraffic built an experimental online system that allows authorities not only to have 
access to container itinerary data but also to extract useful information from it and use 
this information for risk analysis. Currently there are about 800 registered users, mostly 
from MS Customs Authorities accessing these services on a 24/7 basis. 
The back end of the system is composed by three main processes: Gathering of CSMs 
data, Processing and storage of data, and Data mining. 
The gathering service runs continuously and is used to collect CSM data from the 
carriers' track and trace web sites. The JRC ConTraffic system is not an operational 
system and, as such, is capable of tracking a rather limited amount of containers 
worldwide (30-40% or more for imported containers). The database contains at present 
more than 2.3 billion Container Status Messages (CSM) covering events that took place 
over the last 12 years. In June 2015 it contained data for about 9 million distinct active 
containers. 
Once CSMs for a container are retrieved by the gathering process, the records are 
processed and stored in the ConTraffic database. The pre-processing includes data 
cleaning and normalisation. As part of the cleaning process there is the normalisation of 
the locations (from free text to UN location code) and event descriptions. 
The last process extracts from the collected CSMs, which are a raw list of simple events, 
the collection of information useful to calculate risk indicators and perform advanced 
query. In ConTraffic this collection of information is called Container Trip Information 
(CTI). Each CTI summarizes the available information about the transportation of goods 
from an origin location to a destination location in a particular container. The aim is that 
the CTI indicates where and when the goods have been stuffed in the container, what 
was the maritime route of transport (first port of loading, transhipments, port of final 
discharge) and where was the final destination of the goods (the place where the 
container was stripped to become empty).  
The front end of ConTraffic is a web site which provides access to a number of online 
services: 
• "Track and Trace" is the main and most used on-line service of ConTraffic. It 
allows the user to get information of Container Status Messages (CSM) of one or 
more containers in a specified time period (historical movements in the ConTraffic 
DB) or in real time from the carrier web site. 
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Figure 11 Tracking screen in ConTraffic 
 
• Container Surveillance is an on-line service that tracks in near real-time the 
movements of specific containers entered in the system by the users. The 
application notifies (by email) the users of any detected new movements of the 
containers they have entered for tracking. 
 
 
Figure 12 Tracking of specific containers in almost real time. 
 
• Port2Port is an application that shows the results of pre-computed statistical 
analysis on the logistic routes followed by carriers to transport containers 
between particular departure and destination ports. The graphs for the pre-
calculated pair or departure-destination ports (of a particular carrier) show which 
logistic routes have been used by the carrier over a period of time and with what 
frequency, identifying any possible outlier (abnormal logistic route). 
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Figure 13 Pre-computed statistical analysis on the logistic routes followed by carriers to transport 
containers 
 
• Visual Analytics is an application that allows the user to interactively explore all 
the data in the ConTraffic database. Visual Analytics allows searching and 
visualising Container Status Messages (CSM) but also other information derived 
from the initial CSM data like the CTI. A Visual Analytics session is normally 
composed by a first selection of the data to be displayed, followed by the 
visualisation of selected data and finally by the interaction with results for further 
refinement of the selection criteria leading to new visualisations. 
 
 
Figure 14 Visual analytics in ConTraffic 
 
Once the selection criteria have been set, the selected information is visualized as a 
geographical map, timelines and text tables. The map shows the spatial distribution of 
the selected information. Symbols are represented at some locations where some 
information has been found. These symbols are usually pie charts representing the 
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information distribution by type. The symbol's size depends on the amount of 
information. Connecting lines represent estimated maritime routes related to the 
selected information. 
 
 
Figure 15 Information selection in ConTraffic 
 
The timeline shows the distribution of the selected information across time. For each 
container, several timelines are shown, depending on the selected information. 
 
Figure 16 TimeLine of a container 
 
6.1.2.3. ConTraffic Pilot Projects 
A number of pilot projects have been initiated based on the ConTraffic IT infrastructure 
and data.  
One of this is the ConTraffic SAD Analysis project. JRC, in collaboration with OLAF and 12 
MS Customs, has been developing an experimental system to provide for automatic 
cross-checking of the origin declared by importers in the SAD datasets, supporting MS 
Customs Authorities in the detection of potentially fraudulent declarations and validation 
of investigative results.  
The SAD Analysis system identifies the cases for which the declared country of origin is 
different from (or not compatible with) the country estimated by using the Container 
Status Messages. The detected fraud is the one of mis-declaration of origin (quota, 
preferential duties, anti-dumping) and not the ones of smuggling, misclassification or 
under-valuation. The results of this pilot project have been used by OLAF to propose the 
amendment of (EC) 515/97. 
Another project is C-ENS. It aims to study the methods that combine container itinerary 
information with Entry Summary Declarations (ENS, advanced cargo information) for the 
real time targeting of high risk containers posing security and safety threats. The project 
is implemented with the participation of 7 customs authorities and under the guidance of 
DG TAXUD. 
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6.1.2.4. Analysis of ConTraffic for the fight against counterfeiting 
In the context of the fight against counterfeiting, ConTraffic can support evidence in 
ongoing investigations by providing an additional source of information. For good results 
in detecting counterfeiting, it needs to be used together with other information such as 
bills-of-lading or customs declarations; ConTraffic does not possess data on the products 
inside containers but only on their routes. 
ConTraffic cannot track individual shipments and can be used only when the goods are 
transported in containers by ocean carriers and the identifiers of the containers carrying 
the goods are known. If this is the case, an investigator can easily explore the ConTraffic 
database and get information like the route followed by the container, the location where 
it was stuffed with goods, the transhipment ports, the handling time for each transport 
phase, the vessels involved, etc… 
 
6.1.3. Standards and standardization activities for Container 
Tracking 
Beyond the ConTraffic project described in the previous sections, there are numerous 
standardization activities and standards related to container tracking, which are 
identified here: 
1. Standard: ASTM D5728-00 Standard Practices for Securement of Cargo in 
Intermodal and Unimodal Surface Transport. These practices are intended to 
serve as a guide to shippers, carriers, and consignees for load planning, loading, 
blocking, and bracing of intermodal and unimodal cargo in surface transport. The 
practices are referenced to a bibliography of information concerning the above. 
Hazardous materials, bulk cargo, non-containerized break bulk in ocean carriage, 
and transport of cargo by air are not included in these practices at this time.  The 
practices are intended to form a framework for the safe and effective loading and 
unloading of cargo in intermodal and unimodal surface transport. This standard 
does not purport to address all of the safety concerns. 
2. Standardization Activity: ISO TC204 Intelligent Transport Systems: security 
intermodal freight, transport of dangerous goods, real time tracking of 
transported goods with RFID, on board computing and mobile communication 
with vehicles. Transport telematics on the worldwide level is being solved mainly 
in the frame of the technical committee ISO TC 204 Intelligent Transport 
Systems. Some of the working groups of the ISO overlap in their activities with 
the working groups of CEN, as shown below. Other working groups do not have a 
European equivalent. Relevant Working Groups for container transportation are: 
o WG1 - Architecture 
o WG3 - TICS database technology 
o WG4 - Automatic vehicle and equipment identification 
o WG7 - General fleet management and commercial/freight 
o WG9 - Integrated transport information, management and control systems 
o WG11 - Route guidance and navigation systems 
3. Standardization Activity: TC 104 Containers. Standardization of freight 
containers, having an external volume of one cubic meter (35.3 cubic feet) and 
greater, as regards terminology, classification, dimensions, specifications, 
handling, test methods and marking. The TC will provide current standards that 
continue to define intermodal freight containers, related equipment and 
technology applicable to the intermodal, containerized movement of freight. 
Specific areas of expertise codified or being codified in TC 104’s series of 
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standards includes design and testing of all types of intermodal freight 
containers, terminology, equipment to secure freight containers to vessels and 
other conveyances, container handling equipment, electronic tagging and 
identification of containers and their contents, electronic and mechanical 
container seals, power line transmission of data relating to electrically powered 
containers such as refrigerated containers, electronic data interchange message 
formats, container markings and container security from a design perspective. 
4. Standardization Activity: ISO TC 8 Maritime. This is the general committee for 
ships and marine technology. In particular, TC 8/SC 11 is the subcomitte for 
intermodal, inland navigation and short sea shipping. 
5. Standard: ISO 9897:1997 Freight containers – Container equipment data 
exchange (CEDEX) – General communication codes 
6. Standard: ISO 17363:2007 Supply chain applications of RFID – Freight containers  
7. Standard: ISO 17363:2007 defines the usage of read/write radio-frequency 
identification technology (RFID) cargo shipment-specific tags on freight 
containers for supply chain management purposes (shipment tags). It defines the 
air-interface communications, a common set of required data structures, and a 
commonly organized set of optional data requirements (through common syntax 
and semantics). 
It contains recommendations about a containerized cargo supply chain RFID system, 
based on shipment tags; specific recommendations about mandatory non-
reprogrammable information on the shipment tag; and specific recommendations about 
optional, re-programmable information on the shipment tag.   
8. Standard: ISO/TS 10891:2009 Freight containers – Radio frequency identification 
(RFID) – Licence plate tag. 
ISO/TS 10891:2009 establishes: 
- a set of requirements for container tags, which allow the transfer of 
information from a container to automatic processing systems by 
electronic means; 
- data coding system for container identification and permanent related 
information which resides within a container tag; 
- data coding system for the electronic transfer of both container 
identification and permanent related information from container tags to 
automatic data processing systems; 
- the description of data to be included in container tags for transmission to 
automatic data processing systems; 
- performance criteria necessary to ensure consistent and reliable operation 
of container tags within the international transportation community; 
- the physical location of container tags on containers; 
- features to inhibit malicious or unintentional alteration and/or deletion of 
the information content of container tags when installed on a freight 
container. 
It is intended to be applicable to freight containers as defined in ISO 668 as well as to 
other containers not defined in ISO 668 and container ancillary equipment such as road 
and terminal chassis, generator sets and power packs. 
9. Standard: An important element of the Container Tracking is the exchange of 
messages among control centers for container tracking. For this function, the 
following standards are used: 
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- ISO 17687: Data dictionary and message sets for electronic identification and 
monitoring of hazardous materials/dangerous goods transportation 
- ISO 24533: Electronic information exchange to facilitate the movement of 
freight and its intermodal transfer 
- ISO 26683: Freight land conveyance content identification and 
communication. 
- ISO 15638: TARV - Telematics Applications for Regulated Commercial Vehicles 
- ISO 17262: AVI / AEI Automatic Vehicle and Equipment Identification – 
Intermodal goods transport numbering and data structures. 
 
6.2. Container seals  
 
6.2.1. Description of the technology 
Container seals technology focuses on maintaining the physical integrity of the closed 
container doors by means of mechanical seals. Every attempt to trespass on the 
container should leave behind evidence on the seal.  
Tamper-indicating seals have been in use for well over 7,000 years and are still widely 
used today for sealing of freight containers. 
We have to distinguish between a seal and lock. Unlike a lock, a seal is not intended to 
delay or discourage unauthorized entry.  Instead, a seal is meant to leave behind 
unambiguous, non-erasable evidence of unauthorized access.  
There are devices, also called “barrier” seals, which are devices that are part lock and 
part seal. Barrier seals have their uses, but the downside is that they may not be 
optimal lock nor the optimal seal for freight containers. 
Container seals are typically affixed to the door end of the freight container. They are 
used to secure the freight container in a manner that provides an indication of tampering 
with the seal if an attempt is made to open the container doors. Different seal types 
provide evidence of tampering in different ways, from scratches or nicks on the body of 
the seal to a deformation of the locking mechanism (from (Bohlman (2005)). 
A container seals based on RFID technology is shown in Figure 17. 
A list of standards for seals is provided here: 
1. ISO/PAS 17712:2006 Freight containers – Mechanical seals  
ISO/PAS 17712:2006 establishes uniform procedures for the classification, acceptance 
and withdrawal of acceptance of mechanical freight container seals. It provides a single 
source of information on mechanical seals which are acceptable for securing freight 
containers in international commerce. 
2. ISO/PAS 17712:2003 
ISO/PAS 17712:2003 establishes uniform procedures for the classification, acceptance, 
and withdrawal of acceptance of mechanical freight container seals. It provides a single 
source of information on mechanical seals which are acceptable for securing freight 
containers in international commerce.  
ISO/PAS 17712:2003 is not applicable to special-purpose seals, such as fibre-optic and 
sophisticated electronic seals. 
3. ISO 18185-2:2007 Freight containers – Electronic seals 
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ISO 18185-2:2007 specifies a freight container seal identification system, with an 
associated system for verifying the accuracy of use, having:  
o a seal status identification system,  
o a battery status indicator; 
o a unique seal identifier including the identification of the manufacturer; 
o a seal (tag) type. 
 
 
Figure 17 An example of container seal based on RFID technology from (Stringa (2010b)) 
 
6.3. Packaging 
Packaging is another technique, which can deter counterfeiting (Ling, 2013). Authentic 
logos, seals, and security printing can be included in packages to help indicate that the 
content and the package are genuine. The analysis on packaging can be similar to what 
already described in section 6.1. Container tracking for the containers obviously on a 
smaller scale. Packaging can be broadly categorized to primary, secondary, and tertiary. 
Primary packaging is the material that wraps or holds the product and is in direct contact 
with the contents. Secondary packaging is outside the primary packaging and is used to 
group primary packages together. In addition to primary packaging and secondary 
packaging, anti-counterfeit labels, seals, barcodes, and EPCs on packages can provide 
additional layers of product protection. Tertiary packaging (e.g., containers) is used for 
bulk handling to make loading and unloading convenient. 
An extensive study on anti-counterfeit packaging technologies is provided in (Dhar, 
2009), which identifies a classification of technologies. Most of the technologies have 
been already identified in the report, but they are applied to packaging in (Dhar, 2009).  
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 (Dhar, 2009) proposes two taxonomies. One is based on Usage Criteria and the other is 
based on technological solutions. 
Taxonomy based on Usage Criteria 
• Overt (Visible) Features. Such features will normally be prominently visible, and 
difficult or expensive to reproduce.  
 
They include:  
- Film wrappers, which is a transparent film with a distinctive design 
wrapped securely around the  package. 
- Shrink seals and bands. Bands or wrappers with a distinctive design are 
shrunk by heat or drying to seal the cap and container union. 
- Breakable caps. Such caps break when an attempt to open it is made. 
 
• Covert (Hidden) Features. The purpose of a covert feature is to enable the brand 
owner to identify counterfeited product. The general public will not be aware of its 
presence nor have the means to verify it. For example, Encrypted text visible 
under special light embedded in the package surface or the package itself. 
 
• C. Forensic Markers, which can be considered a type of covert feature but which 
require more sophisticated means to authenticate the package. 
 
• Track and Trace technologies, which have been already extensively discussed in 
this report and they are described below for packaging. 
 
Taxonomy based on technological solutions 
• Serialization.  Like the use of Bar-codes, QRCode and RFID already described in 
this report but applied over the package. 
• Packaging design, where techniques includes both identification solutions and 
sealing technologies for packages. The identification solutions can be 
implemented with a specific type of paper, a substrate on the surface of the 
package or labels. The labels can be of different types: from holograms labels to 
transfer label or multi-layered labels. The sealing technologies include secure 
packaging tapes or tear tapes/bands or even a liner carton. 
 
For a detailed discussion on the advantage/disadvantages of the different techniques 
applied to packaging, see (Dhar, 2009). 
 
6.4. Analysis on Container tracking, packaging and seals 
technologies for fight against counterfeiting 
 
As described in the previous sections, the main purpose of container tracking and seals 
technologies is to ensure that the goods are safely transported from the point of origin to 
the point of destination, they are not tampered with and no illegal or counterfeited 
products are introduced in the container. 
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The threat of using container to transport counterfeit goods is real as reported in 
(UNODC (2014)), which highlights that evidence gathered from the results of the joint 
UNODC / World  Customs Organization Global Container Control Programme (CCP) on 
the extent of illicit trafficking of counterfeit goods by sea. Between January and 
November 2013, more than one-third of containers stopped for inspection by CCP teams 
worldwide, and subsequently seized, have involved counterfeit goods. 
As described in https://www.unodc.org/ropan/en/BorderControl/container-
control/ccp.html, the Global Container Control Programme can be very effective in 
addressing counterfeiting due to Counterfeit, but it requires inter-agency information 
exchange among the main government agencies (e.g., Customs office) among the world. 
An advantage of container tracking and seals technologies is that they are already 
implemented and deployed for other reasons (e.g., safety of the goods, mitigating 
stealing risks) than fight against counterfeiting. As a consequence, in comparison to 
other approaches, the incremental costs in the fight against Counterfeit are limited and 
mostly related to the exchange of information among the main agencies and data 
centres. 
Beyond tracking, packaging of the goods is a very effective technique against 
counterfeiting when combined with overt/cover features or track and trace techniques, 
which allow the tracing of the good in the supply and distribution chain. The main 
disadvantage of packaging is that goods inside the package can be remove from the 
package and substituted with another good. In this case, sealing could mitigate this risk.    
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7. New Trends and technologies: Analysis of e-
Commerce web sites and Internet of Things 
 
7.1. Techniques for fight against counterfeiting in E-
Commerce 
 
7.1.1. Description of the technique 
In recent time, the counterfeit market has increasingly been going online, where it can 
be easier to trick buyers with slick websites and photographs copied from genuine 
retailers. This is a significant change from the traditional means to distribute counterfeit 
items, which involved shipping companies and retailers, as the counterfeit items can be 
sold directly online. The impact on the fight against counterfeit items can be significant 
because counterfeit goods no longer come in through containers but they are being 
shipped directly to consumers. While the physical ports of entry can be similar and still 
under control of customs officer, the procedures for checking containers or small 
packages can be different. This new trend requires new tools and approaches to detect 
counterfeit items. Various types of products can be bought through mobile e-commerce 
sites including shoes, apparel, luxury, accessories and other design-oriented goods as 
well as medicines and electronic consumer products. While the authentication methods 
described in section 4 can be used to identify counterfeit goods, new approaches must 
be defined. 
As described in the report Situation Report on Counterfeiting in the European Union 
(OHIM, EUROPOL 2015), the distribution of counterfeit products through e-commerce is 
rising.  
We can identify four main e-commerce channels of distribution of counterfeit products 
(OHIM, EUROPOL 2015): 
1. Fake website, which try to emulate the proper websites. Some websites are of 
such high quality and sophistication that they rival (and in some cases are even 
better than) those of the rights holder. The fake website uses similar names or 
similar appearance of the proper web site to cheat the customer (also called 
cyber squatting or domain squatting). 
 
2. Web blogs or social network websites, which sells counterfeit items. The blogs or 
website can be independent or associated with well-known social networks. Even 
if blogs or social networks do not sell directly counterfeit products, people 
commenting on them, can suggest places where they can buy counterfeit 
products. 
 
3. Proper e-commerce retailers including auction sites, which do not control properly 
their distribution and supply chain and sell unknowingly counterfeit products. 
Many cases have been reported of lawsuits against large e-commerce retailers for 
the sale of counterfeit products. 
 
4. A growing area is mobile apps such as Instagram, depop.com and whatsapp. 
Depop is a mobile app that works like eBay but is only available on your phone. 
In some cases, messages are sent directly to people to suggest websites (case 
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1), which offer large discounts off  popular brands. (Disclaimer: these companies 
and web sites are only cited as examples; this report does not suggest in any way 
that these mobile app are responsible for the distribution of counterfeit products). 
 
One essential challenge for the fight against counterfeiting in e-commerce is that many 
authentication techniques are not applicable because the physical good cannot be 
touched or seen directly. Rather an image is provided on the web site, which can be of 
dubious quality or it can be just a copy of an image of the valid product but it is not 
related to physical good (i.e., counterfeit good) actually sold. 
Different approaches are needed to address the identified cases. 
7.1.2. Fake website 
Regarding the problem of fake website, countermeasures are based on the analysis of 
the fake websites through different means: either by simple reporting of consumers, by 
private companies specialized in brand protection, scouting by law enforcement 
organizations (e.g., Interpol, EUROPOL) or by analytical tools. Examples of companies 
specialized in brand protection against e-commerce counterfeiting are BRANDSTRIKE 
(2015) and NETNAMES (2015) 
A very good and successful example of fight against Fake Websites has been “Operation 
In Our Sites”, a joint effort by Europol and US ICE to tackle websites selling counterfeit 
products, has led to the seizure of more than 2 600 domain names since the operation 
started in June 2010 (US ICE 2015) and (OHIM, EUROPOL 2015). 
Another government initiative is from USSTOPFAKES (2015) from the US Government, 
which was launched to serve as a one-stop shop for U.S. government tools and 
resources on intellectual property rights (IPR). The federal agencies behind 
STOPfakes.gov have developed a number of resources to educate and assist businesses, 
particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as consumers, 
government officials, and the general public. One of the main focus areas for 
STOPfakes.gov is the identification of fake web site and general distribution of 
counterfeit items on the web. 
The analysis of the e-commerce web sites and the content provided through the web site 
can be performed through: 
1. Analysis of the features of the e-commerce web site itself to identify malicious 
activities. Examples of features could include the methods of payment (e.g., 
bitcoin instead of traditional credit cards), the presence of fake logos on a web 
site or a similar structure of brand e-commerce web site. In other words, an e-
commerce website selling counterfeit products could be designed to be quite 
similar to a brand e-commerce website to cheat potential customers 
2. An analysis of the images of the products sold online or complementary 
information (e.g., serial numbers).  
 
Regarding the first approach, the analysis could be human-based or machine-based. In 
the first case human-based, the e-commerce web sites are identified on the basis of the 
reports by web users. Reports could be sent to enforcers agencies to notify a suspect 
“web site”. Enforcers themselves could conduct this analysis using more powerful tools 
based on web crawling or statistical analysis. Such analysis can be done by the 
companies owning a brand themselves. For example, UGG Australia has a service 
(http://counterfeit.uggaustralia.com/), where users can detect if another web site is 
selling counterfeit products or not.  Another successful example of identification of web 
sites is based on the usage of special features of the web site, like the payment method. 
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In the ‘follow the money’ approach, EUROPOL has successfully identified a large number 
of websites selling counterfeit products (EUROPOLMONEY 2015). 
For machine-based, various techniques can be used for identifying phony websites. 
Automated detection systems have emerged as a mechanism for combating fake 
websites, however most are fairly simplistic in terms of their fraud cues and detection 
methods employed as described in (Abbasi (2010)). Consequently, existing systems are 
susceptible to the myriad of obfuscation tactics used by fraudsters, resulting in highly 
ineffective fake website detection performance.  
 
The following main techniques for machine-based approach can be used: 
1. Lookup mechanisms try to identify phony websites by looking up to blacklists 
comprised of uniform resource locators (URLs) taken from member-reporting 
databases maintained by online trading communities. Note that the reliance by 
these systems on people’s reports makes them reactive by nature: by the time 
fake websites are added to the blacklist, many users have already been exposed 
to them (Chou et al. 2004). 
2. Classifier systems detect fake websites based on the appearance of fraud cues in 
website content and/or domain registration information.  Many fraud cues or 
simply features of the web site can be used to classify and detect fake website: 
specific sentences are often used in web sites, grammar errors or typos, lengthier 
URLs, and ones with dashes or digits are also common in fake websites. Fake e-
commerce websites also copy company logos from the websites they are 
mimicking. The main challenges for classifier systems are the choices of the 
features and the fact that fake websites can be periodically be updated and made 
more sophisticated, so that the previous techniques are not valid any longer in a 
subsequence check. More sophisticated analysis techniques based on statistical 
learning or statistical classifiers can also be used (Abbasi (2010)), but again the 
choice of the features is essential to decrease the rate of false alarms. Another 
approach used for fake medical web sites is described in (Abbasi (2012)), where 
an adaptive learning algorithm called recursive trust labeling (RTL) was used. RTL 
uses underlying content and graph-based classifiers, coupled with a recursive 
labeling mechanism, for enhanced detection of fake medical Web sites. 
 
The greatest issues of the human based approaches is that a) they require considerable 
resources to collect and analyse the reports and investigate manually the reported web 
sites and b) they are able to control only a portion of the web sites in the market.  In 
addition, the reports should be kept confidential to avoid image impacts to rightful e-
commerce web sites.  
The greatest issue for machine-based approach is the high percentage of false alarms 
and the fact that fake e-commerce web sites continuously evolve and become more 
sophisticated so it become a race between designer of fake web sites and analysis tools 
to identify them. 
Probably, the most effective way forward would be a combination of the human-based or 
machine-based approaches, where machine-based techniques use the detected and 
recorded web site to build a database of statistical significant features, which can be 
used to identify additional fake web sites. There are various examples of systems, which 
use a combined approach. For example, (CTECH 2015) uses an approach based on 
images provided by customers. Another example is (NETNAMES 2015). 
Another important weapon is increased awareness for customers. A detailed and updated 
list of specific features of web sites and counterfeit products (e.g., low quality logos) sold 
on the web can be quite useful to inform customers of the potential presence of 
counterfeit products. See 
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http://www.stopfakes.gov/sites/default/files/Consumer_Tips.pdf for an example of the 
awareness tool, which can be proposed. 
7.1.3. Web blogs or social network websites 
Similar techniques to what described in the Fake Websites can be used. In addition, 
another teqnique can be based on the analysis of the level of trust of social network 
websites, where a low level of trust can indicate a social network website, which is 
involved in non-compliant practices. A study on the application of trust model in social 
networks is provided in (Guo, 2011). While, this technique is still very much in a 
research phase, the possibility of quantifying with a level of trust a specific fake site 
could be helpful to differentiate social networks websites. Trust can be built using 
different features or metrics of the website like number of positive or negative 
feedbacks, items on sale, type of information provided and associations to other social 
network websites. In other words, if a social network is not associated to a trusted 
association or web site (e.g., an alternative medicine blog is not associated to a medical 
foundation or an university), this can suggest that the social network website is not to 
be trusted or trusted to a limited level.  
7.1.4. Proper e-commerce retailers including auction sites 
In this case, the previous techniques used for the fake web site or the social network 
website selling counterfeit items do not apply because the e-commerce web site is a 
valid one. What is required in this case is a greater control on the supply chain and the 
relationships with supplier and rights holders to avoid that counterfeit goods enters in 
the distribution chain. 
The role of Due Diligence and Responsible Supply Chain Management for the fight 
against counterfeiting and IPR infringement has been evaluated in (EC 2015) where e-
commerce is a specific scenario.  
Due Diligence techniques applied to e-commerce can be classified in three main areas: 
1. Definition of Traceability policies, which have the objective of identifying the 
history, distribution, location and application of products, parts and materials, to 
ensure the reliability of sustainability claims. By implementing traceability of the 
goods, the e-commerce company can mitigate the risk of counterfeiting goods 
entering in the chain by preventing their entry or by identifying them when a 
notification of counterfeit good has been created. 
2. Design of policies with suppliers to implement control and collaboration with their 
suppliers in order to identify root-causes and take corrective actions whenever a 
violation is identified. Such policies can include service level agreements between 
the e-commerce companies and the suppliers. Integration and alignment between 
the company and its supply chain is important for sharing responsibilities, 
information and risks, for setting goals, for exchanging feedbacks on performance 
and for laying the foundations of risks prevention. A transparent and open 
communication is part and parcel of such collaborative approach. 
3. Communication channels with the right holders of the goods. The right holders 
can establish procedures to notify the e-commerce platforms, which offers of sale 
concern counterfeit products or which sellers are offering counterfeit products for 
sale. In this case, the e-commerce platforms must set-up information channels to 
the right holders.  In one direction, the right holders shall report to the e-
commerce platform the presence of counterfeit goods on their web-sites. In the 
other direction, the e-commerce platforms will notify the right-holders on the 
successful removal of counterfeit goods.  
In addition, another information channel is from the consumers themselves to the e-
commerce platforms. Consumer complaints on the received counterfeit goods can be 
forwarded to the rights holders from the e-commerce platforms. Many e-commerce 
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platforms have usually implemented this technique (e.g., see (EBAY 2015)). A 
communication channel should also be established from the ecommerce platform and the 
rights holder. In this channel the ecommerce platform informs the rights holder of sellers 
who go over a predefined sales level in a given period. The rights holder can then be 
given the opportunity to confirm whether the products being sold are genuine or fake. 
 
7.1.5. Analysis of the detection of non-trustable e-Commerce web 
sites selling counterfeit goods 
In the e-commerce word, many authentication techniques based on the visual inspection 
of the analysis of the physical features of the good cannot be applied by the consumer 
because the web site only provides an image and description of the good, which may not 
even related to the good itself. Other techniques must be identified. In the previous 
section, we have identified three main sub-cases of the counterfeiting problem in e-
commerce. Each sub-case may require the application of different techniques. For proper 
e-commerce platforms and web site, the risk of counterfeiting products can be mitigated 
by Due Diligence and Responsible supply chain management processes to increase the 
control on the supply chain and the relationships with the supplier. In some cases, such 
practices are already being defined by the main e-commerce company. In the cases of 
faked web-sites, various techniques are available from the simple reporting by 
customers or law enforcers to sophisticated analysis algorithms based on the features of 
the fake web site. While some of these algorithms are still in the research domain, some 
private companies have started to implement them in the market. The third sub-case of 
social networks is more recent and more challenging because such web sites are more 
difficult to identify. Even if techniques based on trust have been described in research 
literature, their applicability in the market is limited at the moment.  
 
7.2. Application of Internet of Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 
 
7.2.1. Description of the technique 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a concept being increasingly supported by various 
stakeholders and market forces. The idea is to connect various devices or objects 
(“things”) through wireless and wired connections and unique addressing schemes  and 
create a pervasive environment where a person can interact at any time with the digital 
world and physical world.  IoT technologies are heavily dependent on the clear 
identification of the “thing” or on the possibility to acquire information on the 
environment and other objects through sensors. With these two capabilities, IoT can 
become a  new technique for tracing and tracking goods in supply chains, as well as 
verifying product authenticity. 
The capability of IoT to improve track and trace for fight against counterfeiting has also 
been recently highlighted in (MICROSOFT 2014), where it was said that IoT can improve 
product serialization to help companies protecting their brand by making counterfeiting 
very difficult. Another example is from the Johnny & Walker company for the tracking of 
bottles (see (Walker 2015)). 
As described in (Li (2013)), IoT can be considered as an applicable new technique for 
tracing and tracking goods in supply chains, as well as verifying product authenticity. 
The advantage of the pervasive connectivity of IoT may mitigate the risk of imitating 
product series numbers or phony packaging, because the authentication information 
associated to a RFID or bar-code could be checked to a remote server. 
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In (Xu, L. (2011b)), the author describes the application and the role of new 
technologies like service-oriented architecture (SOA), RFID, agent, workflow 
management, and the Internet of Things (IoT) to enable real-time quality management 
and control in the supply chain. The paper attempts to analyse the current state of the 
art in information management for supply chain quality management, reviewing the 
current research and development in information architecture for supply chain quality 
management, and highlighting some of the key technologies that have the potential to 
significantly improve the performance of supply chain quality management. 
Unfortunately, a cost/benefit analysis is missing in the paper. 
Another example is provided in (Li et al (2102), which describe the integration of 
wireless networks with cloud infrastructure. The implementation of algorithms and 
databases to collect the data collected in the field (e.g., RFID or barcode) could deployed 
in cloud infrastructures, which have more capable processing capabilities than a mobile 
device. A cost/benefit is also missing in this paper but it is highlighted that the 
development of new applications (e.g., against Counterfeit) could be implemented and 
deployed as an add-on on existing infrastructures rather than creating a new 
infrastructure.  
7.2.2. Analysis on the Application of Internet of Things (IoT) to 
fight against counterfeiting 
The concept of IoT is a natural extension of existing ICT technologies with greater 
wireless connectivity, remote server capabilities (e.g., cloud computing), improved track 
and trace granularity and so on. From this point of view, existing anti-counterfeiting 
technologies (e.g., Track and Trace) can exploit new IoT technologies. In other words, 
IoT is not going to be revolutionary approach to the fight against counterfeiting but 
rather an evolutionary approach. 
While the concepts of IoT for fight against counterfeiting has many promises, there are 
not many products in the market at this moment. This is sign that related products are 
still at an early stage. 
Finally, because the application of IoT to the fight against Counterfeit is a concept strictly 
related to the Empowerment of the customer, when the customer is capable to access 
IoT products and services, we refer to section 12. Empowering the Consumer for a follow 
up of the analysis (including cost/benefits considerations). 
 
7.3. Correlation of data from difference elements/sources 
 
7.3.1. Description of the technique 
In this category, we have all the solutions where data is correlated from different 
sources to identify a counterfeit product. One example is the correlation from different 
points of a supply chain as described in Dada et al., (2008), where counterfeits are 
detected in an RFID enabled supply chain using proximity information of items that can 
be gathered. In a similar way, data from different parts of the supply chain can be 
analysed using data mining technologies as described in (Lee (2013)), where supply 
chain patterns from trace records and a classification algorithm is used to identify the 
potential introduction of counterfeit products. 
The use of analytics tools to fight against counterfeiting by aggregating different types of 
data has been also proposed by the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator 
2013. Joint Strategic Plan On Intellectual  Property Enforcement in USIPEC (2013). 
In a similar way, the authors in Pouwan et al, (2005) show how businesses can protect 
their products from counterfeiting by using a secure mobile track and trace system, 
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which will allow their stakeholders to authenticate the products in real time through a 
web enabled mobile camera phone. 
 
7.3.2. Analysis on correlation of data from difference 
elements/sources  
The techniques of correlating data from different sources could be quite effective 
especially, when it is used in combination with track and trace systems. Analytical tools 
can detect anomalies in the supply chain and report them. From this point of view, 
analytical tools can be also complement Responsible Supply Chain Management (RSCM) 
responsibility because they can implement checks that the RSCM “controls in place” are 
effectively working. 
 
The costs associated to the analytical tools are related to the implementation of the 
collection and processing of data from different sources. Collection points must be set in 
specific points of the supply and distribution chains. The collection points must be also 
periodically audited to ensure that there are no errors or failures. The implementation of 
the analytical tools also require domain knowledge of the supply chain and the type of 
products. 
 
The collection of data can be executed with different technologies (e.g., RFID, SMS, Bar 
Code, QR Code, see section on 5. Track and trace techniques). As a consequence, an 
additional cost is the parsing and harmonization of the data coming from different 
sources and different formats. 
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8. Organizational and procedural aspects and techniques 
 
The aim of this section is to discuss the organization and processes aspects for the 
application and deployment of the authentication technologies. 
Technologies can be effective only if they are applied correctly with organization 
frameworks both existing or to be defined. As described in (Chaudhry (2009)), a multi-
pronged approach is needed. For example, existing approaches on supply chain 
management already existing in the company can be complemented by authentication 
technologies at critical points of the supply chain.  
Here we identify the main organizational and processes, which can be used together with 
authentication/track trace techniques or on their own. 
8.1. Due Diligence and Supply Chain Management 
Responsibility  
Due diligence practices are another powerful tool to mitigate risk of counterfeiting or IPR 
infringement. Due diligence practices for the relationships with second or third tier 
suppliers can prevent the introduction of counterfeit products in the supply chain of the 
main manufacturers/producers. In another area, due diligence can also mitigate the risk 
of counterfeit products due to overproduction where sub-contracting manufacturers 
produce and sell components in addition to the ones requested by the main company. 
Organizational aspects are also important in the effectiveness of solutions for fight 
against counterfeiting based on track and trace and the involvement of the end-users, 
which can be a law enforcer or a generic consumer (see also section 12. Empowering the 
Consumer).  If the supply chain of the producer is a closed-loop, the tracking data of a 
product will not be available outside the producer context. As a consequence, a 
consumer would not be able to use it to determine the authenticity of a product. Then, a 
recommendation would be to provide open-loop supply chain or implement a system 
(e.g., gateway) to distribute the tracking data to the end-users. 
Additional details on the application of Due Diligence and Supply Chain Management 
Responsibility procedures to fight against counterfeiting and IPR infringement is provided 
in technical report (EC 2015), which also provides recommendation on the application of 
such procedures. 
8.2. Informing consumers/Awareness 
As described in (Wilcock 2013), consumers are not very educated about the 
ramifications associated with counterfeiting (L. Lipkus, personal communication, 2012). 
Even if they are aware of the potential consequences of buying counterfeit products both 
from a financial impact on the society and from a safety point of view (e.g., fake 
medicines), the economic drivers (e.g., cheaper fake products than the real ones) are 
very strong as reported in (PWC 2013). Education programs that address the varied 
motivations of consumers need to be developed and appropriately disseminated. For 
example, while it is known that low income consumers purchase counterfeit products 
because of price incentives, this information may be insufficient to define an anti-
counterfeiting strategy. Anti-counterfeiting programs need to emphasize quality and 
safety and reinforce the value of the authentic product. They should be tailored to the 
country for which they are designed in order to address specific beliefs and ethical norms 
prevalent within the society. 
Additional consumer-based strategies should also be considered. Since satisfied 
consumers are more resistant to changing their subsequent behaviour, legitimate 
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businesses may consider offering consumers incentives that strengthen the relationship 
not only with the product but also with the firm itself. 
8.3. Harmonization of customs procedure 
Customs procedures in different parts of the world may share a common approach but 
the specific procedures are different. Considering that counterfeiting is global problem, 
the harmonization of customs procedures could enhance the fight against counterfeiting. 
The process for harmonization of the customs procedures started already many years 
ago with the Kyoto Convention, adopted in 1973, revised in 1999 and entered into force 
in February 2006. The World Customs Organization is actively working in this area with 
the definition of the SAFE Framework of Standards, whose objectives include the 
strengthening of networking arrangements between customs administrations to improve 
their capability to detect high-risk consignments (like counterfeit products). 
8.4. Establishing notification channels for end-users 
Another powerful technique to mitigate counterfeiting is to establish notification channels 
from end-users, which can notify the brand-owner, the manufacturer or the distributor 
on the presence of counterfeit products. One example is the complaint channel, where 
complaints can also be used to notify the reception of counterfeit items (see (EBAY 
(2015)). 
There are also web-sites either privately or publicly funded where a consumer can report 
a counterfeit items or a web site. An example of private funded web site is TLAND 
(2015), where on the Timberland website, consumer can report counterfeit Timberland 
products. An example of a public funded (US government) is USSTOPFAKES (2015), 
where consumers can report both counterfeit products and counterfeit web sites. 
One issue with the notification by consumer is that consumer themselves may not have 
strong drivers to notify counterfeit products because of the fear that they will be fined or 
exposed. Special incentives could be applied to drive the consumer to report on 
counterfeit goods. An example is the uFaker application UFAKER (2015), which allows a 
consumer to report fake products in exchange for online discounts. These reports are 
then entered into a database, which companies can mine to determine where to target 
their investigations. 
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9. Government and Private Initiatives 
 
The aim of this section is to provide a brief description of the main government and 
private (association of companies) initiatives for the fight against counterfeiting and IPR 
infringement. The list is not exhaustive as many countries around the world have 
programs to fight against counterfeiting. 
 
9.1. World Customs Organization and IPM Connected 
IPM Connected by the WCO is one of the largest and most effective implementation of 
technical means to fight against counterfeiting. 
In 2014, IPM connected had around 80 countries and 8000 customs officers 
organizations connected to the application.  
As described in (WCO 2015), IPM addresses two main goals: 
1. the possibility to use mobile devices to scan barcodes found on millions of 
products 
2. the possibility to interface IPM with authentication and traceability solutions 
companies. 
 
IPM connected can be quite useful for customs officers. Custom officers scan the barcode 
on a product and if the product is secured by a track&trace or authentication solution, 
IPM automatically launches the application, allowing them to instantly verify the 
authenticity of the product. 
The main authentication technology currently used by IPM Connected is the checking of 
the barcode. From the initial version available through a fixed computer (e.g.,) (IPMv1), 
a new application on mobile devices was made available in 2013 ((IPMv2). A third 
version of IPM connected (IPV3) does not only allow Customs officers to control physical 
products but does also  provide them with enhanced traceability of  the international 
supply  chains. The scanned barcode is sent to a remote server, which provides back 
information on the product itself to  identify genuine from fake products: technical 
description, image and video, examples of genuine/fake, packaging information, routes, 
previous cases and right holder’s contact details. 
The application allows searching of products on the basis of names or other information. 
The Custom officer requests are geo-tagged to provide the location where the customs 
officer request and the potential identification of a fake product is executed. An 
important feature of IPM connect is the capability to access routes taken by genuine 
products to distinguish them from fake products. In addition, IPM connect can provide 
examples of counterfeits or packaging information like images of counterfeit products to 
support the customs officer in the identification of counterfeit goods. 
Additional details are in (WCO 2015). 
 
9.2. Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy 
(BASCAP) 
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In 2004, ICC launched the Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) 
to combat product counterfeiting and copyright piracy worldwide. 
The goal of BASCAP was to bring firms together to pursue a more unified approach to 
combating counterfeiting and piracy. Its efforts include the creation of platforms for 
exchanging information on the counterfeiting and piracy situation in different economies 
and sectors, and for sharing information on effective brand protection techniques. 
Research projects have been funded to investigate effective methods to fight against 
counterfeiting in different nations. BASCAP produced a very relevant global survey on 
counterfeiting and piracy in 2007 (BASCAP 2007), which revealed that industry efforts 
have mainly focused on initiatives to develop technologies to combat infringement and 
that resources have also been directed to aiding enforcement and improvising 
awareness, but to a lesser extent.  
A more recent report (BASCAP 2015) has highlighted the important development in the 
counterfeit phenomenon in the world. Key findings of the report are: 
• The growing important of Online marketplaces. For physical items, counterfeiters 
infiltrate both large and small commercial exchanges on e-commerce sites. In 
blurring the distinction between real and fake products, they succeed in selling 
staggering quantities of infringing items. 
• Deploy technologies, such as tracking and tracing, where possible, to complement 
monitoring and compliance efforts, basing them on open standards to ensure 
interoperability between systems and to avoid fragmentation across companies, 
sectors and countries. 
• Support the deployment of Due Diligence schemes with suppliers to have a better 
control on the supply chain and avoid the inflow of counterfeit products. 
• Improve tracking in container shipping. 
 
9.3. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a multinational treaty for the purpose of 
establishing international standards for intellectual property rights enforcement. ACTA 
includes articles on Enforcement Practices, International Cooperation, Civil Enforcement 
and Border Measures.  
Some aspects of ACTA have been criticized and it has been rejected by the European 
Parliament in 2012 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20120703IPR48247/html/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA). 
 
9.4. Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) 
and European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual 
Property Rights. 
 
The European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights is a network 
of experts and specialist stakeholders, whose objectives are to (from OHIM (2015)): 
• Provide evidence-based contributions and data to enable EU policymakers to 
shape effective IP enforcement policies and to support innovation and creativity 
• Provide data, tools and databases to support the fight against IP infringement 
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• Provide knowledge and learning programmes for IP and enforcement authorities 
as well as for businesses and IP practitioners 
• Develop initiatives to help innovators, creators and businesses (especially SMEs) 
protect their IP rights 
• Design campaigns to raise awareness of the value of IP and the negative 
consequences of IP infringement 
 
The Observatory is coordinated by the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(OHIM), which has the task to promote and manage Community Trade Marks and 
Community Designs within the European Union. It carries out registration procedures for 
titles to EU industrial property and keeps public registers of these titles. It shares with 
the courts in Member States of the European Union the task of pronouncing judgment on 
requests for invalidation of registered titles. 
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10. Comparison Matrix  
 
10.1. Introduction 
The purpose of the comparison matrixes is to show how the different techniques can be 
used in the different domains. 
10.2. Metrics 
The following evaluation metrics will be used to compare the different technologies 
against the use cases. The evaluation metrics are all positive to facilitate the analysis in 
the comparison matrixes. 
1. Technical simplicity: This metric is used to determine the complexity of the 
technical solutions from the point of view of design and deployment. For 
example, a bar code is simpler than a sophisticated covert token. The 
antonym of complexity is used in the matrix to have a positive evaluation 
metric. 
2. Field Identification. This metric is used to evaluate how complex is to 
identification of the goods in the field. It is measured as a positive metric, 
which means that an higher value means a low level of complexity and cost of 
the identification device/facility or laboratory. For example a bar code has an 
high value of field identification while a sophisticated technique like X-Ray, 
which requires an expensive forensics lab has a low value of field 
identification. This metric is used to identify the techniques, which can support 
the empowerment of the consumer. 
3. Accuracy. This metric is used to evaluate the accuracy of the technology to 
detect a counterfeited product. For example, how FTIR can be accurate to 
detected counterfeited textiles. Note that accuracy could be impacted by the 
risk of clonability. If the authentication information can be easily cloned, this 
will produce a low score for accuracy. 
4. Impact to the good (opposite of destructiveness): This metric is used to 
indicate when a test is destructive: if the good under inspection will be 
destructed after the test. 
5. Economic efficiency: This metric is used to evaluate the cost of 
implementing and deploying the technology. For example, spectroscopy could 
be quite accurate and effective but it may very expensive to apply. The 
antonym of cost is used in the matrix to have a positive evaluation metric. 
6. Extendibility: This metric is used to evaluate the future extendibility of the 
technology. For example, if RFID technology can be enhanced in the future to 
support dynamic re-configurability. This metric is opposed to technological 
obsolescence. 
7. Adaptability to organizations and existing processes: This metric is used 
to evaluate the impact of the option to organizations and existing process. For 
example, if the adoption of the new technology requires the implementation 
of new complex processes, this could be a negative factor. 
8. Market support. This metric is used to evaluate the market support by the 
stakeholders. A technology can have benefits but it may not be adopted by 
the market if it is mostly a proprietary solution or too complex or costly to 
implement and deploy. 
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9. Level of Training. This metric is used to evaluate the level of training 
needed. It is measured as a positive metric. An higher value means a low 
level of training. 
10. Technical maturity. This metric is used to evaluate the maturity of a specific 
technique. Some techniques like RFID are already well adopted in the market 
while other are still in the research phase. 
 
The metrics are positive, which means that a technique with higher value is more 
feasible for a specific domain. 
10.3. Comparison Matrixes 
In the comparison matrixes a value from 1 to 5 is used to evaluate the relevance of the 
metric, with 5 the highest value and 1 the lowest value. In the evaluation, we do not use 
No-Go options with the meaning that even a low score does not preclude its use in a 
specific domain. 
Note that the single techniques are evaluated. The combination of different techniques 
can be more effective than a single techniques. For specific cases, this evaluation can be 
executed in a second phase. 
 Description 
1 This is the lowest score. This indicates that the proposed technique is not 
really applicable or feasible. For example, the cost or the technical 
complexity of implementing a specific solutions is very high.  
2 This score indicates that the proposed technique supports the metric in a 
very limited way. For example, market support is weak (e.g., very few 
products) but present, which could mean that we are in the early phase of 
technological adoption. 
3 This score indicates that the technique under analysis partially satisfies the 
metric. For example, the technique is valid but counterfeiters have already 
identified new sophisticated means to cheat the technique. 
4 This score indicates that the technique under analysis satisfies the metric 
to an high degree. For example, the technique is very cost effective. 
5 This score indicates that the technique under analysis satisfies the metric 
to an excellent degree. For example, the accuracy of identification a fake 
good is extremely high on a statistical basis (e.g., 99 %). 
Figure 18 Values for the evaluation of the techniques 
A value of 0 means that the technique is not applicable. For example, unintentional radio 
frequency emissions does not apply to textiles, which do not generate radio frequency 
emissions. 
 
10.3.1. Evaluation Matrix  
The following link in this section points to the excel file, which the evaluation matrix of 
the different techniques. 
The evaluation matrix is a qualitative analysis, with the objective to provide hints on the 
feasibility of a technique in a specific domain. The analysis is based on feedback from 
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experts in the fields, manufacturers of anti-counterfeiting solutions and the references 
used in this report. New products coming into the market or new technological 
evolutions could alter some of the values in the matrixes in the short and medium term. 
The following link points put to the excel file containing the analysis, which will open if 
you read the report as word file.  
If you read the report as a PDF file, the analysis is also provided in Annex 1 as a list of 
separate tables for each domain. 
analysis_technique_
v7.xlsx   
  
 
88
 
 
11. Forecasting new threats for fight against 
counterfeiting 
 
In this section, we describe future potential threats in the fight against counterfeiting. As 
described in the rest of the report, fight against the production and distribution of 
counterfeit products is often a never-ending battle between companies developing anti-
counterfeit technologies and the counterfeiter themselves.  
We identify the following threats: 
• 3-D printing 
One example of new technologies, which could support the counterfeiting phenomenon is 
3D printing as described in (WIRED 2015). The article claims that the “threat of a major 
surge in counterfeiting based on the availability of relatively cheap 3D printers, 
increasingly sophisticated printing materials, and a never-ending supply of CAD designs 
available on the Internet will fuel an enormous black market in counterfeit parts” Along 
the same lines, a recent report by Gartner Group speculates that intellectual property 
loss due to 3D printer counterfeiting could total $100 billion by 2018 (see (Gartner 
2013)). 
• Higher medicine costs 
In recent times, new medicines with a very high price tag like SOVALDI for the 
treatment of Hepatitis C or Kalideko from VERTEX for the treatment of Cystic Fibrosis 
has been launched in the market. These drugs are just two examples of medicines for 
life-threatening diseases, other medicines will come in the near future. The potential for 
the creation and distribution of counterfeit medicines is greater when the price of the 
medicines is very high. 
• Malicious software in electronic components and device 
Most of the anti-counterfeiting techniques are focused on detecting the counterfeit good 
form a physical point of view (e.g., an hardware component). A new threat highlighted in 
(MIL (2015)) is when malicious software is inserted in an electronic component or device 
(e.g., a sensor). The hardware component of the electronic component or device is not 
counterfeit but it may be a legitimate refurbished component (and sold in this category) 
where malicious software is applied. In this case, the application of the overt or covert 
tag would not help, because it only identifies the hardware component rather than the 
software, which is compromised. 
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12. Empowering the Consumer 
 
12.1. Introduction 
 
This section is used to provide an overview of the main concepts of “empowering the 
consumer”. A full detailed description of the concept is not in the scope of this report, 
but it is the main objective of a subsequent report, which will use the analysis of this 
report to select the main techniques, which can be used to empower the consumer in the 
detection and identification of counterfeit items. 
The concept of “empowering the consumer” is not new. The need to empower the 
consumer to make informed choices in the market has been already presented by 
various sources including (EC 2011) even if the focus was not on the fight against 
counterfeiting but more on the detection of frauds or the protection of the customers. In 
addition, the ISO Strategic Plan 2011-2015 ISO (2015), recognizes that the advice and 
involvement of consumer stakeholders is essential to ISOʼs overall performance and 
success. 
With the term empowering the individual we mean all the possible procedural and 
technical tools that can be available to the average buyer to protect himself from 
acquiring counterfeit products or to mitigate this threat.  The empowerment ranges from 
simply avoiding being deceived and suffering economic loss to safeguarding the 
individual from health and life risks. These tools are not limited to a specific category. In 
fact, we claim that the term consumer can be used in a wider sense for the fight against 
counterfeiting. 
Regarding the authentication techniques, empowerment of the consumer is focused on 
the detection phase rather than the forensic phase. In other words, the objective is to 
empower the consumer to detect counterfeit items through easy accessible tools and 
equipment (e.g., like a smartphone). 
We can identify the following categories of customers: 
1. The generic citizen, who wants to buy a good and would like to be empowered to 
understand if the good is counterfeit before the purchase. 
2. The law enforcer (like the custom officer), who must detect counterfeit goods 
entering the border. 
3. The brand-owner to detect the distribution in the market of counterfeit items. 
4. Retailers/distributors which want to detect counterfeit items entering in their 
supply chain. 
5. Enterprise, which want to buy supply material for their own business. 
6. Companies which want to detect counterfeit items entering in their supply chain. 
 
The description of techniques and the means to empower the consumer could also be of 
interest to other categories like regulators, consumers associations. 
Under this perspective, several complementary approach directions can be followed and 
implemented; those approaches (and techniques) can be generally classified in “soft” 
and “hard”. 
Normally in the soft cluster fall the following approaches: 
• Campaigns of awareness on the risks derived from the use of Counterfeit 
goods (especially effective when the target of the campaign is related to 
Counterfeit drugs, health devices or in general every good which, could in 
an explicit way put in danger the health of the consumer). 
• Informative Campaigns on “visual detection” of Counterfeit goods, i.e. 
campaigns aiming at coaching the consumer in identifying by visual 
inspection the indicators which might raise some doubts on the 
authenticity of the good 
• Create official specialized web sites that expose the methods and the 
associated risks from Counterfeit and counterfeit products  
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• Promote the use of serial numbers, barcodes, holograms and other marks 
to the public. 
 
While easy to implement, soft approaches have obviously limited efficacy when the 
Counterfeit good is of high quality. 
In this case, the detection of counterfeit products requires a certain level of expertise, 
dedicated devices and infrastructures. Those techniques fall into the so called “hard” 
cluster. 
In the past only a very limited number of consumers had access to the needed expertise 
and resources to use hard techniques.  
Today, the large diffusion of smart-phones/tables with powerful features (described 
below) paves the way to new anti-counterfeit detection techniques having the potential 
of the most sophisticated hard techniques, while guaranteeing at the same time a low 
cost accessibility and high usability to the citizen. 
As a consequence, the focus of the empowerment of the consumer is the application of 
easy- accessible low cost or consumer devices (like a smartphone) or portable devices 
(for law enforcer), which can be used to detect counterfeit items. 
While, these techniques were still considered in the research domain until few years, the 
lowering of the cost of technological components and the increased power of consumer 
devices have fostered the development of many applications for empowering the 
consumer. 
A description of the approach for empowering the consumer is presented in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19 Empowering the individual 
 
According to this vision, the centre of the new technologies to empower the citizen would 
be the smart-phone, as it can be considered today the natural technological everyday 
companion of the end-user. As such it will act as field sensor (to detect optical features, 
read RFID tags, geo-location etc.), telecommunication gateway (to obtain real-time 
information on the object or to allow direct interactions between the object and a remote 
verification system) and notification system (to provide information to the track and 
trace supply chain system) 
A common smartphone is equipped today with: 
1. An high resolution camera, which can be used to collect images of a good or both 
overt and covert tags, 
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2. A very powerful processing and computing platform, which is able to process 
sophisticated algorithms. 
3. NFC readers, which can be used to read NFC tags. 
4. Other sensors like magnetometers/GNSS receiver and so on. 
5. Wireless connectivity through a variety of standards like Cellular networks, WiFi 
and so on, which can be used to connect applications or remote data servers. 
6. Web browsers to access web sites. 
7. Short Message Services (SMS) or Multimedia Message Services (MMS) (and 
future messaging systems as well) 
In addition, specific add-ons, which did not exist or whose price was prohibitive until 5-
10 years ago are now affordable. One example are USB Analogic Digital Converter (ADC) 
which cost now in the range of 10-20 Euros and which can be used to authenticate 
goods on the basis of their radio frequency emissions (see 4.8.  Application of Radio 
Frequency emissions for fight against counterfeiting). The USB Visual The Augmentation 
system described in 4.4. Augmented Visual inspection is another example of another 
add-on, which can be linked/connected to a laptop/tablet or smartphone. 
At the same time (as described in the previous sections of this report), anti-
counterfeiting technologies, which required sophisticated laboratories and expensive 
equipment, are now available on portable readers and systems. 
As described in the beginning of this introduction, the aim of this section is only to 
provide the main concepts and some examples of empowering the consumer, while a 
subsequent report will present in detail the main techniques and processes, which can be 
put in place. 
 
12.2. Literature survey 
 
In the following we present a short-list of technical directions the scientific community is 
exploring. 
• Anti- Counterfeit  based on Short Message Service (SMS) messages (Wang (2009)): 
this technique is based on the use by the citizen of SMS to query a producer database 
and to verify the authenticity of an object.  
• Simple RFID data acquisition and online verification as from (Yan and Huang (2008)): 
use of different RFID tag approaches, acquisition through NFC compliant mobile 
phones and online verification 
• Mobile track & trace systems based on QR and Bar codes as from (Lei et al. (2005)): 
family of techniques exploiting the presence of cameras on mobile phones to acquire 
QR and Bar codes and verify online their meaning/origin 
• Anti-Counterfeit using reflective micro-structures as described in (Babu et al. (2010)). 
The concept revolves around the use of random distribution of reflective 
microstructures as PUF. The particles are embedded into product’s surface or in the 
document. These particles are invisible to naked eye, the verification is done by 
imaging the reflections from these micro structures with a camera enabled cellphone 
equipped with some add-on optics. 
• Community based reputation systems for anti-Counterfeit as described in (Reischach 
et al. (2007)): this line of work does not concentrate its attention on the mean by 
which detect a Counterfeit object, but on the possible ways to exploit the social 
network capabilities to create awareness among consumers on the presence in certain 
markets of Counterfeit objects. In (Reischach et al. (2007)) the authors present a 
system based on the use of RFID, a remote database system and smartphones for 
reading RFID data. The system is described as a “consumer-driven approach for 
product authentication”, as it is based on the idea that consumers can, by scanning 
the RFID code, upload data about products that they discover to be counterfeited and 
the shop where they found them for the benefit of other consumers. On the other 
hand, savvy consumers can consult the database for information on counterfeits about 
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a product they are interested in. Although technically feasible and easy to implement, 
authors do not discuss issues related to the practical implications and ownership of 
implementing such a system. 
A preliminary analysis of the literature shows how the use of mobile technologies in the 
anti-Counterfeit field is still at its early stage. Several technical problems needs still to be 
solved, from the protection of the identifying element (e.g. the RFID, the identification 
code, the PUF), to the definition of secure acquisition protocols (optical, radio-frequency 
based etc.), to the use of the data gathered (to identify Counterfeit objects, to identify 
malicious sellers, to disseminate awareness among consumers etc.). 
Moreover, in this context we remark at the moment the lack of directives for industrial 
producers and other stakeholders to provide online methods for authenticity checking, 
which should facilitate the development and wide adoption of the techniques just 
described. 
Along these lines, (Bilcare 2015) also underlines the potential for new smart devices to 
support fight against counterfeiting.  
 
12.3. Scenarios for empowerment the consumers 
 
We can identify two initial scenarios for the empowerment of the consumer: 
1. Empowerment based on track and trace information (e.g., a barcode) 
2. Empowerment based on authentication of the good on the basis of images of the 
good  
3)  
Each of these solutions has different associated implementation and deployment costs, 
which need to be split among the main elements of the solution: 
1. Backend system 
2. Database of the matching information (e.g., track and trace or fingerprinting for 
goods identifications) 
3. Mobile applications 
4. Management of the system 
 
12.3.1. Empowerment based on track and trace information  
In the first scenario, the track and trace information present on the good or the package 
containing the good can be checked by the consumer using the smartphone, which is 
connected to a remote server. The tracking information can be of different types as 
described in the section 5. Track and trace techniques: serial numbers, barcodes, QR 
code, overt and covert token containing an identification id, RFID and so on. Through a 
smartphone or another similar device, the consumer can read the track and trace 
information and send it remotely to a server, when it is compared and checked against a 
reference library.  
This scenario already exists and tools to support the user in the validation of a good on 
the basis of the identification number stored in the token are already proposed by 
various companies. , the collection and analysis of track and trace information from the 
mobile device of an user has been proposed by various companies One example is the 
SICPATRACE system (SICPA 2015) already presented in the previous sections, which can 
be used by a generic user or a retailed to check the validity of a good. Another well know 
example is the IPM Connected program from WCO described in section 9. Government 
and Private Initiatives.  An example based on RFID/NFC is from FINNCODE (2015).  We 
can conclude that this technique is quite mature and it is a primary candidate for 
empowering the consumer in the fight against counterfeiting. 
From a business/cost point of view the empowerment must be built on an existing 
infrastructure as the library of the good identifiers must be built by the manufacturers or 
the retailers. Then, the empowerment is mostly an extension of existing and already 
deployed track and trace infrastructures. This means that the business costs can be very 
high or very low on the basis of the presence of the existing track and trace 
  
 
93
infrastructures. The approach of using the same track and trace infrastructure already 
developed by the manufacturers and retailers for the end-users as well is also proposed 
by NXP3, one of the largest manufactures of RFID. 
Even if an existing supply chain infrastructure is already present, the tracking and 
tracing data may not be available to the consumer or to an application to empower the 
consumer. In this case, we have to distinguish between close-loop track and trace supply 
chains. A closed-loop supply chain is where the manufacturer, retailer and distributor are 
the same entity and the tracked goods are controlled by the same business entity (either 
directly or indirectly). An open-loop supply chain is instead where the tracked goods can 
be distributed to different business entities, each of them equipped with its own back-
end. This difference is quite relevant to support the empowerment concept because in 
the closed-loop, the ICT infrastructure is not designed to share information on the 
tracked goods with external  entities. In the open-loop, the extension to the end-user is 
relatively straightforward and the associated costs are similar to the implementation of 
an android application, connected to a remote backend infrastructure (e.g., a cloud 
infrastructure), which can range from tens of thousands of euros to hundreds of 
thousands of euros.  
Another aspect to be considered for the development of an empowerment solution is 
related to information sharing among the different back-end systems, which store the 
tracking information on the goods. The back-end systems should be capable of 
exchanging information with similar data formats. In addition, security and access 
control solutions should be developed to protect sensitive data but also to guarantee 
access to the end-users or the empowerment back-end systems, which are responsible 
for matching the information collected by the end-users. All these factors contribute to 
the overall cost of the empowerment solution. 
To conclude, it is not possible a-priori to provide a generic cost for the 
implementation/development of an empowerment solutions based on track and trace 
systems. We can identify the following main drivers for implementation costs: 
1. Open Loop against Closed Loop supply chain. If the empowerment solution must 
be built on a closed loop chain, this will require extensive and costly modifications 
to the supply chain. This is not the case of an open-loop chain, which is designed 
to support different entities. 
2. Integration of back-end system from the data format point of view. The back-end 
systems used to support the supply chain should be interoperable and use a 
similar data format (e.g., based on an OASIS standard). 
3. Access control. The access to data of the track and trace supply chain should be 
regulated but also able to support the empowerment solution. 
4. Design and implementation of the mobile device application. This cost is relatively 
minor in the case of track and trace based on simple overt and covert techniques 
because an application on a smartphone can implement that. 
 
12.3.2. Collection and analysis of images of the object to be 
authenticated 
In this solution, the user collects an image of the object to be authenticated and use 
algorithms to provide an estimate that the image is related to a valid (non-counterfeit) 
good. 
An example of this solution has been announced recently by NEC in (PCWORLD, 2014). 
The electronics maker NEC has developed an authentication system that compares 
images taken with a phone with those in a cloud-based database. Images of the 
authentic product from the manufacturer would need to be registered beforehand. As 
described in the report, this can be applied to the retail sector or any other good, which 
can be identified through augmented visual inspection. 
                                           
3 http://www.nxp.com/applications/rf-identification/fmcg.html#design-considerations 
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NEC notified that the technology is currently in the testing phase and the firm plans to 
release a commercial version in 2015. 
The article points out that "object fingerprint authentication technology" is the first such 
system in the world that can identify individual objects, according to the company.  
The know-how makes use of fine patterns in the grain of metal or plastic that occur 
naturally during manufacturing and are invisible to the human eye. 
The system can be used to find pirated goods, to trace the origin and distribution 
through the marketplace of authentic goods and to manage components in industrial 
applications such as maintenance and repair work, making sure they're being used 
correctly. 
This is an example of the technical and commercial feasibility of the empowerment 
application at least based on images. 
In comparison to the solution 1), the effort (in terms of development of the solution) can 
be much larger for the following reasons: 
 
1. Existing track and trace infrastructures cannot be reused for this solution, which 
is based on the identification of images of the goods. In most cases, a new 
infrastructure must be put in place. In the example of NEC, a Cloud infrastructure 
must be put in place to store the fingerprints of the existing goods. 
 
2. There may be a large variety of goods, where we need to collect the fingerprints, 
which are used for pattern matching. The collection of fingerprints can be quite 
complex and effort-consuming because the good should be photographed in 
various positions and angles. In addition, a retail or apparel manufacturer can 
produce different types of products at different time, so the database must be 
continuously updated. 
 
3. The delivery of images from the mobile phone must be supported by high speed 
wireless connection. The high speed is needed because the higher the quality of 
the images and the higher the accuracy of the algorithm. While, this may not be 
a problem in the future, there are still many areas today, which provide limited 
data connectivity. 
 
An additional issue of this solution is that techniques of pattern matching based on the 
images of dress and apparel can lead to false alarms due to damages in the fabric of the 
good, different light conditions and so on. There is an extensive literature on pattern 
matching of images, which identify the main challenges for accurate identification. See 
for example (Rytter, W. (2000)). 
To conclude, we can identify the main drivers for the implementation and deployment 
cost of this solution: 
1. Remote database. A back-end database (e.g., Cloud Computing) should be 
created with all the fingerprint of the goods to be checked for Counterfeiting. 
2. Implementation of the algorithms: Sophisticated algorithms for pattern matching 
should be implemented. The algorithms should be optimized for the type of good. 
3. Fingerprints collection: Fingerprints should be collected for each type of good 
produced by a manufacturer. 
4. Cameras with adequate resolution: mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) of the 
user should be equipped with cameras with adequate resolution to support the 
image validation. This should not be a problem in the future, as the level of 
resolution of the camera in commercial smartphone is increasing. 
5. Data connectivity. User should have access to high speed wireless data link to 
support the upload of images to the central cloud. Note that existing wireless 
communication standards are usually asymmetric: the uplink capacity is usually 
less than the downlink capacity for business reasons as the majority of the traffic 
is usually in the downlink direction. 
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12.3.2. Conclusions on Analysis on empowerment for fight against 
Counterfeiting 
 
In table, we provide a comparison of the three techniques from the cost, maturity and 
complexity point of view: 
 
Table 2 Comparison of the techniques to empower the consumer 
Technique Cost in the back-
End/Infrastructure 
Cost for the user Maturity 
Collection of track 
and trace 
information  
Low if the solution is 
based on an 
extension of an 
existing open-loop 
RFID track and trace 
infrastructure 
Medium if the 
solution is based on 
an extension of an 
existing closed-loop 
RFID track and trace 
infrastructure 
Very high is a new 
RFID track and trace 
infrastructure must 
be created.  
Low, because RFID 
readers are widely 
available and they 
can be easily 
installed in mobile 
devices. Needed 
data connectivity is 
limited. 
High, because  
solutions are 
already available. 
Collection and 
analysis of images 
of the object to be 
authenticated 
Medium-High 
because 
infrastructures are 
not developed yet. 
On the other side of 
the coin, there is 
only data collection 
point to be created 
in the manufacturing 
process. 
Low because most 
of the mobile 
devices have a 
camera with high 
resolutions (more 
than 5 MPixel). 
Data connectivity 
should be 
available. 
Medium. NEC has 
announced a 
solution available 
to customers in 
2016. (PC World, 
(2014)). 
 
12.3. Privacy aspects 
 
This section addresses the problem of the privacy of the individual. The technologies 
used to identify a good could also become a privacy risk because tracking information of 
the good can be captured and processed. For example, and active RFID on a package 
containing medicines for diabetes could be read from a distance. In another case, the 
RFID information on a luxury bag could be read from a distance, exposing the owner or 
carrier of the bag to the risk of theft. Various techniques to mitigate privacy risks and 
they are described in the JRC report (JRC 2012), which analysed in detail the privacy 
risks associated to the use of RFID and the potential countermeasures. Here we focus on 
RFID because most of the other track and trace technologies do not use radio frequency 
emissions and the collection of tracking data must be implemented at a visual distance. 
Then, the owner of the good is obviously aware that somebody is trying to collect the 
identifier information. 
Another privacy risks related to empowerment the consumer is that the consumer 
(through the application in the smartphone) must transmit the identifier information to a 
remote server on the good, s(he) want to check. Transmitted data can include the 
identifier of the consumer, which is considered personal data. On the other side of the 
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coin, it can be claimed that the consumer is willingly providing this information and has 
provided his/her informed consent to the use of such data to support the fight against 
counterfeiting. Another approach could be to limit or remove the personal data used in 
the validation of the good. In other words, the personal data sent to the remote server 
could be made anonymous or pseudonyms could be used. After all, the application for 
empowering the user is designed to identify and validate the good rather than the 
consumer.  
To summarize, the dangers of privacy risks in “empowering the consumer” are limited 
either because the consumer has provided an informed consent or because privacy 
mitigation technologies could be put in place 
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13. Recommendations 
In this section, we identify recommendations, which are based on the analysis of this 
report and the feedback from experts. 
1. Due Diligence and Responsible Supply Chain Management techniques can be 
quite helpful to mitigate the risk of production and distribution of counterfeit 
items both for manufacturers and retailers. In particular, these techniques can be 
applied to large e-commerce companies to ensure that the products sold on their 
web-sites are not counterfeit. The organizational and financial costs for the 
application of Due Diligence and Responsible Supply Chain Management 
techniques to small companies must be carefully evaluated. 
Recommendation 1) The application of Due Diligence and Responsible Supply 
Chain Management to e-commerce distribution should be further analysed and 
the definition of a suitable regulatory framework should be supported. 
2. The evolution of technologies for forensic analysis has considerably decreased the 
costs of tools and equipment to implement and deploy these technologies. In this 
context, many techniques previously available only in the forensic labs can be 
implemented in cost-effective portable equipment which can be used by law 
enforcers or even generic citizens.  
Recommendation 2) The application of techniques for forensic analysis to 
empower law enforcers or even the generic citizen in the field in the fight against 
counterfeiting should be supported in collaboration with industry and 
standardization bodies. 
3. The capabilities of consumer equipment like smartphones has greatly increased in 
recent times. The availability of wireless connectivity and high resolutions 
cameras can be used to support the fight against counterfeiting even by the 
generic citizen. Awareness on counterfeit products can be made accessible to the 
citizen through a smartphone. On the other side there are no standardization 
activities in this area even if there are a number of proprietary solutions 
appearing in the market. 
Recommendation 3) Standardization activities for the usage of consumer 
equipment like smartphones for fight against counterfeiting (including awareness) 
should be supported. 
4. The technology landscape for fight against counterfeiting is quite fragmented and 
many private and proprietary solutions are available on the market. There is the 
need for a knowledge management database to be maintained and frequently 
updated as new solutions appear in the market. Ideally, this knowledge base 
should be defined at European level to harmonize the efforts for the fight against 
counterfeiting at European level. In addition, the knowledge management 
database should be linked to the techniques for empowering the consumer. 
Recommendation 4) A knowledge management database should be put in place 
at European level. The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) 
and Observatory could be quite suitable to this goal. 
5. As can be seen in the report, there is a huge range of possible technologies to 
fight against counterfeit of goods manufactured in various domains, ranging from 
the very simple to the highly complex, from zero cost to highly secure against 
compromise. The wide range of options adds to the potential security by diluting 
the advantage gained by a counterfeiter in defeating any one system. In addition, 
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brand owners are legally liable for authenticating their products. Therefore, brand 
owners should keep being the ones who select the technologies to apply on their 
products, and make this choice wisely for optimum security gain against 
counterfeiting. 
Recommendation 5) Regulatory frameworks or guidelines should be put in 
place to support brand owners in their choice of selecting the best techniques for 
fight against counterfeiting.  
6. To support the authentication of the goods in the market, manufacturers and 
retailers should include authentication technology in the product design, 
manufacturing and distribution processes. On the other side, the cost of 
implementing authentication technology can be quite high and it can different 
depending on the type of good and sectors (e.g., automotive, pharmaceutical). A 
cost/benefit analysis may be needed to this purpose. 
Recommendation 6) A cost/benefit analysis should be implemented for the 
deployment of authentication technology in the product design, manufacturing 
and distribution processes in different market sectors. 
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14. Conclusions 
Counterfeiting and IPR infringement is a very complex problem, which negatively 
impacts not only businesses (through loss or revenues by brand owners) but also the 
health and the safety of the citizens (e.g., due to counterfeit medicines).  
As described in the scope section, this report does not aim to address the main reasons 
of counterfeiting but to describe the current or potential techniques, which can be 
applied to mitigate the counterfeiting 
Counterfeit products impact many different domains and one of the main challenges for 
drafting a survey in anti-counterfeiting techniques like this report is that different 
domains may require different techniques or that a specific technique valid in one 
domain requires adaption to be applied in another domain. Another challenge is that the 
landscape of anti-counterfeiting technologies is continuously evolving. Innovative anti-
counterfeiting products and technologies appear in the market but the level of 
sophistication of counterfeit items also increases. A recent development is the 
distribution of counterfeit goods through the world wide web and e-commerce, which 
poses new challenges to law enforcers, customer and brand-owners. This report tried to 
address these developments from a high level point of view and provide a reference 
framework based on an extensive bibliography. 
We believe that the reduction in price of consumer equipment, their increasing power 
and the ubiquitous connectivity can empower the consumer (where consumer is a wide 
category of stakeholders) to fight against counterfeiting in a more effective way than 
today. This topic is briefly presented in this report, but it will be the main objective of a 
subsequent report.   
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Table 3 Evaluation for Fast Moving Consumers Goods 
 
 
Fast moving 
Consumer 
Goods
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FTIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-Ray Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-ray fluorescence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5
Container seals 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
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Table 4 Evaluation for Textiles 
 
 
TEXTILES
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 3 5
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 5 2 3 3 4 3 3 4
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
FTIR 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-Ray Inspection 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-ray fluorescence 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 3
Container seals 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 3
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 3 3
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3
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Table 5 Evaluation for Luxury Goods 
 
Luxury Goods
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 5 1 3 3 4 3 3 4
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 3 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
FTIR 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-Ray Inspection 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-ray fluorescence 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 3
Container seals 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 3
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 3 3
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3
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Sporting Goods
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 4 4 5 3 3 3 4 4 3 4
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 3 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
FTIR 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-Ray Inspection 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-ray fluorescence 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 3
Container seals 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 3
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 3 3
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3
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Table 6 Evaluation for Electronics/Semiconductors 
 
 
Electronics-
Semiconductors
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 3 3 2 5 5 4 4 4 2 4
Augmented Visual inspection 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 4 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 3
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 3 3 4 2 2 3 4 3 3 3
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 3 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 2 3
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 3 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 2 3
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 4 2 3 4 3 2 4
FTIR 2 2 3 4 2 3 4 3 2 4
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 3 2 4
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 2 1 5 2 3 3 3 3 1 4
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 2 1 5 2 3 3 3 3 1 4
X-Ray Inspection 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 4 1 4
X-ray fluorescence 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 4 1 4
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 4 1 4
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 2 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 2 1 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 2
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 3 2 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1
Electrical Inspection 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Chemical Inspection 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
Path Delay 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3
Authentication based on DNA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests (SAM) 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 4 3 4
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 4 3 4
Other overt technologies 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 3 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 3
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 3
Container seals 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 4 3 4
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 3 3 2 4 3 3 4 3 3 3
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3
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Table 7 Evaluation for Smartphone/Tablets 
 
Smartphone/Ta
blets
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 3
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 3 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 2 3
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 4 3 4
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
FTIR 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-Ray Inspection 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
X-ray fluorescence 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3
Electrical Inspection 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4
Chemical Inspection 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
Path Delay 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3
Authentication based on DNA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests (SAM) 3 2 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 3
Container seals 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 3
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 3 3
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3
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Table 8 Evaluation for Food 
 
Food
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FTIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-Ray Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-ray fluorescence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5
Container seals 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
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Table 9 Evaluation for Medicines 
 
Medicines
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 3 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 5
FTIR 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 5
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 5
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
X-Ray Inspection 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4
X-ray fluorescence 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5
Container seals 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
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Table 10 Evaluation for Medical Devices 
 
Medical Devices
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 3
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 5
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FTIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-Ray Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-ray fluorescence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 3 2 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 3 2 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2
Electrical Inspection 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Chemical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Path Delay 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3
Authentication based on DNA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests (SAM) 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 3 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 3
Container seals 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 3 5 3 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 3
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 3 4
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 4 3 5 4 3 3 3 3 3
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3
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Table 11 Evaluation for Agricultural products 
 
 
Agricoltural products
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on electromagnetic 
spectrum emissions
Visual inspection with no augmentation 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Chemical reaction for visual inspection 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4
Statistical analysis of images of the good (object 
recognition) 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in the good 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FTIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) in 
combination with electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-Ray Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-ray fluorescence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on artefacts generated 
internally by the good
Statistical analysis of images produced by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio samples produced by 
the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts generated 
internally by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Authentication based on Weight and Structural 
Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on Acoustics tests 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging and sealing
Container tracking 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5
Container seals 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: Analysis of e-
Commerce web sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against counterfeiting in E-
Commerce 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Application of Internet of Things (IoT) to fight 
against counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from difference 
elements/sources 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Organizational and processes aspects and 
techniques
Due Diligence and Supply Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4
Informing consumers/Awareness 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Harmonization of customs procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
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Table 12 Evaluation for Agrichemicals 
 
Agrichemicals
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to the 
good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 4 4 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4
FTIR 3 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 3 4
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-Ray Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-ray fluorescence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 4
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5
Container seals 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
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Table 13 Evaluation for Crops and Plants 
 
Crops and Plants
Technical 
simplicity
Field 
Identification  Accuracy
Impact to 
the good
 Economic 
efficiency Extendibility
Adaptability 
to 
organizations 
and existing 
processes
Market 
support
Level of 
Training
 Technical 
maturity
Authentication based on 
electromagnetic spectrum 
emissions
Visual inspection with no 
augmentation 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3
Augmented Visual inspection 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
Chemical reaction for visual 
inspection 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Statistical analysis of images 
of the good (object 
recognition) 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Visual Identifiers inserted in 
the good 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Analysis of Radio Frequency 
emissions
Radio Frequency Identifier 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Unintentional Radio 
Frequency emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Radio Frequency Emission 
while transmitting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Physical Unclonable Functions 
(PUF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Induced emissions
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FTIR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning Electron Microscopy 
(SEM) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) in combination with 
electron dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-Ray Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X-ray fluorescence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Energy-dispersive X-ray 
spectroscopy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
artefacts generated internally 
by the good
Statistical analysis of images 
produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of audio 
samples produced by the good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical analysis of artefacts 
generated internally by the 
good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electrical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chemical Inspection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on 
Weight and Structural Tests
Thermogravimetric Analysis 
(TGA) 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Path Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Authentication based on DNA 3 2 5 3 3 3 3 4 3 4
Authentication based on 
Acoustics tests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track and trace technologies
Numeric Identifier/ One 
dimension-Bar Code 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
QR code and other two 
dimensional bar codes 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Other overt technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Other Covert technologies 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
Radio Frequency Identifier 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 5
Container tracking, packaging 
and sealing
Container tracking 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5
Container seals 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5
Packaging 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
New Trends and technologies: 
Analysis of e-Commerce web 
sites and Internet of Things
Techniques for fight against 
counterfeiting in E-Commerce 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
Application of Internet of 
Things (IoT) to fight against 
counterfeiting 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3
Correlation of data from 
difference elements/sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Organizational and processes 
aspects and techniques
Due Diligence and Supply 
Chain Management 
Responsibility 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4
Informing 
consumers/Awareness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Harmonization of customs 
procedure 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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List of abbreviations and definitions  
Glossary 
ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
BASCAP Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy 
CCP Customs Organization Global Container Control 
Programme (CCP)  
COAs Certificate Of Authenticity (COAs) 
COAs Privilege Management Infrastructure (COAs)  
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
EDS Electron Dispersive Spectroscopy 
EPC EPC (electronic product code).  
FMCG Fast Moving Consumer Goods 
FTIR Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
GTIN Global Trade Identification Number 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
OHIM Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
IC Integrated Circuits 
IoT Internet of Things (IoT) 
IP Intellectual Property 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
NFC Near Field Communication 
NIR Near-infrared spectroscopy 
PUF Physical Unclonable Function 
QR Code Quick Response Code 
PET Privacy Enhancing Technlogy 
RFID Radio Frequency Identifier 
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SAM Scanning Acoustic Microscopy 
SEM Scanning Electron Microscopy 
TGA Thermogravimetric Analysis 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
UV Ultra-Violet 
WCO World Customs Organization 
WHO World Health Organization 
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Definitions 
 
  
authentication 
tool 
set of hardware and/or software system(s) that is part of an 
anticounterfeiting solution and is used to control of the authentication 
element 
(From ISO 12931:2012) 
covert 
authentication 
element 
Authentication element which is hidden from the human senses until the 
use of a tool by an informed person reveals it to their senses or else 
allows automated interpretation of the element 
(From ISO 12931:2012) 
counterfeit 
(verb) 
to simulate, reproduce or modify a material good or its packaging 
without authorization 
(From ISO 12931:2012) 
counterfeit 
good 
material good imitating or copying an authentic material good 
(From ISO 12931:2012) 
counterfeiting Counterfeiting  and  piracy  are  terms  used  to  describe  a  range  of  
illicit  activities linked to intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement.  
(Source OECD) 
counterfeit 
trademark 
goods 
goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark 
which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such 
goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from 
such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of 
the trademark in question under the law of the country of importation 
(From The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) 
forensic 
analysis 
 
scientific methodology for authenticating material goods by confirming 
an authentication element or an intrinsic 
attribute through the use of specialised equipment by a skilled expert 
with special knowledge 
(From ISO 12931:2012) 
overt 
authentication 
element 
Authentication element which is detectable and verifiable by one or more 
of the human senses without resource to a tool (other than everyday 
tools which correct imperfect human senses, such as spectacles or 
hearing aids) 
(From ISO 12931:2012) 
rights holder 
 
physical person or legal entity either holding or authorised to use one or 
more intellectual property rights 
(From ISO 12931:2012) 
technique Technique is a technology and/or a process or both, which can be used 
in the fight against the production and distribution of counterfeit 
products. 
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track and 
trace 
 
Means of identifying every individual material good or lot(s) or batch in 
order to know where it has been (track) and where it is (trace) in the 
supply chain. 
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